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Abstract 
 
 
Socially anxious individuals have been reported to display negative interpretive biases 
towards self-relevant information, particularly for contexts where external information is 
deemed ambiguous. Despite relatively consistent findings for group differences relative to 
non-anxious controls, previous studies have not compared responses to ambiguous and 
unambiguous contexts simultaneously. The present study examined the differential effects of 
positive, negative and ambiguous feedback on affective experience and cognitive appraisals in 
a group of socially anxious individuals and non-anxious controls. Following participation in a 
three-minute impromptu speech task, all participants were provided with standardised 
feedback after a delay of one week, before being informed that they would participate in a 
second speech task, which did not actually occur. Results showed that ambiguous feedback 
was interpreted to be moderately positive by both groups and led to congruent changes in 
cognitive re-appraisals for the clinical group, but not for controls. Socially anxious individuals 
who received positive feedback, however, exhibited continued change on cognitive outcomes 
post-feedback, with significant reductions in performance appraisal and perceived ability. 
These results are discussed in relation to current cognitive models of Social Anxiety Disorder 
as well as the availability of distinct self-presentations elicited by external feedback about 
performance. Treatment implications and directions for future research are also explored. 
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Overview 
 
The present research attempted to investigate the effects of positive, negative and ambiguous 
feedback following a speech task for re-appraisals made for a second speech task. Chapter 1 
provides a broad literature review of Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) and interpretation of 
ambiguity and positive outcomes within clinical populations. Chapter 2 contains a 
systematic review of all studies to date pertaining to the interpretation of ambiguity in SAD. 
Chapter 3 outlines the aims of the current study and provides a description of methodology, 
results and discussion of the results obtained. Chapter 4 provides a broader discussion of the 
current study, encompassing results, strengths and limitations and proposes directions for 
future research in the area of ambiguity and feedback in SAD. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
  1.1 Social Anxiety Disorder: Definitions and Diagnosis 
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) is characterised by a marked and persistent fear or 
anxiety about a single or multiple situations where there is potential for scrutiny by others 
(American Psychiatric Association [DSM-5], 2013). Some examples of situations which may 
induce anxiety for an individual include social interactions (e.g., meeting unfamiliar people, 
having a conversation), being observed by others (e.g., whilst eating or drinking), and 
performance situations (e.g., giving a speech in front of an audience). The anxiety 
experienced across such situations is accompanied by worries of not performing satisfactorily 
and that anxiety symptoms will be observable and result in negative evaluation from others. 
The onset of anxiety is often immediate but can also be delayed for in some cases. In 
addition, a range of cognitive processes occur during and following the event such as 
increased self- focus, hypervigilance to threat and negative rumination. Understandably, 
these difficulties often lead to the avoidance of feared situations or are endured with 
significant anxiety and distress. Physiological symptoms may also be present such as 
increases in heart rate, muscle tension or tremors. Whilst the experience of anxiety in socio-
evaluative situations is not uncommon for individuals in the general population across time, 
individuals who are diagnosed with SAD experience significant distress or impairment in 
social, occupation, or other important areas in their life as a consequence of the disorder 
(APA, 2013). 
 
  1.1.1 Changes in the diagnosis of SAD in DSM-5 
Diagnosis of SAD according with DSM-IV (APA, 2000) states that individuals must 
recognise their fear in social situations to be excessive or unreasonable. However, DSM-5 
states that individuals should instead view their fear to be disproportionate to the actual 
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danger or threat in the situation taking into consideration cultural and other environmental 
factors. This change has occurred due to the tendency for individuals with such disorders to 
overestimate the actual level of threat in feared situations (American Psychiatric Association 
[APA], 2013). 
A small change has also been made in relation to the duration of symptoms present, 
which is now a minimum of six months for all individuals whereas it had previously been 
limited to those over the age of 18 in the DSM-IV-TR. The purpose of this change was to 
minimise over-diagnosis of transient fears (APA, 2013). In addition, specification of whether 
social fears are generalised or specific is no longer required according to DSM-5. 
 
1.1.2 Epidemiology 
 
According to a large national health survey in Australia, SAD was reported to be a 
highly prevalent and co-morbid psychological disorder, with 12-month prevalence rates of 
2.3% (Lampe, Slade, Issakidis, & Andrews, 2003) and a life-time prevalence rate of 12.1% 
(Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005). Across Western countries, estimates of lifetime 
prevalence of SAD range from 7% to 13% (Furmark, 2002) with a larger proportion of 
females meeting criteria for SAD compared to males. Rapee (1995), however, reported a 
greater proportion of men diagnosed with SAD in clinical samples, which may be due the 
reports of greater interference to functioning. Comorbid diagnoses of anxiety, mood and 
substance use disorders are common in individuals diagnosed with SAD (Rapee & Barlow, 
1990; Hunt & Andrews, 1995). Rates of comorbidity up to 62.9% have been reported by 
Ruscio and colleagues (2008) for individuals who have met criteria for at least another 
psychological disorder. 
Reports from clinical populations indicate that the age of onset is typically during the 
mid-teens, with the majority of individuals reporting onset before adulthood, with a mean age 
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of 10-13 years (Nelson et al., 2000). The severity of the disorder appears to be associated with 
an earlier onset. Overall, reported cases of onset in adulthood are rare (approximately 0.5% 
rate of incidence) and often found to be secondary to other disorders such as panic disorder or 
unipolar mood disorders (Neufeld, Swartz, Nienvenu, Eaton, & Cai, 1999). 
 
1.1.3 Aetiology 
 
The development of SAD in individuals may be influenced by a number of different 
intrapersonal variables and their interaction with external environments. Ollendick and 
Hirshfeld-Becker (2004) hypothesised that a biological predisposition, temperament, parental 
influences, conditioning events and peer relationships are all important factors which may 
contribute to the onset of SAD. In isolation, each of these factors are insufficient, rather, the 
interaction of these various factors as well as timing and circumstance will determine both the 
onset and trajectory of this disorder with additional cognitive processes serving as 
maintaining factors. Longitudinal studies demonstrate persistence of SAD is common and is 
associated with symptom severity, avoidance, lack of treatment seeking and comorbid mood 
disorders (Blanco, Xu, Schneier, Okuda, Liu, & Heimberg, 2011). 
 
1.2 Cognitive models of Social Anxiety Disorder 
 
The focus of cognitive models of social anxiety (Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Beck, 
Emery & Greenberg, 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Hofmann, 
2007) is primarily on the interactions between cognitive processes and associated affective, 
physiological and behavioural consequences (e.g., avoidance) which play a role in 
maintenance of the disorder. The central supposition of these models is that socially anxious 
individuals are overly concerned with evaluation and hold unrealistic and rigid beliefs about 
the standards to which others hold them to.  
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Earlier cognitive models of SAD (e.g., Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985) have 
primarily influenced current conceptualisations by establishing that dysfunctional belief 
systems (schemas) form the basis of the model proposed by Beck and colleagues (1985), 
which are believed to exert a strong influence on cognitive processes by distorting 
perception, attention and memory for self-relevant events. Schemas are thought to speed up 
the processing of salient information and retrieval of stored experiences (or meanings 
derived from these experiences) to make sense of current situations, and as such, may serve 
an adaptive function in some instances.  
 
1.2.1 Clark and Wells, (1995) 
 
Standard cognitive behavioural treatments typically target the core maintaining features 
of SAD as outlined within the cognitive models. For example, Clark and Wells’ (1995) model 
begins with the assumption that individuals with SAD hold a number of dysfunctional beliefs 
about themselves (e.g., I am boring, I am no good) and the environment (e.g., others judge 
harshly) which are activated in socio-evaluative situations leading to the behavioural, somatic 
and cognitive symptoms associated with the disorder (See Figure 1). 
These beliefs may have arisen from a combination of personality traits, formative 
experiences and interactions with significant others which are particularly salient. High 
standards for social performance are adopted by the individual as a way of compensating for 
perceived failures and to prevent the possibility of unsuccessful interactions in the future. 
These standards may take the form of conditional beliefs (e.g., “If I am funny all the time, 
they will like me”, or “If I make a mistake during my speech, everyone will notice and think 
that I am bad at my job”). 
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Figure 1. Clark and Wells’ (1995) Cognitive model of SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995, p. 72). 
 
Clark and Wells (1995) emphasise that socially anxious individuals make self-
appraisals as if one was observing the self, that is, processing the self as a ‘social object’ 
rather than implementing resources to complete a task or pay attention to external cues. This 
vantage point may result in increased self-monitoring, equating internal cues to visible signs 
of anxiety and be accompanied by negative mental imagery. These processes in themselves 
are perceived to be a source of threat that coincides with continued self-monitoring to gauge 
their performance. Internal cues are consequently more salient and encourage increased self- 
focused attention, rendering resources inadequate to process external cues which can provide 
corrective information to disconfirm negative self-appraisals during the situation. In addition, 
self-focused attention may distract one’s focus from the task at hand and lead to objective 
deficits in performance. This could then influence the behaviours of perceived audience 
members or interaction partners, leading to a less successful outcome, which verifies negative 
self-views and reinforces pre-existing schemas  
Despite the presence of different kinds of cues within one’s immediate environment, 
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social interactions often provide an unclear context which requires interpretation to resolve 
ambiguity. The resolution of ambiguous cues is also observed in cognitive processes which 
occur following a socio-evaluative situation and takes the form of a ‘post-mortem’ in which 
details of the situation are scrutinised and ‘resolved’, often in a way that maintains symptoms 
and exacerbates anticipatory anxiety for future situations. Post-event rumination can often 
lead to more negative self-appraisals over time, increase avoidance behaviours and reliance 
on safety behaviours. Avoiding feared situations and use of safety behaviours obstructs 
access to corrective information and only maintains dysfunctional beliefs. Safety behaviours 
such as avoiding eye contact and repetitive use of well-practiced phrases during 
conversations can also have a significant impact on the responses of interaction partners 
(e.g., less friendly, less likely to be interested) which confirms negative self-appraisals and 
maintains anxiety. 
 
1.2.2 Rapee and Heimberg (1997) 
 
The Rapee and Heimberg model (see Figure 2) makes a number of similar assumptions 
to that of Clark and Wells (1995) but places emphasis on the discrepancy between perceived 
ability and perceived standards leading to anxiety and associated behavioural and 
physiological outcomes. 
Rapee and Heimberg (1997) focus on the notion that socially anxious individuals view 
others as inherently critical, yet view positive evaluations from others as being of paramount 
importance. When placed in a socio-evaluative situation, a mental representation of one’s 
external appearance and behaviour as believed to be seen by the audience is formed. This 
mental representation of one’s appearance and behaviour is derived from various sources 
including stored memories of past experiences, internal bodily cues (e.g., somatic symptoms) 
and external cues in the environment (e.g., feedback). At the same time, attention is directed 
to sources of potential threat in the environment. 
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The most salient aspects of the projected self-image and potential sources of negative 
evaluation (including ambiguous cues) are also the focus of selective attention. Furthermore, 
a prediction is made about the expected standard for performance and accompanied by an 
estimation of one’s current performance or the resources available to meet the perceived 
standard. A judgment is then made about whether or not one is adequately meeting perceived 
audience standards and a large discrepancy between ability and standards determines the 
degree to which anxiety is experienced and informs perceptions of the likelihood of negative 
evaluation. This experience of anxiety and ‘looming’ perceptions of negative evaluation is 
accompanied by behavioural and physiological consequences. This information is then fed 
back into the mental representation of the self and the process reiterates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.Factors which contribute to the onset and maintenance of anxiety in social and evaluative 
situations (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997, p.743).  
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1.2.3 Schlenker and Leary, (1982) 
 
This model shares similar features to that of Rapee and Heimberg (1997) and 
emphasises that anxiety arises when individuals are motivated to make a favourable 
impression but believe that they are unable to do so. This failure in impression management 
is then believed to result in negative evaluation from subjectively important observers. A 
basic assumption of the model rests on the idea that as social creatures, one would prefer to 
leave a positive impression rather than a negative one, with the exception of some situations 
where desirable outcomes follow from leaving a negative impression (e.g., realising that the 
job you’re interviewing for is not one you want). Regardless of the nature of the desired 
impression, the model posits that if one is highly motivated to leave a particular impression 
but is not confident of one’s ability to do so, anxiety will result. 
The model allows for different permutations of the two variables of expectations 
(standards) and confidence in one’s ability, of which their interaction may or may not lead to 
anxiety. For example, individuals who are not motivated to create a particular impression on 
others should not be concerned about evaluations and hence do not experience anxiety. 
Similarly, individuals who are concerned about making a particular impression but who are 
confident in their ability to do so would also not feel anxious. Such situations, however, are 
presumably infrequently reported by socially anxious individuals, for example, they may be 
motivated to leave a particular impression but are unsure about how to do so (i.e., novel or 
ambiguous situations mean that audience standards are unclear). Another possibility is that 
one is aware of audience standards but perceives a substantial discrepancy between one’s 
ability and these standards. Similarly, anxiety would be experienced if one believes that one 
might be viewed favourably but is unsatisfied with the extent of this positive evaluation 
(e.g., one thinks one will be seen as competent but wishes to be seen as extremely 
competent). Schlenker and Leary’s (1982) model also accounts for situations where having 
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succeeded in the past, one risks loss of a positive self-presentation through anticipated future 
failure (e.g., engaging in a successful conversation with an acquaintance, only to engage in 
an awkward exchange in a subsequent interaction). 
In situations where guides to self-presentation are absent, unclear or contradictory, 
socially anxious individuals are likely to have even less confidence in their ability to convey 
desired impressions. If high standards are adopted when cues are ambiguous and confidence 
is reduced, this would increase the discrepancy between expectations and ability leading to 
elevated levels of anxiety (e.g., Moscovitch & Hofmann, 1997). 
In summary, the models make similar predictions in regards to the role of ambiguity in 
SAD. Despite this, they differ with respect to the cognitive mechanisms proposed to be 
central in the maintenance of the disorder.  
 
1.3 Cognitive, attentional and behavioural consequences of Social Anxiety Disorder. 
 
1.3.1 Threat Appraisal: Overestimation of cost and probability 
 
In line with cognitive models, socially anxious individuals perceive threat within a 
social situation (Clark and Wells 1995) and the probability of a feared outcome occurring 
(Rapee and Heimberg 1997) disproportionately. Fundamentally, anxiety can be thought of as 
a multi-stage reaction to a feared stimulus or stimuli, either in one’s immediate environment 
or one’s foreseeable future. In particular contexts, anxiety and/or fear can motivate an 
organism to escape an actual source of danger, however, in SAD, salient learning 
experiences may lead to belief systems which distort the perception of actual danger within 
a social situation, resulting in the experience of anxiety and accompanying cognitive, 
physiological and behavioural responses. 
There is strong empirical support for the notion that socially anxious individuals make 
judgmental biases to negative social outcomes compared to non-anxious individuals (Foa, 
Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996; McManus, Clark & Hackmann, 2000; Voncken, Bögels, & 
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Vries, 2003). Foa and colleagues (1996) found that individuals with SAD endorsed higher 
probability and cost evaluations associated with social events compared to non-anxious 
controls; however, group differences did not emerge for non-social events. McManus and 
colleagues (2000) extended these findings and compared treatment seeking individuals 
diagnosed with SAD to individuals diagnosed with another anxiety disorder (e.g., PTSD, 
OCD, Panic Disorder) and non-anxious controls. The authors found that only the SAD group 
perceived the cost of negative evaluation to be higher compared to both controls groups but 
made similar estimates of probability to the anxiety-control group, who had significantly 
higher Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE) scores than the non-anxious control group. Foa and 
Kozak (1985) posited that in SAD, the likelihood of particular negative events is somewhat 
realistic, for example, stuttering during a speech may occasionally occur under normal 
circumstances compared to other anxiety disorders (e.g., Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, 
Panic Disorder) where the probability of feared outcomes occurring is relatively minimal 
(e.g., suffering from a heart attack, the house burning down because the stove is left on). 
Consequently, they proposed that an overestimation of cost, as opposed to probability may be 
more relevant for socially anxious individuals, however these propositions have not been 
consistently supported by the literature (e.g., MacManus et al., 2000). 
Voncken and colleagues (2003) found that overestimations for cost and probability 
did not only occur for negatively valenced social vignettes, but also for neutral and 
positively valenced social events. Vassilopoulous (2006) showed that for unambiguous 
events which were mildly negative or positive in valence, individuals high in social anxiety 
catastrophised the mildly negative event and underestimated probabilities of positive 
events, compared to non-anxious controls. 
Overall, these studies suggest that probability and cost overestimations are largely 
specific to social anxiety rather than other mood- or anxiety-disorders and do not extend 
to non-social events. Furthermore, judgmental biases and perceptions of threat in terms of 
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probability and cost may generalise to self-relevant social events regardless of valence. 
 
 
1.3.2 Information processing biases 
 
In accordance with the predictions of cognitive models (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee 
& Heimberg, 2007), individuals who hold negative self-beliefs such as “I am uninteresting” 
have been shown to interpret benign information in a catastrophic manner. A substantial 
body of evidence from experimental and clinical treatment studies provides support for the 
notion that interpretation biases mediate state anxiety and act as a maintaining factor for the 
disorder (Lucock and Salkovskis, 1988; Foa et al., 1996; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; 
Hofmann, 2001). 
Velijaca and Rapee (1998) demonstrated that socially anxious individuals were more 
adept in detecting negative audience behaviours (e.g., a frown) compared to those low in 
social anxiety who were more accurate in detecting positive audience behaviours (e.g., 
smiles) displayed by an audience. In the study, a total of 14 behaviours were displayed by the 
three confederates who formed the audience, with an equal proportion of negative behaviours 
(e.g., looking sleepy, yawning, looking at watch, and coughing) and positive behaviours 
(e.g., leaning forward, smiling, nodding, and laughing) presented at regular intervals. The 
authors found that socially anxious individuals were less sensitive to positive behaviours 
than negative behaviours with controls exhibiting the reverse pattern of responses. The 
pattern of response bias confirmed the reported findings with socially anxious individuals 
demonstrating a tendency to apply a more liberal criterion for classification of negative 
behaviours compared to positive behaviours; a pattern which was not observed in the control 
group. 
Greater accuracy in the detection of negative behaviours is not surprising, given that 
these responses are well practiced and verify negative self-beliefs. The results of Velijaca and 
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Rapee (1998) suggest that the attentional resources allocated during the simultaneous 
monitoring of audience behaviours were not significantly affected by heightened self-focused 
attention as the accuracy for all behaviours would have otherwise been generally poor. Hence, 
a more likely explanation is that attentional resources were divided and prioritised in line with 
negative self-beliefs, increasing the salience of negative audience behaviours, which is 
consistent with the propositions of the Rapee and Heimberg (2007) model. 
Interpretation bias has been conceptualised as consisting of both an online (automatic) 
and offline (effortful) process (Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Beard & Amir, 2009). An online 
process suggests that the individual integrates information as it is being presented, and has 
been examined in studies by assessing reaction times to congruent and incongruent pairings of 
target words and incomplete sentences. In an earlier study which looked at test-anxiety 
(Calvo, Eysenck, & Estevez, 1994), non-anxious controls reacted faster to target words which 
were aligned with a neutral inference, compared to those who were test-anxious, although 
there were no significant group differences in reaction times for targets words aligned with a 
threat-based inference. These results suggest that those who are text anxious are less inclined 
to make benign inferences of threatening information compared to those who were not test- 
anxious. 
The pattern of online and offline response bias is aptly demonstrated in a study by 
Nader, Prouvost and Kuckertz, (2012), which compared responses of individuals diagnosed 
with SAD and non-anxious controls. In the study, participants were required to decide 
whether or not a threat related word (e.g. embarrassing, bored, criticise) or non-threat related 
word (e.g. funny, praise, graceful) was related to a socially relevant or non-relevant sentence. 
Decision reaction times to different word and sentence pairings informed online biases 
whereas the percentage of trials in which relatedness or lack of relatedness was endorsed 
provided a measure of offline bias (e.g., endorsement/rejection of social threat/benign 
interpretations; endorsement/rejection of non-social threat/benign interpretations). The SAD 
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group demonstrated slower response latencies (i.e., greater online bias) towards neutral 
interpretations of sentences compared to controls, which may translate to reduced processing 
of non-threatening cues within the immediate environment. Despite equal proportions of 
neutral interpretations being rejected between the two groups, faster reaction times were 
observed in the non-anxious control group suggesting that the SAD group still had greater 
difficulty with making neutral interpretations (also see Constans et al., 1999). An unexpected 
finding was that the differences in reaction times was also observed for non-social sentences, 
which may indicate general biases away from neutral interpretations across contexts, 
especially for those with comorbid mood disorders or those who present with subclinical 
SAD (e.g., Beard & Amir, 2009). 
Taken together, these studies suggest that there is a bias towards use of belief-congruent 
information to make appraisals of current information. Individuals with SAD may be 
impaired in making both benign and threat-based interpretation of verbal cues, suggesting 
that memories for past experiences may be more salient and direct attention towards internal 
representations and retrospective memories for events. 
 
1.3.3 Self-appraisal and standards setting 
Standard-setting and the associated comparison processes can motivate behaviour 
towards a directed goal, but under certain conditions may also lead to discouragement and 
withdrawal from an attempted task (Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Carver & Scheier, 1986). In a 
study by Wallace and Alden (1991), men who were high or low in social self-efficacy 
engaged in a conversation with a female confederate for which a high or low standard had 
been set with a pre-interaction video; there was also a condition in which no video was 
shown which meant that standards were ambiguous. The high standard video depicted two 
individuals looking relaxed and interested during the conversation with minimal pauses 
whereas the low standard video showed an awkward interaction with many pauses and short 
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sentences. The duration of the interaction provided a measure of withdrawal and avoidance 
displayed by participants. Compared to the high self-efficacy group, the low self-efficacy 
individuals withdrew significantly more quickly in both the low and no standards condition 
which suggests that additional standards had been self-imposed under such conditions, 
consistent with Carver and Scheier’s (1986) propositions that the standards pertain to both 
personal values (e.g., perfectionism) and others’ behaviours (e.g., social comparison). These 
findings were largely replicated in a similar study comparing high and low socially anxious 
males (Wallace & Alden, 1995) where it was found that high socially anxious (SA) group 
felt they could not meet the standards of the experimenters due to lower perceived ability, 
although no such discrepancy was reported between ability and self-standards (which was 
significantly lower than their low-anxious counterparts). In this study, high self-efficacy 
individuals in the low and no standards condition engaged in the interaction for significantly 
longer than the low-self efficacy individuals. Although the individuals with low-efficacy in 
the low standard condition rated the interaction as more successful than those in the high 
standard condition, it seemed that performing to an attainable standard was not enough to 
attenuate the tendency to withdraw from the interaction. On self-report measures, low self-
efficacy individuals felt more discomfort, perceived less control over the interaction and also 
felt more pressure to not withdraw than high self-efficacy individual overall. 
The role of perceived audience standards is perhaps more aptly demonstrated by 
Moscovitch and Hofmann (2007). In the study, participants were allocated to a high-standard, 
low-standard or no-standard condition and presented with corresponding videos prior to the 
speech task. In the no-standards condition, participants were simply asked to count the 
number of times a particular word was repeated in the video. Overall, prior to instructions and 
viewing of videos, socially anxious individuals reported higher perceived audience standards, 
compared to controls. The authors reported that individuals in the no standards condition 
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made predictions of performance that were comparable to those made in the high standards 
condition. Furthermore, standards were shown to be a significant mediator of performance 
appraisal. No such differences were observed between the SAD and control group when in 
the low standards condition. These findings suggest that in actual situations where standards 
are high or are perceived to be high by socially anxious individuals (i.e., only ambiguous or 
unclear cues are available), socially anxious individuals assume a high standard which leads 
to a distorted self-appraisal that confirms initial fears of failure. 
Empirical studies (Wallace & Alden, 1995; Rapee & Lim, 1992; Stopa & Clark, 1993; 
Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Perini et al., 2006; Zou & Abbott, 2012) have generally reported that 
socially anxious individuals appraise their own performance worse than that of an objective 
observer. In a study by Rapee and Lim, both non-clinical controls and patients diagnosed 
with SAD retrospectively underestimated their own speech performances compared to the 
objective observers in the audience, but the SAD group did this to a significantly greater 
degree. Such differences were observed for both global (e.g., kept audience interested, 
generally spoke well) and specific evaluations pertaining to behaviours that may be 
indicative of anxiety (e.g., kept eye contact with audience, had a clear voice). Similarly, 
Wallace and Alden (1995) reported significant group differences in performance appraisal 
between individuals with SAD on an interaction task with a confederate; with similar 
findings being reported between high and low socially anxious groups (Mellings & Alden, 
2000). Furthermore, performance appraisal has been shown to predict state anxiety during 
speech tasks (Rapee & Abbott, 2007), as well as anticipatory anxiety for a subsequent 
speech tasks (Rodebaugh, Heimberg, Schultz, & Blackmore, 2010). 
Empirical studies suggest that the above pattern of self-appraisal is uniquely seen in 
individuals with SAD and not those with other anxiety disorders. Stopa and Clark (1993) 
found that individuals diagnosed with SAD make more negative and less positive appraisals 
27  
of their performance in interaction tasks compared to both non-anxious and anxiety-control 
groups. Despite the objective rater evaluating the SAD group’s performance to be worse 
than both control groups, the clinical group still overestimated negative behaviours and 
underestimated positive behaviours relative to the rater, while the anxiety-control group 
tended to underestimate negative behaviours and did not differ from the rating for positive 
behaviours. The non-anxious controls underestimated positive behaviours compared to the 
independent rater but matched objective evaluations for negative behaviours. In line with 
Stopa and Clark’s findings, Kashdan and Savostyanova (2011) reported that socially anxious 
individuals were less likely to make positive appraisals and did not expect others to have 
evaluated them positively. Accuracy of self-concept, meta-accuracy and the degree to which 
they believed that others would not notice positive qualities were found to be significantly 
worse for socially anxious individuals compared to controls. This suggests that socially 
anxious individuals do not only rate themselves more negatively and less positively than 
others, they also believe that others will in fact appraise them more negatively, worse than 
they appraise themselves. Similar results were reported by Perowne and Mansell (2002) who 
found that socially anxious individuals were significantly less likely to appraise their 
performance on a speech task as “successful” compared to controls, despite no objective 
differences between speech performances between the two groups. 
1.3.4 Feedback 
 
According to cognitive models of SAD, absence of corrective feedback plays an 
important role in the maintenance of symptoms and behavioural consequences. Most socially 
anxious individuals, however, do in fact experience frequent interactions which do not result 
in objectively negative outcomes but despite this; minimal reduction in apprehension about 
subsequent interactions is observed (Clark & Manus, 2002). 
Socially anxious individuals appear to exhibit distinct pattern of responses to positive 
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cues during social interactions compared to non-socially anxious individuals. In a study by 
Wallace and Alden (1995), socially anxious males interacted with a female confederate who 
displayed positive, negative or neutral behaviours, followed by matching verbal feedback 
from the experimenter, or no feedback in the case of the neutral condition. Socially anxious 
individuals who received positive feedback believed that others held higher standards for 
their performance than those who received negative feedback. However, those who did not 
receive feedback perceived standards to be between those made in the positive and negative 
feedback conditions. Despite socially anxious individuals holding lower personal standards 
for the task compared to controls, they continued to believe that they had insufficient ability 
to meet their own standards, irrespective of the type of feedback received. In a subsequent 
study by the same authors (Wallace & Alden, 1997), patients with SAD and non-anxious 
controls again interacted with a confederate who displayed positive and negative behaviours, 
which were reinforced with congruent verbal feedback from the experimenter following the 
interaction, to induce outcomes of social success of failure. The discrepancy between ability 
and perceived standards following a successful interaction were no different from the group 
who had engaged in a non-successful interaction, accompanied by similar levels of negative 
mood states. The clinical group further believed that others expected more of them following 
a successful interaction, leading to even greater discrepancy between perceived ability and 
others’ standards for the second interaction. 
These studies suggest that the cognitive appraisals and consequences following positive 
social interactions are more negative for individuals with SAD compared to those who are 
non-anxious. Instead, socially anxious individuals may remain vigilant and attempt to prevent 
the possibility of increased social demands and future failure (i.e., a current positive 
evaluation may be followed by negative evaluation). The increase in anticipatory anxiety and 
poorer predictions about future performance following positive outcomes is consistent with 
assumptions of Schlenker and Leary’s self-presentation model (1982). 
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A study by Alden, Mellings and Laposa (2004) investigated patterns of responding to 
different types of feedback about one’s performance. Patients diagnosed with SAD and non- 
anxious controls participated in two interactions with a stranger. Participants were either 
provided with feedback which negated acknowledgement of negative behaviours (e.g., did 
not look anxious), or provided with feedback which mentioned positive behaviours (e.g., 
spoke well, appeared calm). Interestingly, patients who received the second type of feedback 
reported more anticipatory anxiety for the second interaction task compared to controls, with 
no differences observed between groups for the first type of feedback, when state anxiety 
during the first interaction was controlled for. In addition, there were no differences found 
between ratings of how positive or believable both feedback conditions were between patients 
and non-anxious controls. These findings are consistent with the results reported by Wallace 
and Alden (1997) who found that a successful interaction led to worse outcomes for socially 
anxious individuals and provides support for the notion that socially anxious individuals may 
also fear the consequences of positive evaluation in particular contexts (Weeks, Heimberg, 
Rodebaugh, & Norton, 2008). 
There are a number of possible mechanisms which lead to biased processing of positive 
outcomes or feedback. It is possible that positive outcomes are attributed to external features 
of a situation, which reduces the likelihood of re-appraisal one’s own ability and self-efficacy 
(e.g., Wallace & Alden, 1995), particularly when one believes that the external standards may 
have also increased. Given that there is evidence that socially anxious individuals are 
generally less likely to pay attention to positive aspects of a social situation (e.g., Velijaca & 
Rapee, 1998), another possibility is that features incongruent with self-views during a 
successful interaction are not adequately attended to, which would only serve to maintain 
negative belief systems and anxiety symptoms. 
Alden and colleagues (2008) developed the Interpretation of Positive Events Scale 
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(IPES) which measures negative interpretations of positive social events. Following the 
methodology used across previous studies, participants were asked to appraise their own 
performance, interaction partners’ performances and make predictions about performance and 
anxiety for a subsequent interaction following one that was initially manipulated to be 
objectively successful. Higher IPES scores were found to predict more negative appraisals of 
future performance even when the severity of social anxiety symptoms was accounted for. 
Furthermore, meditational analyses revealed that the degree to which negative interpretations 
were made about positive events mediated the relationship between state anxiety and reduced 
positive affect. These results have been replicated by Vassilopoulos and Banerjee (2012), 
who found that the degree to which positive outcomes were rejected mediated state anxiety 
and low positive affect. In light of these findings, biased interpretations of positive social 
events may be an important mechanism which maintains elevated levels of anxiety about 
future encounters for socially anxious individuals. 
 
1.4 Ambiguity: Definition and use 
The concept of ambiguity is pertinent to SAD because information exchanged during a 
social situation may often be perceived to be unclear or contain multiple meanings, requiring 
some degree of interpretation. A concrete definition of ambiguity remains somewhat elusive 
in the literature, however, Norton (1975) attempted to provide a definition by considering the 
different features of ambiguity; such as multiple meanings, inconsistency, vagueness, lack of 
information and/or clarity. Similarly, Ellsberg’s (1961) definition pertains to a lack of 
information that is necessary to understand a situation or to identify all of the possible 
outcomes. Cognitive theories (Barlow, 1998; Beck et al., 1985) also identify ambiguity as a 
key component of anxiety because when the precise nature of a given threat is ambiguous, 
one is unable to direct behaviour confidently to minimise potential harm. Thus, the ability to 
select and direct one’s available resources to cope with potential threat can become misguided 
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or impaired, and it is this lack of control and unpredictability that then undermines one’s 
sense of self-efficacy in directing a favourable outcome (Lazarus & Averill, 1972). 
1.4.1 Empirical Research – Interpretation of Ambiguity 
In socio-evaluative situations, information relevant to one’s performance often 
undergoes some degree of interpretation, which resolves any perceived ambiguity about 
others’ cognitions, affective states and motivations. Cognitive models posit that ambiguous 
information is most susceptible to interpretation biases and to date, empirical studies have 
found that interpretive bias of ambiguous information are likely to be specific to individuals 
who experience social anxiety (e.g., Amir et al., 2008; Stopa and Clark, 2000). 
Amir and colleagues (2008) asked treatment seeking individuals diagnosed with SAD, 
OCD and non-anxious controls to rank the likelihood of positive (e.g., “They are about to ask 
you to join them'”), negative (e.g., “They are saying negative things about you'”), and neutral 
interpretations (e.g., “They just ended their conversation”) of socially ambiguous scenarios 
(“You see a group of friends having lunch, they stop talking when you approach”) for 
themselves and for a ‘typical’ person. Compared to individuals in the OCD and non-anxious 
control groups, the SAD group was significantly more likely to select a negative 
interpretation of the ambiguous social scenarios when thinking about themselves but not 
when thinking about how a ‘typical’ person would respond. They were also significantly less 
likely to select a positive interpretation compared to the other two groups who did not differ 
from each other. These results are likely to be affected by the increased salience of internal 
representations and memories for past events under conditions of self-examination. These 
results replicate findings reported by Amin, Foa and Coles (1998) and Stopa and Clark 
(2000) who found that socially anxious individuals displayed a negative interpretation bias 
for ambiguous scenarios based on open ended questions coded by an independent rater. 
Constans and colleagues (1999) examined interpretation biases of ambiguous social 
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information in high and low SA samples and used a blind date social vignette which contained 
ambiguous social and non-social information across three different settings. The authors 
found that although high socially anxious individuals agreed more with negative 
interpretations than low socially anxious individuals, their mean ratings were slightly above 
mid-point indicating a tendency towards a benign interpretation. This finding may provide 
thus stronger evidence for a lack of positive interpretation bias that is exhibited by controls, 
rather than a negative interpretation bias per se. 
Other studies have used confederates to examine the effects of deliberately ambiguous 
behaviours displayed during a speech task (Kanai et al., 2010); pre-recorded ambiguous 
comments regarding the participant’s appearance (Amir, Beard, & Bower, 2005; Bögels and 
Lamers, 2002c); linguistic decision making tasks (Huppert et al., 2007; Jalal & Amir, 2014) 
and the presentation of neutral or ambiguous facial expressions (Yoon & Zinbarg, 2007). 
Kanai and colleagues found that socially anxious individuals rated ambiguous behaviours 
displayed by audience members as more negative and more threatening than non-anxious 
controls. In a study by Budnick, Kowal and Santuzzi (2015), high socially anxious and non- 
anxious control individuals engaged in a mock interview with a confederate who either 
displayed positive, negative or neutral behaviours throughout the interview. Neutral 
behaviours consisted of congruent expressions, a conversational tone, and semi-open body 
posture; for the socially anxious group, a coder independently rated them as appearing more 
anxious, less assertive and was evaluated to be less successful in the interview, compared to 
non-anxious controls in the neutral condition. These results are consistent with those of Amir 
and colleagues (2005) who pre-recorded videos of confederates commenting on the 
appearance of individuals (e.g., “That’s an interesting shirt you have on”) who were either 
high in social anxiety or high in trait anxiety. The results from the first experiment indicated 
that the socially anxious group rated that the ambiguous remarks as more negative compared 
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to the control group. In regards to the valence attributed to each of the videos, socially 
anxious individuals rated the ambiguous video to be less negative than the negative video 
but more negative than the positive video. This pattern of valence ratings was consistently 
reported by the control group and an additional dysphoria group in the second experiment. 
This suggests that despite the ability to objectively gauge the valence of social events, 
ambiguous comments are more likely to be interpreted negatively during the situation. 
Other studies have used ambiguous faces to examine early interpretation biases of 
ambiguous visual stimuli. Inconsistent findings have been reported, which could be due to 
methodological differences, variation in samples and stimuli selection. For example, Yoon 
and Zinbarg (2007) found that while neutral faces tended to be interpreted as neutral by the 
control group, socially anxious individuals tended to identify neutral faces as threatening 
(i.e., pertaining to anger or disgust); an attentional bias towards angry expressions was also 
supported by faster reaction times to angry faces when preceded by a neutral face. Richards, 
French, Calder and Fox (2002) presented blended facial expressions at various ratios (e.g., 
0%:100%, 30%:70%, 50%:50%) and found that individuals high in trait anxiety tended to 
interpret blended expressions as fearful compared to controls, but no significant group 
differences were observed in relation to interpretation and detection of anger. Following a 
mood-induction manipulation to induce higher state anxiety however, both groups identified 
significantly more blended expressions as angry and significantly less faces as happy. 
Blanchette, Richards and Cross (2007) found group differences for ambiguous facial 
expressions blended at the same ratio as those used in Richard et al., but the stimuli were 
presented alongside positive, negative, neutral or irrelevant words related to one of the two 
expressions which had been blended. The authors found that state anxiety facilitated use of 
contextual cues in interpretation of ambiguous faces in the high SA group, such that the 
interpretation of the blended expression was congruent with the presented words. A different 
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pattern was observed for trait anxiety in the second experiment, such that high SA 
individuals interpreted blended expressions as significantly more negative than low SA 
individuals but responses were unaffected by context. Finally, in a more recent study, Jusyte 
and Schönenberg (2014) found no evidence that individuals with generalised SAD were 
more likely to detect anger in ambiguous faces presented at the optimal ratio (50:50) when 
fearful and happy expressions were blended. Similar findings indicating a lack of group 
differences have not been unreported, however, it is possible also that inclusion of a 
manipulation to provide context and/or induce a state of anxiety allows for better 
observation of possible interpretation biases towards visually ambiguous information. 
Treatment studies which target modification of interpretation biases for ambiguous 
information also suggest that such biases may play a significant role in SAD. Amir, Bomyea 
and Beard (2010) attempted to modify participants’ interpretations of ambiguous social 
scenarios towards neutral interpretations with use of the Interpretation Modification Program 
(IMP). Individuals were randomly allocated to receive IMP or a control condition that did not 
guide participants' interpretation in either direction. Compared to the control group, socially 
anxious individuals were better at disengaging from threat-related stimuli post-intervention. In 
a similar treatment study, Bowler and colleagues (2012) trained socially anxious individuals to 
make neutral interpretations of ambiguous events and found that compared to controls, those 
who received the training became more adept in appraising ambiguous events as neutral; these 
improvements also mediated reductions in social anxiety and improved attentional control. 
These findings suggest that biased processing of ambiguous stimuli plays a role in the 
maintenance of anxiety. 
In summary, the findings from studies examining interpretations of ambiguous 
information relevant to socio-evaluative situations suggest that socially anxious individuals 
may lack a benign interpretive bias for such information, which is not observed in those who 
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are non-anxious. Results from treatment studies suggest that reductions in negative 
interpretation biases also lead to changes in symptoms and processing of social situations. A 
systematic review of relevant studies detailing specific findings can be found in Chapter 2. 
 
1.5 Limitations and future research 
 
1.5.1 Limitations of current research 
 
One of the main limitations of research in social anxiety to date is that different studies 
designate group status using a vast range of measures. Inconsistent findings have been 
reported, presumably due to sample differences as some studies have determined group 
status via a clinical diagnostic interview whereas others rely on use of screening measures 
and cut-offs to separate individuals high or low in social anxiety groups. Although screening 
measures are often useful in the selection of participants, the dimensionality of SAD makes it 
difficult to specify whether or not unique effects are observed in those clinically diagnosed 
groups. 
Similarly, the extent to which group differences are observed may also differ as a function of 
severity of symptoms and associated interference and distress. This has important 
repercussions for researchers because cognitive models of SAD posit a myriad of interrelated 
and simultaneous processes which maintain the disorder and it may be that specific 
vulnerabilities are more consistently observed in individuals with severe manifestation of the 
disorder. Clarification of whether or not particular processes dominate individuals at 
different levels of severity on the continuum of SAD would further inform understanding of 
the disorder. 
Given that there are high rates of comorbidity in SAD with mood disorders and other 
anxiety disorders, inclusion of a mood or anxiety control group in addition to a non-anxious 
control group (Amin et al., 1998; Amir et al., 2008) is beneficial. In instances where there is 
significant overlap in symptoms across diagnoses (e.g., mood and anxiety disorders), a 
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clinical control group can be useful in isolating the unique contributions of SAD rather than 
attributing observed effects to depression (e.g., Constans et al.,  1999). Nevertheless, in most 
instances, analyses using mood ratings and depression scores as covariates have attempted 
to address high rates of comorbidity in clinical samples and specify reported effects to SAD 
(e.g., Moscovitch & Hofmann, 2007). 
Another potential limitation across studies is that the interpretation of ambiguous 
information is generally restricted to between group comparisons (e.g., SAD and non-
anxious controls). Whilst group differences do inform the degree of interpretive bias 
displayed by socially anxious individuals to some extent, findings fail to take into account 
pre-existing differences between groups which may be largely responsible for such 
differences. In addition, comparisons across different types of feedback where study designs 
have allowed for it are often secondary to reporting of group differences (c.f., Wallace & 
Alden, 1997). In addition, significant variation across measures of interest limits the ability 
to integrate findings across studies, which minimises opportunities to contribute to broader 
conclusions about the interaction between symptom and process measures. 
 
1.5.2 Possible directions for future research 
 
Group differences in the interpretation of socially relevant information has been 
reported across a large number of studies, furthermore, linguistic decision task paradigms also 
suggest that socially anxious individuals display impairments in integrating current external 
information to inform present experiences, such that they may be unable to make ‘online’ 
interpretations within social situations (e.g., Hirsch & Mathews, 2000). Given that ambiguity 
is inherently present in socio-evaluative situations, it may be useful to distinguish between 
contexts which differ in the degree of ambiguity present. Highly ambiguous contexts in 
which there may be a complete lack of external information may lead to greater reliance on 
internal representations or appraisals, which are likely to be subject to negative interpretation 
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biases in line with dominant schemas. Future studies may focus on identifying how different 
levels of ambiguity within socio-evaluative situations is processed and resolved by 
individuals relative to situations that are less ambiguous. Although this has been examined 
to some extent in studies which employ the use blended facial stimuli; application to other 
stimuli may be of assistance in identifying factors which may attenuate or exacerbate the 
degree of negative interpretation bias displayed by socially anxious individuals. 
There appears to be some potential in the application of training individuals to make 
benign interpretations via computer-based tasks to the real world. Presumably, these 
paradigms increase the threshold for ambiguity tolerance, such that ambiguous social 
information is more likely to be perceived as neutral, without the need for additional 
interpretation. Clinicians may similarly set up behavioural experiments which involve 
interactions with confederates who deliberately display behaviours which gradually become 
more ambiguous, while simultaneously challenging negative interpretations of behaviours. 
Finally, there is emerging evidence that socially anxious individuals process positive 
events in a way that maintains threat and anxiety for future events. Given these 
vulnerabilities in this group, further understanding of how individual differences in 
motivations to leave a desired impression interact with the experience of objectively 
negative and positive events is necessary. Re-appraisals of one’s ability and perceived 
audience standards may also warrant particular attention in the therapeutic context, given 
that socially anxious individuals do in fact receive objectively positive feedback both during 
and following socio-evaluative situations, which are not benefited from and may be 
experienced negatively, maintaining maintained anxiety for future events. 
 
1.5.3 Summary and research implications 
 
A focus on how individuals interpret ambiguous situations seems particularly pertinent 
not only due to empirical findings that suggest a unique bias to socially relevant information 
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but due to the fact that the resolution of ambiguity is important in real life social situations 
and seems to play a role in the maintenance of the disorder. According to cognitive models of 
SAD, individuals already possess an internally driven focus which is interpreted as a source 
of potential threat. The attentional resources expended on this process subsequently lead to 
reduced attention for external information in the immediate environment that contradicts one’s 
experience. Due to the reduced processing of cues incongruent with one’s experience and 
increased processing of congruent cues, the individual remains in the heightened state of 
anxiety because corrective information is not adequately incorporated to modify appraisals 
and behaviour. 
It is important to consider what form the corrective information should take in order to 
attenuate negative interpretive bias of ambiguous information. Consider a standard thought 
monitoring sheet in CBT treatment; objective outcomes may not be negative but neutral 
outcomes may still be interpreted to be negative (e.g., she probably didn’t think anything of 
what I said”). Individuals who have strong negative self-beliefs may be particularly 
susceptible to interpreting such information in line with pre-existing schemas, particularly 
following feedback, and find it difficult to make re-appraisals which are benign for future 
events. According to cognitive models, the discrepancy from predicted and actual outcomes 
should ameliorate anxiety in future situations, however, impairments in one’s ability to make 
benign interpretations are likely to undermine this process and impede treatment progress. 
Socially anxious individuals are more likely to assume high standards when cues 
regarding performance are unclear or absent (Moscovitch & Hofmann, 2007) or perceive 
others’ expectations to have increased following successful social events (Wallace & Alden, 
1997). These studies indicate that the mere availability of corrective feedback which is 
objectively positive is insufficient to ameliorate anxiety about future interactions due to 
unhelpful reappraisals associated with a sense of low self-efficacy in effecting positive 
outcomes (e.g., Wallace & Alden, 1995). Maximising the benefits of exposure to corrective 
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information may be increased through careful analysis of underlying changes to appraisals, 
perceived ability and audience standards which can occur at different stages of socio- 
evaluative situations and may extend to sustained effects under certain conditions. 
 
1.6 Aims and hypotheses of the current study 
The present study aimed to examine how socially anxious individuals respond to 
positive, negative and ambiguous feedback provided following a delay after an initial speech 
task, compared to non-anxious controls. It aims to incorporate different features of previous 
studies such as Moscovitch and Hofmann (2007) and Wallace and Alden (1997) to examine 
changes in performance appraisal, perceived ability, standards, state anxiety and mood states, 
in anticipation of a second speech task. Whilst a substantial number of studies have observed 
interpretation biases in information processing, only a small number have focused on 
comparing responses on symptom and cognitive variables across time, as a function of 
feedback. Furthermore, previous studies have applied the concept of ambiguity to both verbal 
and non-verbal information simultaneously, whereas the current study limits application to 
written information which contains inconsistencies in relation to evaluations of performance. 
A speech task was used to elicit evaluative concerns about performance from the 
perceived audience. The key feedback manipulation scripts were adapted from the 
Performance Questionnaire (Rapee & Lim, 1992) and contained both global and specific 
items regarding speech performance. Based on definitions of ambiguity which pertain to lack 
of clarity, inconsistencies and multiple meanings or vagueness (Norton, 1975), the 
ambiguous feedback condition was created with an equal number of positive and negative 
statements, with terms modified where possible to increase the degree to which the feedback 
contained multiple meanings. The positive feedback only contained positive references to 
performance, and the negative feedback only contained negative references to performance. 
The study was completed across two sessions which were scheduled to be 
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approximately one week apart. In the first session, participants completed a diagnostic semi- 
structured interview to determine clinical status, completed Time 1 (pre-Speech 1) and Time 2 
(post-Speech 1) questionnaires and participated in an impromptu three-minute speech task 
which was recorded. In the second session, they completed additional state measures at Time 
3 (before a reminder about feedback was given) and Time 4 (immediately before the receipt 
of feedback), before being provided with feedback they had been randomly allocated. 
Participants read feedback about performance in the form of an email from an “independent 
rater” and then completed Time 5 questionnaires. They were then informed that they would in 
fact engage in a second speech task and asked to think of a new topic. No specific instructions 
were provided in relation to a second evaluation or additional feedback, however, they were 
informed that the second performance would again be recorded. Participants were provided 
with Time 6 questionnaires to complete. They were then informed that they would not actually 
have to engage in the second speech task. Manipulation checks and ratings for feedback and 
speech instructions were completed; participants were then debriefed. A more detailed 
description of the study design can be found in Chapter 3. 
Given evidence from previous studies, it was hypothesised that: 
 
1a. Prior to the feedback manipulation, socially anxious individuals will report more negative 
affect, less positive affect, greater anxiety, more threat, more distorted performance 
appraisals, higher standards and lower ability pre- and post-speech, compared to non-anxious 
controls prior to and immediately following the first speech task. 
1b. Similarly, socially anxious individuals will report greater levels of post-event rumination 
and anticipatory anxiety immediately prior to feedback, compared to non-anxious controls. 
 
 
1c. Socially anxious individuals will underestimate their speech performance prior to 
feedback (relative to an objective observer), to a greater degree than controls. 
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2. Immediately following feedback and in anticipation of the second speech task, there will 
be a significant interaction effect between group and condition, such that responses on 
symptom and cognitive variables in the ambiguous feedback condition will be similar to 
those in the negative condition for the SAD group, whereas responses for the controls in the 
ambiguous condition will be similar to responses in the positive feedback condition across all 
variables. 
3a. Compared to baseline ratings, socially anxious individuals in the ambiguous and negative 
conditions are expected to exhibit minimal changes on symptom and cognitive appraisals 
across time. Positive feedback, however, was expected to elicit worse symptom and cognitive 
outcomes, including worse performance appraisals and increased standards for the second 
speech task in the SAD group. In contrast, controls were expected to exhibit relatively 
minimal changes across time, regardless of feedback condition, and exhibit less negative 
scores on all variables relative to the SAD group. 
3b. Given the literature on the discounting of schema incongruent feedback, it was 
hypothesised that positive feedback may initially be well received across variables, but is 
then expected to undergo further changes in anticipation of the second speech task, leading to 
poorer symptom and cognitive outcomes compared to immediately after feedback. In 
contrast, it was expected that controls would exhibit minimal changes across symptom and 
cognitive variables between feedback and anticipation of a second speech task, across 
feedback conditions. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
Abstract 
 
Cognitive models of social anxiety posit that ambiguity may serve as a source of threat for 
socially anxious individuals. Ambiguity pertains to information that is inconsistent, 
contradictory, lacking in detail, or lacking in clarity. A number of studies have directly 
manipulated self-relevant social information to be ambiguous, whereas others may have 
unintentionally induced an ambiguous context purely due to the nature of the study design. 
This systematic review aims to evaluate the current state of research into ambiguity and its 
effects on symptom and cognitive outcomes in Social Anxiety Disorder. The study designs 
were categorised as either implementing a deliberate manipulation of ambiguity, or a non- 
deliberate manipulation. The following databases were searched: PsycINFO, Medline and 
PubMed. Articles were limited to adult samples and English language papers which related to 
social anxiety and ambiguity. In all, 27 studies were identified with results generally showing 
a consistent pattern of group differences in the likelihood of making a negative interpretation 
of ambiguous social scenarios and/or stimuli. Performance appraisal and the perceived 
likelihood of positive evaluation were also found to be significantly lower for socially 
anxious individuals compared to controls. Evidence of differences in state anxiety, post-event 
rumination and self-focused attention is preliminary. More research is required to identify 
specific mechanisms driving interpretation biases, in addition, distinguishing between 
different degrees of ambiguity across stimuli and contexts may also be beneficial. The 
potential benefits of training benign responses to ambiguous information warrants further 
verification, in relation to effecting long-lasting change in interpretive bias in socially 
anxious populations. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The core feature of social anxiety disorder (SAD) is a marked fear of negative 
evaluation that persists across a range of social and/or performance situations (American 
Psychiatric Association [DSM-5], 2013). Individuals with SAD avoid situations where 
negative evaluation is perceived to be likely, or experience significant distress and anxiety 
during socio-evaluative situations, which significantly interferes with on their social or 
occupational functioning. According to a recent national health survey, social anxiety 
disorder is a highly prevalent and co-morbid condition, with 12-month prevalence rates of 
2.3% (Lampe, Slade, Issakidis, & Andrews, 2003) and a life-time prevalence rate of 12.1% 
(Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005). 
Cognitive models of social anxiety (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997; Schlenker & Leary, 1982) posit that the degree of fear of negative evaluation is, in part, 
dependent on perceived audience standards and perceived ability to meet those standards. A 
lack of attention to external cues in the environment due to increased self-focus also reduces 
the individual’s ability to make realistic judgments of others’ standards (Moscovitch & 
Hofmann, 2007). In addition, formative experiences may have led to a number of beliefs 
about the self (e.g., I am stupid; I am unattractive) which elicit cognitions (e.g., I will make 
mistakes; I will be rejected) within socio-evaluative situations (Clark & Wells, 1995). Given 
that most social situations inherently involve some degree of ambiguity (many verbal and 
non-verbal behaviours are ambiguous), each situation may entail competition between 
internal and external information such that internal representations may be more reliably 
inform appraisals when external information is unclear or lacking. Models posit that when 
interpretation biases occur, both the self and one’s performance are judged to be inadequate 
or unfavourable (Leary, Kowalski, & Campbell, 1988; Kashdan & Savostyanova, 2011). 
Recent findings in populations with Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) suggest a 
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negative relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and negative emotional states. 
Nelson and Shankman (2011) found that when presented with conditions where an 
electric shock was unpredictable, individuals who were more intolerant of uncertainty 
actually exhibited startle responses of a lesser magnitude than their non-anxious counterparts. 
This finding is consistent with cognitive models which posit that worry distracts from the 
negative emotions that arise from a state of uncertainty and that heightened arousal 
associated with over-preparedness reduces the level of discomfort and autonomic arousal 
experienced by the individual. This explanation is consistent with the Polyvagal Theory 
proposed by Porges (1994) which posits parasympathetic dominance in our reactions to 
feared situations which are often adaptive when under threat or stress. These findings 
support the notion that a particular level of intolerance to uncertainty can be adaptive in the 
short-term in preparing for possible significant negative events, should they occur. 
Other cognitive models of anxiety disorders (Barlow, 1998; Beck et al., 1985) posit 
that a lack of information or clarity in one’s immediate environment limits the ability to 
identify the nature of the threat and which may lead to miscalculation and subsequent 
misdirection of available resources to deal with the potential threat. These processes serve to 
reinforce the perceived nature of the threat, as well as the belief that one does not possess 
adequate resources to cope with undesired outcomes. Overall, there is a perception that 
anxious individuals lack a strong internal locus of control in directing desired outcomes, 
which only serves to further exacerbate the experience of anxiety (Lazarus & Averill, 1972). 
The distinction between uncertainty and ambiguity has not always been appreciated and 
the terms have often been applied interchangeably (Grenier, Barrett, & Ladouceur, 2005). 
While responses to both ambiguity and uncertainty involve a set of cognitive, emotional and 
behavioural reactions, uncertainty is often associated with future-oriented negative outcomes, 
whereas ambiguity tends to refer to present-focused potential (negative) outcomes (Grenier et 
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al., 2005). However, it is likely that uncertainty about future events interacts with the 
emotional, cognitive and behavioural responses as a result of ambiguity in the present 
situation. According to Newman and Llera (2011), intolerance of uncertainty can be 
conceptualised as a ‘schema about the danger of ambiguity’ (p. 376), which suggests 
interdependence between the two constructs. 
Norton (1975) identified a number of different aspects of ambiguity which include 
contexts pertaining to multiple meanings, inconsistency, vagueness, lack of information and 
clarity. Intolerance of uncertainty has been defined as the tendency for an individual to be 
excessively concerned about the possibility of a negative outcome occurring, no matter the 
probability, and to consider such an outcome unacceptable (Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 
2001). 
A number of studies have found that socially anxious individuals tend to interpret 
ambiguous information negatively and also report greater cost associated with an ambiguous 
or negative outcome (e.g., Amin, Foa, & Coles, 1998). Moscovitch and Hofmann (2007) 
found that when no information regarding expected standards of a speech task was given, not 
only did socially anxious individuals automatically adopt high standards, they appraised their 
performance similarly to those in the high standards condition. These findings can be 
understood in terms of ambiguity acting as an indirect source of threat, such that a lack of 
information or clarity regarding audience standards activates pre-conceived beliefs which are 
consistent with the notion that one will fall below an expected standard resulting in negative 
evaluation. 
The likelihood of making positive inferences in ambiguous situations, compared to 
non-anxious controls however, is less clear-cut. While a number of studies have found that 
socially anxious individuals are significantly less likely to endorse positive interpretations of 
ambiguous behaviours (Amin et al., 1998; Huppert, Pasupuleti, Foa, & Mathews, 2007; Leary 
et al., 1988), others have merely found that the inferences socially anxious individuals make 
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are relatively more negative than non-anxious controls but are not necessarily negative per se 
 (e.g., Constans, Penn, Ihen, & Hope, 1999; also see Cody & Teachman, 2010). Support for a 
lack of positive bias comes from findings that the reaction times of socially anxious 
individuals in resolving ambiguous sentences were not facilitated by previous presentations 
of ‘baseline’ sentences for which the neutral inference had to be made (Hirsch & Mathews, 
2000). This finding suggests that socially anxious individuals display a deficit in their ability 
to generate emotional inferences ‘online’ (or perhaps they are not directly accessible) when 
presented with ambiguous information, particularly with respect to making positive 
inferences. 
A number of treatment studies which are not included in this review should also be 
noted because it supports the notion that an interpretation or processing bias of ambiguous 
information contributes to the maintenance of SAD. The most common paradigm used within 
treatment studies is the Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) or otherwise termed 
Interpretation Modification Program (IMP) which is a text-based computerised task aimed at 
teaching individuals to interpret socially ambiguous information in a benign way (Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000). Currently, only a limited number of studies have found that such tasks 
can alter inferences to ambiguous information across multiple sessions. For example, Beard 
and Amir (2008) trained participants across eight sessions within a period of four weeks and 
found that the group that received training made less threatening interpretations of ambiguous 
scenarios which mediated decreased in social anxiety symptoms post-intervention. Murphy, 
Hirsch, Mathews, Smith and Clark (2007) found that participants who received CBM training 
not only made more benign interpretations following training, they also anticipated that they 
would be less anxious in future interactions. Amir, Bomyea and Beard (2010) attempted to 
modify participants’ interpretations of ambiguous social scenarios towards neutral 
interpretations which were compared to a control group that received no training. Individuals 
who received the training were less likely to endorse negative interpretations of ambiguous 
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events, and demonstrated improvements in their disengagement from threat-related stimuli. 
Mobini, Mackintosh, Illingworth, Gega, Langdon and Hoppitt (2014) extended these findings 
to show that after a single session of CBM training, individuals made more positive 
interpretation of ambiguous scenarios post-test and at one-week follow-up, comparable to 
improvements exhibited by individuals who completed an online CBT program. 
This review aims to systematically assess the literature to better understand how 
ambiguity is interpreted and resolved by individuals with social anxiety disorder or those who 
are highly socially anxious, as indexed by interpretation or attentional biases, hypervigilance 
to threat, performance appraisal, rumination and subjective anxiety ratings and mood states. 
The studies assessed have experimental designs, with all studies except one including a non- 
anxious control group. Specifically, this review will analyse relevant research based on the 
following study characteristics: induction of ambiguity, participants, clinical status, 
assessment, method, measures, and outcomes. The reliability of the results from the studies 
assessed will be discussed, with reference to effect sizes across studies, in relation to 
differences between social anxiety disorder and control groups or high and low social anxiety 
groups. A number of studies reported direct intention to apply ambiguity to target stimuli or 
cues to identify biases in interpretations; these studies have been classified as attempting to 
directly manipulate ambiguity. Other studies which reported the primary focus of the research 
to be distinct from the examination of interpretations of ambiguous information have been 
classified as indirectly manipulating ambiguity. The results from searches in three databases 
will be limited to adult samples and English language papers which relate to social anxiety, 
social anxiety disorder and ambiguity. Finally, identified studies will be assessed for risk of 
bias to examine the validity of reported findings, according to the guidelines in the Cochrane 
Handbook for Systematic Reviews (Higgins & Green, 2011). To ensure appropriate reporting 
of results, the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses 
(PRISMA) statement and guidelines were referred to in guiding the presentation of results in 
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this review (Liberati, Altman, Tezlaff, Mulrow, Gotzche, & Ionnidis et al., 2009). 
 
 
2.2 Method 
 
2.2.1 Summary of search strategy 
 
A comprehensive literature search was conducted among published articles indexed in 
the following databases: PsycInfo, PubMed and Medline. The key words employed included: 
(‘Social Anxiety’ OR ‘Social Anxiety Disorder’ OR ‘Social Phobia’) AND (‘Ambiguity’ OR 
‘Stimulus Ambiguity’ OR ‘Uncertainty’ OR ‘Threat’ OR ‘Self-Evaluation’ OR ‘Feedback’ 
OR ‘Standards’ OR ‘Performance’ OR ‘Social Perception’ OR ‘Cognitive Appraisal’ OR 
‘Intolerance of Uncertainty’). Articles were limited to peer-reviewed articles, English- 
language papers, and adult human populations. Chapters and unpublished dissertations were 
excluded, but no limitations were made regarding publication dates. The most recent search 
was conducted on 8 August, 2015. 
 
2.2.2 Selection and exclusion criteria 
 
Studies were initially retained if the abstracts mentioned social anxiety, social anxiety 
disorder, or social phobia. Correlational studies were excluded and only experimental studies 
were included. Studies related to intolerance of uncertainty were retained for further 
assessment as the term ‘uncertainty’ is often used interchangeably with ‘ambiguity’ in the 
literature (Grenier, Barrett, & Ladouceur, 2005). Studies were then excluded on the following 
criteria: 1) Lack of a specific social anxiety group, 2) no consideration of applying or 
evaluating conditions of ambiguity, 3) investigation of the intolerance of uncertainty 
construct without reference to ambiguity, 4) correlational studies limited to responses to self- 
report questionnaires, 5) systematic review or meta-analyses, 6) clinical trials or treatment 
programs for social anxiety, 7) ambiguity resolved through use of specific feedback, and 8) 
child and adolescent samples. Given the limited number of studies available, all applicable 
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studies were considered regardless of sample size or experimental design. 
Twenty-seven articles were identified through this search strategy as eligible for 
inclusion in this review and all were experimental studies. The earliest study was published in 
1988, and the most recent study was published in 2015. Abstracts were coded by a second 
rater and there was 85% agreement in selection of relevant abstracts for the review, all other 
articles were discussed between the raters and agreement reached as to whether they met 
criteria for inclusion. A flow diagram of study selection is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3. Flow diagram of study selection 
 
 
No direct manipulation of 
ambiguity: 12 
Direct manipulation of 
ambiguity: 15 
Manuscript review and application of inclusion 
criteria 
Excluded (n =46) 
Lack of specific social anxiety group: 9 
No ambiguous condition: 23 
Relating to Intolerance of uncertainty: 8 
Cognitive preparation for video feedback studies: 3 
Questionnaire-based correlational studies: 2 
Clinical treatment studies: 3 
Reviews/Meta-analyses: 3 
No control condition: 1 
Note: Some studies met more than one exclusion 
criteria. 
Included (n = 27) 
Included (n = 73) 
Articles screened on basis of title and abstract 
Excluded (n = 3302) 
Duplicates: 636 
Not specific to social anxiety: 1495 
Not specific to the concept of ambiguity 
(and social anxiety): 1100 
Search results combined 
(n = 5001) 
Initial literature search 
Databases: PsycINFO, Web of Science, 
Medline, Cochrane Central Register of 
Controlled Trials 
Limits: Peer-reviewed, English-language 
articles only, human subject’s only, adult 
populations only 
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2.2.3 Data analysis 
 
Studies were evaluated based on the following factors: i) whether or not ambiguity had 
been deliberately manipulated, ii) number of participants, iii) clinical status of participants, 
iv) assessment methods, v) measures employed, vi) study characteristics, vii) symptom 
measures administered and viii) results obtained. Details of the included study characteristics 
are presented in Table 1. 
 
2.2.4 Reporting 
 
To ensure appropriate reporting of results, the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic 
Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) statement and guidelines were referred to in guiding 
the presentation of results in this view (Liberati, Altman, Tezlaff, Mulrow, Gotzche, & 
Ionnidis et al., 2009). 
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Table 1. Characteristics of included studies. 
Study N Clinical 
status 
Ax measure   Method   
      Procedure/ 
Expt. Stimuli 
 
Induction of 
ambiguity 
 
Conditions 
 
Symptoms 
 
Outcome measure/ 
appraisal time point(s) 
(1) Experimental studies with direct manipulation of ambiguity 
Amin et al., 1998 60  SAD (1) SCID Select positive, 
negative or 
neutral 
interpretation for 
social and non- 
social ambiguous 
situations. 
Ambiguous social 
scenarios. 
SP (n=32) 
OCD (n=15) 
NAC (n=15) 
Social Anxiety 
(SPIN) 
Depression (BDI) 
Anxiety (STAI) 
Interpretation of Ambiguity 
(self-relevant and other relevant 
versions) 
Self- and other-relevant 
interpretations pre and post- 
interview. 
Amir et al. 2005 40  N/A FNE 
(SA and non- 
SA: top and 
bottom 
15th %ile.) 
Videos, 
confederates 
comment on 
appearance. 
Ambiguous 
statements in videos. 
Socially anxious (n=20) 
Non-socially anxious 
(n=20) 
Social Anxiety 
(FNE, ISI) 
Depression (BDI) 
Anxiety (STAI-T/STAI-S; ASI) 
Ratings for emotional valence 
of videos. 
Bögels & 
Lamers, 2002c 
48  SAD (2) SCID Imagine social 
scenarios, 
presented with 
different 
feedback. 
Feedback is 
ambiguous. 
SP (n=24) 
Other anxiety control 
(n=24) 
Social Anxiety 
(BFNE; FBS) 
Level of anxiety and self- 
awareness across self-focus 
and task-focus ambiguous 
scenarios. 
Brozovich & 
Heimberg, 2015 
114  N/A PRCA 
(High ≥ 78, 
Low ≤ 54) 
BDI 
(<28 in Highs) 
Rate likelihood of 
different 
‘endings’ to 
socially 
ambiguous 
scenarios. 
Ambiguous social 
scenarios. 
High SA (n=57) 
Low SA (n=57) 
Social Anxiety (PRCA) 
Depression (BDI-II) 
Post-event rumination induction 
(PEPQ) 
State anxiety (BSAM) 
Interpretations of ambiguous 
social scenarios (e.g., socially 
anxious, negative, neutral or 
positive). 
Budnick et al., 
2015 
88  N/A SCS (averaged 
to an anxiety 
composite 
score) 
Confederate 
behaviours during 
interview neutral 
(or positive or 
negative) 
Neutral confederate 
behaviours (e.g., 
semi-open body 
posture, neutral 
expression, 
conversational tone) 
High SA (n=44) 
Low SA (n=44) 
Social Anxiety (SCS) 
Self-focus (open ended 
questions) 
Anxiety (coded for particular 
behaviours) 
Assertiveness (coded) 
Interview success (assessed 
across seven categories) 
Levels of self-focus, anxiety 
exhibited, assertiveness and 
interview success. 
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Constans et al., 
1999a 
94  N/A IAS 
(High M=67, 
Low M=27) 
Ambiguous social 
vignettes. 
Ambiguous social 
scenarios. 
High SA (n=47) 
Low SA (n=47) 
Social Anxiety 
(IAS) 
Current mood state 
(MACL-R) 
Interpretation of scenarios. 
 
Guitiérrez-Garcia 
& Calvo, 2014 
40 N/A SPAI Blended facial 
expressions 
(adapted from 
KDEF) with 
incongruent 
expressions in 
eyes and mouth. 
Ambiguous, blended 
expressions. 
Socially anxious (n=20) 
Non-anxious (n=20) 
Social Anxiety (SPAI) 
Depression (BDI) 
Probability of responding 
‘happy’ to blended 
expressions, reactions times to 
selecting a particular response 
category for blended faces, 
discriminating between 
congruent and incongruent 
happy expressions. 
Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2000 
24 SAD 
(1) 
SCID Descriptions of 
social situations 
including 
interviews. 
Ambiguity within 
situations. 
SP (n=12) 
NAC (n=12) 
Interview Anxiety (IAQ) 
Anxiety (STAI-T) 
Depression (HAD) 
Interpretation of socially 
evaluative scenarios e.g., job 
interviews. 
Huppert et al., 
2007 
49 N/A SPIN 
(High ≥ 30, 
Low ≤ 10) 
Sentence 
completion task 
Last word of 
sentences was 
omitted. 
High SA (n=26) 
Low SA(n=23) 
Social Anxiety (SLAS; SIAS; 
SPIN) 
Interpretation bias (SMIB) 
DASS 
Social desirability (SDS) 
Choice of negative/anxious 
words and positive/neutral 
words. Total responses, first 
responses, and endorsed 
responses recorded. 
Jalal & Amir, 
2014 
42 SAD (1) SCID  Homograph 
priming 
paradigm; 
homograph 
followed by 
related/unrelated 
neutral, physical 
or socially 
anxious word. 
Social threat or non- 
threat homographs 
presented, followed 
by a word related to 
threat meaning or 
non-threat meaning. 
SAD: (n=21) 
NAC: (n=21) 
Social Anxiety (LSAS- 
CA/LSAS-SR) 
Trait Anxiety (STAI) 
Depression (BDI-II) 
Reaction times, priming of 
non-threat related information, 
priming of threat-related 
information. 
Jusyte & 
Schönenberg, 
2014 
98 SAD (2) MINI Happy-angry, 
happy-fearful, 
fearful-angry 
Degree of ambiguity 
according to intensity 
levels of emotions 
blended (e.g., 50/50 
maximum ambiguity). 
SAD: (n=64) 
NAC: (n=32) 
Social Anxiety (SIAS; SPS; 
LSAS) 
Response bias, subjective 
intensity ratings. 
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Kanai et al., 
2010 
31 N/A SPS (High ≥ 
26, Low ≤ 12) 
Speech task, 
confederate 
demonstrates 
ambiguous 
behaviour. 
Ambiguous 
behaviours by 
confederate. 
High SA (n=16) 
Low SA (n=15) 
Social Anxiety (SPS, FNE) 
Depression (SDS) 
State anxiety (VAS) 
Interpretation of other’s 
behaviour (LS) 
Interpretation of behaviours, 
focus on the confederate 
during speech rated. 
 
Leary et al., 
1988a 
75 N/A Interaction 
Anxiousness 
Scale 
Median split, 
(High > 37, 
Low < 37) 
Descriptions of 
interactions with 
people who vary 
in degree of 
familiarity and 
status. 
Ambiguous 
behaviours by people 
within these 
interactions. 
Socially anxious 
(n=?) 
Non-socially anxious 
(n=?) 
Social anxiety (IAS)  Predict global and specific 
judgments of self by the 
individuals. 
Moscovitch & 
Hofmann, 2007 
78 SAD 
(1) 
ADIS-IV Speech task, 
video depicts 
high, low, or no 
standard. 
No standard 
condition. 
SP (n=39) 
NAC (n=39) 
Social Anxiety (SPAI) 
Speaking ability (PCRS) 
Depression (BDI) 
Ratings of audience standards, 
predicted performance (VAS) 
Anxiety (SUDS) 
 Predicted performance prior to 
speech, performance appraisal 
following speech, anxiety 
during speech rated 
retrospectively. 
Yoon & Zinbarg, 
2007 
51 N/A SPS 
(Self- 
consciousness 
subscale) 
Presented with 
ambiguous facial 
expressions. 
Neutral faces 
morphed with faces 
that displayed other 
emotions. 
High SA (n=?) 
Low SA (n=?) 
Social Anxiety (SPS) 
Depression (BDI) 
 Reaction times to presented 
faces. 
(2) Experimental studies consisting of an ambiguous condition without direct manipulation of ambiguity 
Abbott & Rapee, 
2004 
73 SAD 
(1) 
ADIS-IV Speech task. No feedback 
provided. 
SP (n=43) 
NAC (n=30) 
Social Anxiety 
(SIAS, SPS, APPQ, and BFNE) 
Performance appraisal (PQ) 
Post-event rumination (Edwards 
et al., 2003) 
 PQ immediately following 
speech task; post-event 
rumination questionnaire a 
week later. 
Chen et al., 2013 121 SAD 
(1) 
ADIS-IV Speech task. No feedback 
provided. 
SAD (n=121) Social Anxiety (SPS; SIAS) 
Performance appraisal (PQ) 
Focus of attention (Rapee & 
Abbott, 2006) 
Probability and Cost (Rapee & 
Abbott, 2007) 
State anxiety (LS) 
Post-event rumination (TQ) 
 Attentional focus, PQ, cost of 
negative evaluation and state 
anxiety questionnaires 
completed after speech. Post- 
event rumination 
questionnaires completed a 
week later. 
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Cody & 
Teachman, 2010 
81 N/A SIAS/ public 
speaking items 
from SPS 
(High 
≥ 30/4-5, 
Low ≤ 9/1-3) 
Speech task, view 
another’s speech 
and receive 
feedback. 
Feedback included 10 
positive and 10 
negative items, 
adapted from the PQ 
High SA (n=42) 
Low SA (n=39) 
Social Anxiety 
(SIAS, SPS, BFNE) 
Affect (PANAS; SUDS) 
Anxiety (STAI-T) 
Depression (BDI-II) 
Rumination (RSQ, PEPQ) 
 Free recall and recognition 
tests of feedback items. 
Again after two days. 
Bias towards recall and 
recognition of negative vs. 
positive items. 
 
Cody and 
Teachman, 2011 
90 N/A SIAS/ public 
speaking items 
from SPS 
(High ≥ 29/4-5, 
Low ≤ 9/1-3 
Short speeches, 
receive feedback. 
Feedback included 
both positive and 
negative items. 
High SA (n=43) 
Low SA (n=47) 
Social Anxiety (SIAS, SPS, 
BNFE) 
Post-event rumination (PEPQ) 
Performance appraisal (EPSP, 
MPSP; both adapted from PQ) 
Self-evaluation of 
performance. 
Predictions regarding 
feedback. 
Kashdan 
& Savostyanova, 
2011 
90 N/A SIAS (High ≥ 
34 
Low ≤ 10 
Opposite-sex 
interaction. 
Questions 
increase in degree 
of self-disclosure. 
No feedback provided High SAIS (n=43) 
Low SIAS (n=47) 
Social Anxiety (SIAS) 
Self- and Partner- appraisals (LS) 
Accuracy 
Meta-accuracy 
Perceived dissent 
Miskovic & 
Schmidt, 2012 
33 N/A SPIN 
(High ≥ 20, 
Low ≤ 10) 
Dot-probe task, 
variation in 
intensity of 
emotion and 
length of 
presentation. 
Facial expressions 
varied in degree of 
ambiguity through 
different levels of 
neutrality. 
High SA(n=17) 
Low SA (n=16) 
Social Anxiety (SPIN) 
Depression (BDI) 
Reaction times of correct 
trials 
Perini et al., 
2006 
60 SAD 
(1) 
ADIS-IV Speech task. No feedback provided SP(n=40) 
NAC (n=20) 
Social Anxiety (SPS; SIAS; 
APPQ-S) 
Self-awareness (SCS) 
Depression (DASS) 
Performance Appraisal (PQ) 
Rumination style (RSQ) 
Worry (PSWQ) 
Thought suppression (WBSI) 
Post-event rumination (PERQ) 
PQ completed following 
speech task. PERQ 
completed a week later. 
Perowne & 
Mansell, 2002 
20 N/A FNE 
(High ≥ 17, 
Low ≤ 8) 
Speech task, 
presented as a live 
performance with 
audience in 
another room. 
Virtual audience 
displayed a range of 
positive, negative and 
neutral behaviours. 
High FNE 
(n=10) 
Low FNE 
(n=10) 
Social Anxiety (FNE; SADS) 
Depression (BDI) 
Trait anxiety (STAI-T) 
Confidence as a speaker (PRCS) 
Focus of attention (FAQ) 
Predicted audience members’ 
enjoyment of speech and 
rated most noticeable 
behaviours. 
Perceived performance, 
focus of attention and 
anxiety during speech 
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Rapee & Abbott, 
2007 
214 SAD 
(1) 
ADIS-IV Speech task. No feedback 
provided. 
SP (n=214) Social Anxiety (SPS; SIAS) 
Performance appraisal (PQ) 
Focus of attention (Rapee & 
Abbott, 2006) 
State Anxiety (LS) 
Probability and Cost (Rapee & 
Abbott, 2007) 
Post-event rumination (Edwards 
et al., 2003) 
Attentional focus, PQ, cost of 
negative evaluation and state 
anxiety questionnaires 
completed after speech. Post- 
event rumination 
questionnaires completed a 
week later. 
 
 
Rapee & 
Hayman, 1996b 
62 N/A FNE, 
(Low ≤ 16; 
High ≥ 16) 
Speech task, rate 
performance, 
view video of 
own speech. 
No feedback provided 
initially. 
High SA (n=33) 
Low SA (n=29) 
Social anxiety (FNE) 
Speech performance (PQ) 
Questionnaires completed 
after first speech, and again 
after video feedback. Self- 
ratings made before 
presentation of video 
feedback. 
Rapee & Lim, 
1992 
66 SAD 
(1) 
ADIS-IV Speech task with 
small audience. 
No feedback provided SP (n=33) 
NAC(n=33) 
Social Anxiety (FNE, SADS, 
SCS) 
DASS 
Performance appraisal (PQ) 
Self- and observer- ratings 
(for another speech) 
completed. 
Zou & Abbott 80 SAD 
(2) 
ADIS-IV Interaction task. Moderate scores for 
feedback, no other 
feedback provided. 
SP (n=40) 
NAC (n=40) 
Social Anxiety (SPS; SIAS; 
BFNE) 
Depression (DASS) 
State mood (PANAS) 
State anxiety (SAR) 
Performance Appraisal (PQ) 
Post-event rumination (TQ) 
SAR and PANAS before and 
after interaction and after 
feedback. PQ after feedback, 
TQ completed 10 minutes 
later. 
Note: Number in brackets in the Clinical Status column indicates whether SAD participants were clinic attendees (1) or recruited from a convenience sample (2). 
ADIS-IV - Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV; APPQ - Albany Panic and Phobia Questionnaire; ASI - Anxiety Sensitivity Index; BDI - Beck Depression Inventory; BC - Behaviour 
Checklist; BFNE - Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; BSQ - Body Sensations Questionnaire; CES-D - Centre for Epidemiological Studies-Depression Scale; DASS - Depression, Anxiety Stress 
Scales; FAQ - Focus of Attention Questionnaire; FBS - Fear of Blushing Scale; FNE - Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; HADS - Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scales; IAQ - Interview Anxiety 
Questionnaire; IPES - Interpretation of Positive Events Scale; IQ - The Interpretation Questionnaire; ISI - Inventory of Social Interactions; LS - Likert Scales; LSAS (SR) - Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale 
(Self-Report); KDEF - Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces; MACL-R - Revised Multiple Adjective Check List; NDRT - Nelson-Denny Reading Test; PANAS - Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule; 
PEPQ - Post-Event Processing Questionnaire; PERQ - Post-Event Rumination Questionnaire; PRCA - Personal Report of Communication Apprehension; PCRS - Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker 
Scale; PSWQ - Penn State Worry Questionnaire; RQ - Rumination Questionnaire; RRS - Ruminative Response Scale; SAR - Social Anxiety Rating; SCID - Structured Clinical Interview for DSM- IV; 
SPIN - Social Phobia Inventory; SCS - Self-consciousness scale; SDS - Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale; SIAS - Social Interaction Anxiety Scale; SILS - Shipley Institute of Living Scale- 
Vocabulary Test; SMIB - Self-Report Measure of Interpretation Bias; SPS - Social Phobia Scale; SPAI - Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory; SPRS - Social Performance Rating Scale; SPCQ - Self 
Presentation Concern Questionnaire; SPQ - Speech performance questionnaire; STAI - State Trait Anxiety Inventory (State & Trait subscales); SUDS - Subjective Units of Distress; TQ -Thoughts 
Questionnaire; VAS - Visual Analogue Scales; BWSI - White Bear Suppression Inventory. 
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2.3 Results 
 
The results of this review including study design characteristics, appraisal measures, 
symptom and process measures and bias in interpretations are categorised according to both 
1) the intentional induction of ambiguity and 2) the unintentional induction of ambiguity. 
 These two categories sufficiently accounted for all 27 studies. The main findings are 
summarised in Table 2. Four studies employed ambiguous socially evaluative passages, nine 
studies involved either a speech or interaction task. In four of these studies, audience members 
displayed ambiguous behaviours and in the other five studies, participants did not receive 
feedback about their performance. Two studies used ambiguous faces, and two studies 
implemented sentence-completion tasks. Fourteen studies asked participants to perform a 
speech, and five asked participants to engage in a social interaction or conversation. 
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Table 2. Study outcomes across control and socially anxious groups in terms of observed effects of ambiguity across performance appraisal,   
mood, rumination, self-focused attention and interpretation biases. 
Note: Please refer to the following key to indicate application of ambiguity: 1. Lack of clarity; 2. Multiple meanings; 3; Incompleteness, lack 
of information; 4. Inconsistency. 
 
  Study Design Characteristics   Study Results  
Study Manipulation Checks 
for Ambiguity 
Manipulation of 
stimuli/feedback/standards 
/ambiguous social 
situations/confederate 
behaviours 
Performance Appraisal 
Ratings (ambiguous vs. 
unambiguous/self-other, 
etc.) 
Symptom Ratings: Anxiety and 
Mood 
Process Ratings 
e.g., attention, 
rumination, 
memory 
Interpretation Biases e.g. likelihood 
of selecting a negative 
interpretation 
(1) Experimental studies with direct manipulation of ambiguity 
Amin et al., 1998 
(1) 
None 
(Scenarios modelled on 
Interpretation 
Questionnaire (Butler & 
Mathews, 1983)). 
Ambiguous social situations N/A N/A N/A Likelihood of negative 
interpretation*** 
Likelihood of positive 
interpretation*** 
Cost ratings of neutral outcomes 
(d= -.62, r = -.29) 
Cost ratings of negative outcomes 
(d=-.49, r = -.24) 
Amir et al., 2005 
(1,2) 
None 
 
(Ambiguous statements 
(α=.62)). 
Ambiguous statements 
(feedback) about one’s 
appearance. 
N/A N/A N/A Ambiguous videos rated as negative* 
Bögels & 
Lamers, 2002c 
(1,2) 
None 
(stories based on 
Bennet, 1989). 
Ambiguous feedback about a 
character’s 
actions/behaviour/ 
appearance. 
N/A State Anxiety 
(self-focus) 
(d = .71, r = .34). 
State Anxiety (task-focus) 
(d = .83, r = .38). 
Self-awareness 
(self-focus) 
(d = .83, r = .38) 
Self-awareness 
(task-focus) 
(d = .89, r = .41). 
N/A 
Brozovich & 
Heimberg, 2015 
(1) 
All scenarios adapted 
from Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000 and 
Hertel et al., 2008). 
Interpretation 
questionnaire items 
from Hertel et al., 2008. 
Ambiguous social scenarios. Predicted Speech 
Performance 
(η2 = .62)*** 
Imagery PEP cond. 
(η2 = .71)*** 
Semantic PEP cond. 
(η2 = .66)*** 
Control cond. 
(η2 = .45)*** 
State Anxiety (all time-points) 
(η2 = .44)*** 
 
Following Induction 
Imagery vs. Semantic PEP 
Induction (η2 = .25)*** 
Imagery PEP vs. Control 
(η2 = .21)** 
 ‘Socially anxious’ interpretation 
(η2 = .52)*** 
Negative interpretation 
N/A 
Positive interpretation 
N/A 
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Budnick et al., 
2015 
(1,2) 
Independent coding on 
confederate behaviours; 
no feedback condition: 
conversational tone, 
semi-open body posture 
and neutral expression 
Neutral behaviors during 
interview. 
N/A Displayed Anxiety 
Positive feedback (p<0.05) 
No feedback (p<0.05) 
 
Assertive tactics 
Positive feedback (p<0.05; β=-.76*) 
Positive feedback 
predicted self-focus 
(β=1.57 in High 
SA); (β=-1.50 in 
Low SA). 
N/A 
Constans et al., 
1999a 
(1,2) 
Pilot tested on 22 
undergraduates (no 
screening) 
M=3.93, SD=1.07 (rated 
on a Likert scale from 
1-7). 
Ambiguous social vignettes N/A N/A N/A No. of –ve interpretations 
(d=-.49, r = -.24). 
Note: 
Mean ratings more negative than 
controls, but >4 on rating scales. 
Guitiérrez- 
Garcia & Calvo, 
2014 
(4) 
Manipulation checks 
across three different 
studies showed 
significant differences 
between blended and 
non-blended facial 
stimuli in terms of 
valence and affective 
outcomes. 
Six composite faces 
displaying neutral, 
happiness, anger, disgust, 
sadness, fear and surprise 
eyes, couple with a happy 
smile. 
N/A N/A N/A Probability of ‘happy’ classification 
for all blended expressions 
(p<0.001)*** 
 
Happy eyes (d = .43, r = .21). 
Angry eyes (d=2.03, r = .71). 
Disgusted eyes (d=1.16, r = .50). 
Fearful eyes (d=1.53, r = .61). 
Sad eyes (d=1.12, r = .49). 
Surprised eyes (d=1.35, r = .56). 
Neutral eyes (d=1.27, r = .54). 
 
Reaction times to Angry (d = .71, r = 
.34)*; Disgusted (d = .67, r = .32)*; 
Fearful (d = .65, r = .31)*. 
Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2000 
(3) 
Probe words developed 
in extensive pilot 
studies (Hirsch & 
Mathews, 1997). 
Ambiguous job interview 
scenarios. 
N/A N/A N/A RT to threat words, ambiguous 
contexts 
(d = .58, r = .28). 
RT to threat words, baseline 
(d = .63, r = .30). 
RT to non-threat words, ambiguous 
contexts 
(d = .90, r = .41). 
Response latencies to non-threat 
words, baseline 
(d = .42, r = .21). 
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Huppert et al., 
2007 
(3) 
None 
Sentences revised 
according to feedback 
from social anxiety 
researchers. 
Sentence completion 
task. 
N/A N/A N/A Negative words (d = .87, r = 
.40). 
Positive words 
(d=-1.54, r = -.61). 
Anxious words (d = .66, r = 
.31). 
Neutral words 
(d=-1.20, r = -.51). 
Agreement ratings with 
negative, anxious, positive, 
neutral resolutions of 
ambiguity 
(η2 = .45; .44; .08; .02) 
Jalal & Amir, 
2014 
(3) 
Homographs and 
paradigm based on 
Richards & French, 
1992 and Amir et al., 
2005. Counterbalanced 
presentation. 
Use of homograph pairs 
which pertained to social 
threat or non-threat (e.g., 
odd-number; odd-
bizarre); unrelated non-
threat or unrelated threat 
(e.g., odd- pull; odd-
spiteful). 
N/A N/A Priming of non- 
threat related 
information (ns) 
Reaction times to 
social homograph 
primes followed by 
related targets 
(d = .55)** 
N/A 
Jusyte & 
Schönenberg, 
2014 
(2,4) 
None Three continuous 
affective dimensions 
blended from (happy, 
angry, fearful) at 10%, 
30%, 50%, 70% and 
90% 
N/A N/A N/A Response bias (ns) 
Subjective intensity ratings for 
happy-fearful (ns); angry 
fearful (ns); angry-happy (ns). 
61 
 
Kanai et al., 
2010 
(2) 
N/A Ambiguous behaviours 
during speech task. 
N/A Emotionality (d = .83)* 
Perceived threat (d = .79)* 
N/A Negative interpretation (d = 
.50)* 
Neutral interpretation (d=-
.75)* 
Threatening interpretation (d = 
.43)* 
Leary et al., 
1988a 
(3) 
N/A Evaluative social 
scenarios. 
N/A N/A N/A Predicted endorsement of 
positive qualities by others 
“Strong” * “Friendly” * 
“Socially skilled” ** “Open” * 
“Interesting” * “Popular” ** 
“Attractive” ** “Secure” ** 
Moscovitch & 
Hofmann, 
2007 
(1,3) 
Participants rated 
perceived level of 
clarity of expected 
performance standards. 
No standards: M=3.69, 
SD=3.10 
No standards condition, 
speech task, feedback. 
Audience standards (η2 = 
.06)* 
Predicted performance (η2  
= .61)*** 
Self-appraisal (η2 = .16)*** 
(d=-2.41, r = -.77). 
State anxiety (η2 = .59)*** 
(d=2.24, r = -.75). 
N/A N/A 
Yoon & 
Zinbarg, 2007 
(1) 
Faces selected from 
Ekman and Friesen’s 
Pictures of Facial 
Affect (1976). 
Interpretation of faces, 
some of which were 
neutral. 
N/A N/A N/A Negative interpretation of 
neutral faces 
(r = .43)* 
Angry interpretation of neutral 
faces (r = .34)* 
62 
 
(2) Experimental studies consisting of an ambiguous condition without direct manipulation of ambiguity 
Abbott & Rapee, 
2004 
(3) 
N/A No feedback provided. Performance Appraisal 
Time 1 
(d= -.89, r = -.40)** 
Performance appraisal 
Time 2 
(d= -1.24, r = -.53)** 
N/A Negative 
rumination 
(d=1.59, r = .62)** 
N/A 
Chen et al., 
2013. 
(3) 
N/A No feedback provided. Self-appraisal mediates 
relationship between trait 
social anxiety and post- 
event rumination: (β=.11, 
p = .07) 
 
Self-appraisal and 
attentional focus: 
(β=.10, p = 08) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Cody & 
Teachman, 2010 
(4) 
Rate credibility of 
feedback. 
Feedback following speech 
task. 
N/A N/A Rumination 
(d = .82)*** 
Recognition valence for +ve items 
(d=-.01, r = -.01) 
Recognition valence for –ve items 
(d=-.57, r = -.27) 
Cody & 
Teachman, 2011 
(4) 
None Feedback following speech 
task. 
Performance appraisal 
(η2 = .34)*** 
N/A Social anxiety 
group status 
predicted: 
PEP (β=.39)** 
Change in global 
item ratings over 
time (β=-.31)* 
N/A 
Kashdan & 
Savostyanova, 
2011 
(3) 
N/A No feedback provided. Self-Evaluation +ve** 
Self-Evaluation –ve** 
Expected Evaluation 
+ve** Expected 
Evaluation 
–ve** 
N/A N/A Accuracy (self-rating vs. other- rating) 
(d = .47)** 
Meta-accuracy (accuracy of predictions 
of others’ ratings) (d = .77)** 
Perceived dissent (beliefs that others 
will rate even worse than one rates 
oneself d = .51)* 
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Miskovic & 
Schmidt, 2012 
(1) 
N/A Neutral facial expressions 
(mild: 25% neutral 75% 
other emotion; moderate: 
50% neutral 50% other) 
N/A N/A N/A Threat bias (hypervigilance to faces of 
moderate intensity 
(η2 = .21)** 
Perini et al., 
2006 
(3) 
N/A No feedback provided. Performance appraisal 
(d= -1.94, r = -0.70)** 
N/A Post-event 
rumination 
Frequency 
(d=1.31, r = 
.55)* 
Control (d=-
.71, r = -.33)* 
Engagement 
(d=1.19, r = 
.51)* 
Distress 
   
 
N/A 
Perowne & 
Mansell, 2002 
(4) 
Valence of positive, 
negative and neutral 
behaviours piloted on 12 
independent raters. 
Neutral rating = -.28 
(0.26). 
‘Live audience’ displayed 
positive, negative and 
neutral behaviours. 
Audience members’ 
ratings (d=-1.80, r = -
.67). 
Self-appraisal 
(d=-1.85, r = -0.68). 
Success of speech (d= 
-1.89 r = -.69). 
State Anxiety (d=2.35, r = .76). Self-focused 
attention 
(d=1.60, r = 
.63). 
Other-focused 
attention 
(d=-1.48, 
r = -.60). 
Response bias (false hits to positive 
behaviours) 
(d=-.40, r = -.19). 
Discrimination of audience behaviours 
(d=-.37, r = -.18). 
Rapee & 
Abbott, 2007 
(3) 
N/A No feedback provided. N/A N/A Negative 
rumination 
(β=-.18**) 
N/A 
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Rapee & 
Hayman, 1996b 
(3) 
N/A No feedback provided. Performance appraisal 
(d= -.76, r= -.35) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Rapee & Lim, 
1992 
(3) 
N/A No feedback provided. Performance appraisal 
of self and other 
speakers (p<0.025) 
Self-ratings on global 
items (d= .49, r= .24) 
Self-ratings on 
specific items 
(d= .98, r= .44) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Zou & Abbott, 
2012 
(1,2) 
Rate credibility of 
feedback. 
Feedback consisted of 
moderate scores such as 
5/10. 
Performance appraisal 
(η2 = .61)*** 
Group interaction 
with 
positive/moderate 
feedback* 
No sig. difference in 
controls. 
Sig. difference in 
SAD** 
State Anxiety post-feedback 
(η2= .55)** 
Post-event 
rumination 
 
Positive 
(η2 = .35)*** 
Negative 
(η2  = .57)*** 
N/A 
* = p< .05, ** = p< .01, *** = p< .001, d = Cohen’s d, r = zero-order correlations, η2 = eta squared, β = standardized beta-weights. 
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2.3.1 Design, manipulation of ambiguity, assessment measures and sample size. 
 
Experimental studies with direct manipulation of ambiguity. Of these 15 studies, at least one 
definition of ambiguity was implemented within the study design. The most common 
definition was a lack of clarity and multiple meanings, followed by incompleteness or a lack 
of information. Only one of these studies included an ‘online’ manipulation check for the 
ambiguous condition, however, 10 other studies had either adapted stimuli from previous 
studies or conducted pilot testing with separate participant samples prior to the main study. 
Six studies determined the clinical status of participants with standardized assessment 
measures such as the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-I; First, Gibbon, 
Spitzer, & Williams, 1996), the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS- 
IV; DiNardo, Brown, & Barlow, 1994) or the Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview 
(MINI; Sheehan et al., 1998). The remaining studies categorised participants into high or low 
social anxiety groups with self-report questionnaires such as the Fear of Negative Evaluations 
Scale (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969); Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE; 
Leary, 1983); Social Phobia Scale (SPS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998); Social Interaction Anxiety 
Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998); The Interaction Anxiousness Scale (IAS; Leary, 
1983); the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Conner et al., 2000); the Liebowitz Social Anxiety 
Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987; Oakman et al., 2003); Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory 
(SPAI; Turner, Beidel, Dancu, & Stanley, 1989); the revised Self Consciousness Scale 
(Scheier & Carver, 1985) and the Personal Report of Communication Apprehension 
(McCroskey, 1982). Overall, sample sizes ranged from 24 to 114 (M = 65.96, SD = 25.63), 
with adequate power reported across all 15 studies. 
 
Experimental studies without direct manipulation of ambiguity. 
 
There were 12 studies which did not deliberately or directly attempt to manipulate 
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ambiguity. One of the primary ways of manipulating ambiguity indirectly was a lack of 
feedback following a speech task. There were a total of nine studies which involved a speech 
task, and two which used an interaction task. Of the nine studies that used a speech task, six 
studies provided no feedback regarding speech performance and three studies provided 
feedback that was inconsistent or contradictory. Of the two studies which included an 
interaction task, one of these provided no feedback while the other provided ambiguous 
feedback through use of moderate scores. 
Three studies attempted to include a manipulation check for experimental stimuli; two 
studies obtained ratings of participants’ agreement with feedback, and the other pilot tested 
confederate behaviours. Five studies determined the clinical status of participants with the 
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; DiNardo, Brown, & Barlow, 
1994). The remaining studies categorised participants into high or low social anxiety groups 
based on self-report questionnaires such as the Fear of Negative Evaluations Scale (FNE; 
Watson & Friend, 1969; BFNE; Leary, 1983); the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; 
Mattick & Clarke, 1998); and the Social anxiety disorder Inventory (SPIN; Conner et al., 
2000). 
 
 2.3.2 Appraisal, symptom and outcome measures 
Five studies included a measure of performance appraisal; of these, four used 
questionnaires which had been adapted from the Performance Questionnaire (PQ; Rapee & 
Lim, 1992). Sixteen studies included a measure for depressive symptoms such as the BDI 
(Beck, 1996), DASS-21 (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) or CES-D (Ratloff, 1977). State 
and/or trait anxiety was assessed in 14 studies and state mood was assessed in two studies. A 
measure of post-event rumination was included in eight studies and four studies assessed 
focus of attention; three via a standardised and one via open-ended questions. 
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2.2.3 Outcomes 
 
Outcomes of the 27 included studies are presented in Table 2. Outcomes were mainly 
assessed in terms of differences between social anxiety disorder and control groups or 
comparisons between high and low social anxiety groups on primary outcome variables with 
the exception of two studies which assessed outcomes primarily for the socially anxious 
group. Due to the significant differences in study design and outcome variables, a common 
effect size could not be calculated. Effect sizes in the form of Cohen’s d and η2 were 
included from published results or calculated whenever possible, however, a lack of reported 
means and standard deviations in reported results across a few studies only allowed for 
reporting of significant differences between groups, despite attempts made obtain the relevant 
data for calculation of effect sizes. In five studies, hierarchical regression analyses were also 
conducted on various variables which predicted outcome variables; these results have been 
reported as β coefficients for the relevant outcome variables. 
 
Interpretation of Ambiguity 
Interpretation of ambiguity was the most common outcome assessed across all studies, 
especially with respect to studies that used ambiguous social scenarios. Seven studies found 
that compared to non-anxious or low social anxiety groups, socially anxious individuals 
were significantly more likely to interpret ambiguous information as negative or threatening, 
with effect sizes ranging from d = .43 to d = .83. In addition, Amin et al., (1998) found that 
for a clinically diagnosed social anxiety disorder sample, the cost associated with unresolved 
ambiguity was significant (d = -.62). 
Three of the seven aforementioned studies found that socially anxious individuals were 
significantly less likely to either select a positive interpretation or attribute positive 
characteristics to the self within an ambiguous situation, compared to controls. However, 
Constans et al., (1999, Experiment 1) noted that mean ratings in the high SA group were 
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above ‘neutral’ on rating scales, even though more negative interpretations were selected by 
the high SA group compared to the low SA group. In contrast, Huppert et al., (2007) found 
that not only were socially anxious individuals significantly more likely to select negative 
and anxious words than neutral or positive words in completing an ambiguous sentence 
describing a social situation, higher agreement ratings were also given for negative and 
anxious words. In addition, Brozovich & Heimberg (2013) found that following an Imagery 
PEP induction where individuals were instructed to visually recall a past negative speech 
experience, socially anxious individuals endorsed more negative interpretations of ambiguous 
social scenarios, compared to socially anxious individuals in the control condition. 
Of all the studies identified, four implemented ambiguous facial stimuli to assess 
interpretive bias. Guitiérrez-Garcia and Calvo (2014) found that when ‘happy’ eyes were 
combined with non-matching mouth regions, socially anxious individuals were significantly 
more likely to identify such faces as ‘not happy’ compared to controls, in addition, they 
displayed faster reaction times to blended expressions of anger, disgust and fear. Yoon and 
Zinbarg (2007) found that the SAD group was more likely to make negative or angry 
interpretations of neutral faces compared to controls and that there was significantly greater 
likelihood of neutral cues priming angry targets. Miskovic and Schmidt (2005) found a 
significant difference between low and high SA groups, such that the latter showed longer 
response latencies to ambiguous faces, indicating hypervigilance to an emotion that was 
presented at 50% intensity. In particular, the effect size of η2 = .21 appeared to be driven by 
an attentional bias to angry-neutral faces. In contrast to these three studies, Jusyte and 
Schönenberg (2014) found that the SAD group did not display interpretive biases of facial 
expressions morphed at the ratio of optimal ambiguity (50:50). 
 
Self-Appraisal and Performance Appraisal 
 
Eleven studies included a measure of performance appraisal (or predicted 
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performance appraisal); of these, two employed a deliberate manipulation of ambiguity. 
Overall, these studies consistently found that socially anxious individuals perceived their own 
performances and/or predicted an upcoming performance to be significantly worse than non- 
or low-anxious controls, with effect sizes ranging from d = -.76 to d = -2.55. One study 
utilised a social interaction task and found that socially anxious individuals were not only 
significantly more likely to evaluate themselves negatively and expect others to do the same, 
they were also significantly less likely to make positive appraisals, or expect others to have 
evaluated them positively under ambiguous conditions (Kashdan & Savostyanova, 2011). 
Predicted performance ratings were also found to be significantly lower compared to controls 
(η2 = .61; Moscovitch & Hofmann, 2007) and one’s own performance was rated more poorly 
on both global (e.g., kept audience interested, generally spoke well) and specific (e.g., kept 
eye contact with audience, had a clear voice) PQ items (Rapee & Lim, 1992). Perowne and 
Mansell (2002) also reported a large effect size for predicted ratings by audience members 
who displayed neutral behaviours during a speech task (d = -1.80) such that the predicted 
ratings of the high social anxiety group were significantly lower than that of the low anxiety 
group. Similarly, the likelihood of the speech being seen as a ‘success’ was significantly 
reduced in the high social anxiety group (d = -1.89). Brozovich and Heimberg found that 
while socially anxious individuals overall made significantly worse predictions about 
performance, group differences were increased following deliberate semantic- or imagery- 
based rumination about a negative past speech performance with greatest differences 
observed in the Imagery PEP condition (η2 = .71). 
Finally, there was only one study which allowed for effect sizes to be calculated for 
accuracy of self-concept (d = .44), meta-accuracy (d = .77), and degree of belief that others 
would not notice one’s positive qualities (d = .51; Kashdan & Savostyanova, 2011). Taken 
together, these results suggest that not only do socially anxious individuals rate themselves 
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more negatively and less positively than others, they believe that others will in fact appraise 
them more negatively, worse than they appraise themselves. 
 
Subjective Anxiety 
 
Six studies found effect sizes ranging from d = .71 to d = 2.35 for levels of anxiety 
experienced during the speech which were retrospectively reported for socially anxious 
participants relative to controls (Bögels & Lamers, 2002c; Moscovitch & Hofmann, 2007; 
Perowne & Mansell, 2002; Brozovich & Heimberg, 2015; Budnick et al., 2015; Zou & 
Abbott, 2012). Bögels and Lamers found that when individuals with social anxiety disorder 
imagined themselves in ambiguous social situations, participants with social anxiety disorder 
reported significantly greater levels of anxiety compared to non-anxious controls under both 
self-focus (e.g., “You suddenly become aware of yourself and your presence amongst the 
guests.”) and task-focus (e.g., “You think about a receipt that you got from a friend”) 
conditions. Brozovich and Heimberg (2013) found that the high anxiety group reported 
significantly higher levels of state anxiety compared to controls at all five time-points in the 
study. Budnick and colleagues found that compared to controls, high SA individuals were 
observed to display higher levels of anxiety when they received neutral feedback from a 
confederate interviewer, but also when they received positive feedback during the interview. 
Zou and Abbott (2012) found that overall, individuals diagnosed with social anxiety disorder 
were significantly more anxious following feedback, compared to non-anxious controls. 
These results are unsurprising; however, they do suggest that the task-focused attention and 
positive feedback for socially anxious individuals do not seem to be beneficial in reducing 
state anxiety to a level that is comparable to non-anxious individuals. 
 
Post-Event Rumination and Attention 
 
Studies which have examined negative rumination generally report reliable group 
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differences, such that individuals with high in social anxiety endorse more frequent post- 
event rumination. Two studies reported increased negative rumination in high SA groups, 
with effect sizes ranging from d = .82 to d = 1.59, when feedback was not provided (Abbott 
& Rapee, 2004) or contained both positive and negative items (Cody & Teachman, 2010). 
Perini, Abbott and Rapee (2006) found that compared to non-anxious controls, individuals 
with social anxiety disorder reported significantly less control, more frequent and greater 
engagement with ruminative thoughts and higher levels of distress in the period of a week 
following a speech task. An unusual finding was reported by Zou and Abbott (2012), such 
that individuals with SAD engaged in both negative and positive rumination significantly 
more than their non-anxious counterparts. The degree of positive rumination was not 
influenced by the type of feedback provided, which may be consistent with the notion that 
these individuals ruminate indiscriminately. 
In another study that provided participants with inconsistent feedback which 
contained both positive and negative items (Cody & Teachman, 2011), social anxiety group 
status was found to be a significant predictor of post-event processing (β = .39), which in turn 
predicted a reduction in global performance ratings after a period of two days (β = .31). Two 
studies reported increased levels of self-awareness and self-focused attention when presented 
with ambiguous information in socially anxious individuals compared to controls (Bögels & 
Lamers, 2002) and reduced other-focused attention (Perowne & Mansell, 2002). Budnick et 
al., (2015) found that positive feedback provided during an interview with a confederate 
actually predicted increased self-focus in socially anxious individuals, and predicted reduced 
self-focus in non-anxious controls. 
Two studies used markedly distinct methodology and stimuli in their study designs 
and are worthy of separate discussion. Using a lexical decision task, Hirsch and Mathews 
(2000) found that socially anxious individuals were unable to make positive emotional 
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inferences “online” (i.e., when first being presented with ambiguous information), compared 
to non-anxious individuals who were biased towards making positive inferences. Similarly, 
the same pattern was observed in relation to making threat-related inferences “online” as 
indicated by slower reaction times within the ambiguous context, compared to baseline. 
Together, this pattern of responses suggests that socially anxious individuals may not 
adequately incorporate external information and instead rely more on retrospective memory 
judgments of their own performance on the basis of salient negative beliefs or imagery within 
social situations. It is also possible however, that cognitive resources subsumed by elevated 
state anxiety may impact on the inferences made. In another study, Jalal and Amir (2014) 
used a homograph priming paradigm where participants were presented with a homograph 
(e.g.,“odd”) followed by a target word (e.g.,“number”, “bizarre”) to assess the priming effect 
of first word on the second word. It was found that SAD individuals were slower to respond 
to socially threatening targets compared to non-social threatening targets when preceded by a 
socially ambiguous homograph which suggests that socially anxious individuals may inhibit 
threat-relevant interpretations of ambiguous social words. 
In summary, the studies assessed show a consistent pattern of results which suggest 
that socially anxious individuals are more likely to make negative interpretations of 
ambiguous information, and less likely to make positive interpretations compared to non- 
anxious controls. In addition, when provided with inconsistent or no feedback, there is a 
tendency to under-evaluate one’s own performance and also underestimate the likelihood 
that others will evaluate their performance of them positively. There is relatively limited 
evidence that levels of post-event rumination, self-focused attention and subjective anxiety 
in ambiguous situations is higher for socially anxious individuals as results from studies 
assessed do not control for pre-existing differences. This could be examined by 
implementing study designs where the control group is presented with unambiguous 
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information that is either positive or negatively valenced. In fact, this is an issue for most of 
the studies where an ambiguous condition was compared to a control condition, but not a 
condition that was unambiguous. The results for studies which use blended facial stimuli are 
somewhat mixed, which may be due to variation in stimuli, paradigm and outcome 
measures. As suggested by Jusyte and Schönenberg (2014), studies which use facial stimuli 
may differ from those that use ambiguous social scenarios because looking at a static picture 
of a blended facial expression may not automatically lead to anticipatory anxiety about a 
future interaction or possible negative evaluation. Consequently, results from such studies 
may aid understanding of automatic processing of facial stimuli before the introduction of 
cognitive processes and biases. 
 
2.3.4 Risk of bias 
 
Risk of bias for each study is reported in Table 3. The domains and formatting have 
been adapted from the Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of Interventions to allow 
for improved assessment of non-randomized controlled trials (Higgins & Green, 2011). An 
unclear risk of bias status will be given to studies in which there are insufficient information 
to allow for allocation to “high risk” or “low risk” status (Higgins & Green, 2011). A second 
rater coded 60% of the included manuscripts, and there was an average of 80% agreement in 
ratings between the two raters across each risk of bias domain. 
Overall risk of bias across the studies was low to moderate, with most studies including 
sufficient information to allow for allocation of “high risk” or “low risk” status. Of the 14 
studies that did not assess the clinical status of participants via structured or semi-structured 
clinical interviews, results may not have accurately reflected the affective, cognitive and 
behavioural outcomes reported, compared to studies in which individuals were diagnosed 
with SAD. Additionally, five studies did not include an adequate control condition, which 
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may increase the risk of selection bias, and six studies that either involved a speech 
performance or interaction task did not include an objective measure for performance, which 
can increase the risk of detection bias. Random allocation was carried out in all studies where 
appropriate, and blinding of personnel and outcomes was ensured across the majority of 
studies. No studies engaged in selective reporting, however, five studies may be at increased 
risk of attrition bias due to insufficient information provided about loss of participant data, 
and a lack of reporting about statistical analyses conducted to control for any attrition. 
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Table 3. Risk of bias levels according to an adapted version of the Cochrane Handbook for 
Systematic Reviews of Interventions (Higgins & Green, 2011) 
Type of bias:  Selection  Performance Detectio n Attrition Reporting 
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Amin et al., 1998 N/A N/A  + + N/A N/A ? N/A + + 
Amir et al., 2005 + N/A N/A - +  + + N/A + + 
Bögels & Lamers, 2002c N/A N/A N/A + +  + + N/A + + 
Brozovich & Heimberg, 2015 + N/A  + - +  ? N/A N/A + + 
Budnick et al., 2015 + +  - - N/A  + N/A  - + + 
Chen, Rapee & Abbott, 
2013 
N/A N/A N/A + + N/A +  + + + 
Constans et al., 1999a + N/A  + - +  + + N/A ? + 
Guitiérrez-Garcia & Calvo, 
2014 
N/A + N/A - + N/A N/A  + ? + 
Hirsch & Mathews, 2000 N/A N/A N/A + +  + N/A  + + + 
Huppert et al., 2007 N/A N/A  + - +  + +  + + + 
Jalal & Amir, 2014 N/A N/A  + + N/A N/A N/A  + + + 
Jusyte & Schönenberg, 
2014 
N/A N/A N/A + N/A N/A N/A  + + + 
Kanai et al., 2010 N/A N/A N/A - ? +   +  - + + 
Leary et al., 1988a + N/A  - - +  + + N/A ? + 
Moscovitch & Hofmann, 
2007 
+ +  + + +  + +  + + + 
Yoon & Zinbarg, 2007 + N/A  - + +  + +  + + + 
Abbott & Rapee, 2004 N/A N/A  + + +  + +  + + + 
Cody & Teachman, 2010 ? N/A N/A - +  + +  - ? + 
Cody & Teachman, 2011 N/A N/A  + - +  + +  - + + 
Kashdan & Savostyanova, 
2011 
+ N/A  - - +  + +  - ? + 
Miskovic & Schmidt, 2005 N/A N/A  + - +  + +  + + + 
Perini, Abbott, & Rapee, 
2006 
N/A N/A  + + +  + +  + + + 
Perowne & Mansell, 2002 N/A N/A N/A - + N/A N/A N/A - + 
Rapee & Abbott, 2007 N/A N/A N/A + N/A N/A N/A  + + + 
Rapee & Hayman, 1996b N/A N/A  - N/A ?  ? ?  + + + 
Rapee & Lim, 1992 N/A N/A N/A + +  + +  + + + 
Zou & Abbott, 2012 + +  + + +  + +  - + + 
+ = low risk of bias (or judged not to affect outcome); - = high risk of bias; ? = unclear risk of bias; N/A = not applicable 
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  2.4 Discussion 
 
2.4.1 Summary of findings 
 
Cognitive models of social anxiety disorder (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997; Schlenker & Leary, 1982) posit the experience of anxiety is associated with 
the level of discrepancy between perceived standards and one’s ability to meet those 
standards. A lack of attention to external cues within one’s immediate environment, as a 
result of self-directed focus also reduces the likelihood that a judgment of perceived 
performance standards will be realistic. For example, Moscovitch and Hofmann (2007) found 
that individuals assumed high standards when no information was provided regarding the 
expected level of performance (Moscovitch & Hofmann, 2007). These high standards may 
direct the preferential allocation of attention which increases an individual’s hypervigilance 
of potential sources of threat and negative evaluation. In addition, individuals with social 
anxiety often hold negative self-beliefs (e.g., I am stupid, I am unattractive) which have 
developed from significant experiences and arise in socio-evaluative situations. These beliefs 
lead to particular cognitions (e.g., I will make a mistake, I will be rejected) which are 
associated with physiological and behavioural outcomes (Clark & Wells, 1995). 
Social situations are inherently ambiguous and present individuals with verbal and non- 
verbal information which may require interpretation within the situation. As an example, for 
a non-anxious individual who observes an audience member running their hands through 
their hair or scratching their head during their speech, this might be simply overlooked or 
considered benign; for socially anxious individuals however, such behaviours may instead 
interpreted as a sign of disapproval and perceived to be threatening and indicative of negative 
evaluation (Kanai et al., 2010). In most cases, ambiguity is resolved when an interpretation is 
made based on the external or internal sources of information available or when specific 
feedback is provided in relation to one’s performance, although this infrequently occurs. A 
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relatively small number of studies to date have attempted to investigate the interpretation of 
ambiguous information by deliberate presentation of ambiguous cues whether it is visual, 
verbal/non-verbal or linguistic social information. This review sought to systematically 
evaluate the existing literature to identify differences between socially anxious and non- 
anxious individuals in their interpretation of ambiguous social information, and in addition 
direct future research towards identifying possible processes underlying these differences. 
There is limited research in this area, with 27 studies available for review, published between 
1988 and 2015. Whilst studies differed in outcome measures, interpretation biases were the 
most commonly reported outcome variable, followed by performance appraisal, attention and 
rumination. The results from various studies suggest evidence for a negative interpretation 
bias, but also a lack of a benign interpretation bias. This is partly attributable to variations in 
experimental methodology, stimulus selection, paradigms used and SAD samples. Despite 
this, exploratory analyses from a number of studies have found that socially anxious 
individuals perceive ambiguous outcomes to be more distressing than their non-anxious 
counterparts, with greater differences between groups in terms of costs associated with a 
neutral outcome, relative to a negative outcome (Amin et al., 1998). 
The 15 studies which employed a deliberate manipulation of ambiguity were 
considered to be the most useful for the purpose of this review as the induction of ambiguity 
was directly experimentally manipulated. Consistently across these studies, significant 
differences were found between socially anxious and the non-anxious individuals, such that 
the SA group made more negative interpretations of ambiguous events than non-anxious 
controls, indicating the presence of a negative interpretation bias. Furthermore, negative 
interpretations of ambiguous social scenarios were found to be exacerbated following the 
induction of mental imagery for past negative performances, which also lowered predictions 
of speech performance (Brozovich & Heimberg, 2015). Objective deficits for interaction 
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performance were also found to be worse when a confederate displayed neutral behaviours 
which contained multiple meanings (Budnick et al., 2015). 
Across these studies, there is some evidence for a lack of positive inferential bias, such 
that SA individuals are less likely to endorse a positive interpretation of ambiguous 
information (Amin et al., 1998; Huppert et al., 2007). Budnick and colleagues (2015) also 
found that SA individuals who interacted with a confederate displaying consistently positive 
behaviours were objectively rated to look more anxious and be less successful in the 
interaction, and no better than those who had been shown consistently negative behaviours. 
These biases also seem to apply to the endorsement of personal attributes, such that socially 
anxious individuals are significantly less likely to believe that others see them as possessing 
desirable qualities, e.g., ‘strong’, ‘friendly’, ‘open’ (Leary et al., 1988). One study 
found that socially anxious individuals reported experiencing significantly higher levels of 
anxiety and self-awareness when imagining themselves receiving ambiguous feedback about 
their behaviour or appearance (Bögels & Lamers, 2002). Similarly, Kanai and colleagues 
(2010) found that socially anxious individuals rated ambiguous behaviours as being more 
negative and perceived more threat in these behaviours than non-anxious controls. In terms of 
predicted and retrospective performance appraisal, Moscovitch and Hofmann (2007) found that 
compared to a low social anxiety group, both predicted performance ratings and self- appraisal 
prior to and following the speech task were significantly poorer when socially anxious 
individuals were given no information about performance standards, i.e., a situation of poor 
clarity. In such situations socially anxious participants responded like those in assigned to the 
high standards condition. 
In terms of studies which examine interpretive bias towards ambiguity in facial 
expressions, results are more inconsistent. For example, Jusyte and Schönenberg (2014) 
found that individuals diagnosed with Generalised SAD did not display a negative 
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interpretive bias for ambiguous faces. Other studies have found, however, that high SA 
groups are more likely to perceive blended expressions with happy eyes as not happy 
(Guitiérrez-Garcia & Calvo, 2014). Neutral cues have also been shown to facilitate 
responding to angry target faces for socially anxious individuals (Yoon & Zinbarg, 2007; 
Miskovic & Schmidt, 2005). 
Finally, studies which employed the use of homographs and priming paradigms suggest 
that socially anxious individuals demonstrate impairments in making both threat-based and 
benign interpretations to current information (Hirsch & Mathews, 2000), and may actually 
inhibit threat-congruent meanings of ambiguous words (Jalal & Amir, 2014). 
Within the group of studies which were not deemed to have deliberately induced 
ambiguity, the majority of these did not provide feedback following a performance task or 
gave feedback containing contradictory or inconsistent information. Due to some differences 
in the design characteristics of this group of studies, a wider range of outcome measures were 
reported, from rumination (e.g., Abbott & Rapee, 2004), to accuracy of self-concept (e.g., 
Kashdan & Savostyanova, 2011). Of the studies that did not provide feedback following a 
speech task, self-appraisal and expectancies of others’ appraisal were consistently worse than 
controls, with individuals also less likely to endorse positive self-evaluations (Kashdan & 
Savostyanova, 2011). Negative rumination and post-event processing were also reported to a 
greater degree in the social anxiety groups, compared to controls when given inconsistent or 
no feedback regarding performance (Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Cody & Teachman, 2010). 
Perowne and Mansell (2002) also found that when socially anxious individuals were shown 
positive, negative and neutral behaviours, they were significantly less likely to have mistaken 
neutral or negative behaviours for positive ones, compared to non-anxious controls. 
 
2.4.2 Strengths and limitations of included studies 
 
The findings in this systematic review are generally consistent across both studies that 
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used clinical assessments and cut-offs for trait measures to determine clinical status or group 
allocation. Roughly one third of the included studies included a clinical interview to diagnose 
social anxiety disorder, of which one also included an anxiety control group where 
participants met diagnosis for OCD (Amin et al., 1998). The remaining studies implemented 
valid and reliable measures often used in social anxiety research and typically included 
additional measures to confirm group allocation (e.g., Amir et al., 2005). Manipulation 
checks were included in the majority of studies which directly manipulated ambiguity, 
through pilot testing or adaptation of prior stimuli (e.g., Amin et al., 1998; Bögels & Lamers, 
2002; Yoon & Zinbarg, 2007). Moscovitch and Hofmann (2007) directly asked participants 
to rate perceived level of clarity in standards across conditions. Two studies did not include a 
manipulation check for ambiguous behaviours demonstrated during a speech task (Kanai et 
al., 2010) and evaluative social scenarios (Leary et al., 1988). 
Of the studies which did not directly assess the clinical status of participants, five 
studies (Huppert et al., 2007; Cody & Teachman, 2010, Cody & Teachman, 2011; Kashdan 
& Savostyanova) used the SIAS and two (Perowne & Mansell, 2002; Rapee & Lim, 1992) 
used the SADS to determine group status. Whilst these measures are not sufficient in 
isolation to inform diagnoses, they do correlate highly with diagnoses of SAD (Mattick & 
Clark, 1998, Watson & Friend, 1969). 
Although the primary aim of a number of studies (e.g., Abbott and Rapee, 2004; 
Perowne & Mansell, 2002) was not to observe the effects of ambiguity per se and the 
outcome variables of interest differed from those of concern to the current review, the 
absence of feedback and/or presence of ambiguous feedback qualifies for the presence of an 
ambiguous context within these studies. A major limitation across studies saw the 
implementation of experimental designs that failed to directly contrast responses to 
ambiguous and unambiguous conditions between socially anxious and non-anxious 
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individuals, particularly for studies that intentionally manipulated ambiguity. For example, 
some studies included a control group but only to the extent that it allowed for comparisons 
between ambiguous social scenarios and ambiguous non-social scenarios, furthermore, earlier 
studies drew conclusions of interpretive biases simply from differences between groups in the 
likelihood of selecting a positive, negative or neutral interpretation of an ambiguous social 
scenario (Amin et al., 1998). A few studies included additional unambiguous conditions in 
addition an ambiguous one (e.g., Moscovitch & Hofmann, 2007; Budnick et al., 2015), 
although this was more common in studies which assessed interpretation of ambiguous facial 
stimuli, allowing for comparisons between blended and non-blended faces presented at 
different degrees of ambiguity (e.g., Miskovic & Schmidt, 2005; Yoon & Zinbarg, 2007). 
 
2.4.3 Conclusions and future research 
 
Evidence from the studies reported is consistent with the notion that there are 
significant and meaningful differences between socially anxious (or high SA groups) and 
non-anxious controls (or low SA groups) in their interpretation of ambiguous social 
information. One study deviates slightly from the results of the others and found that socially 
anxious individuals made a greater number of negative evaluations of ambiguous social 
scenarios compared to controls, but mean ratings were on average neutral (Constans et al., 
1999a). Three additional studies found that socially anxious individuals are significantly less 
likely to endorse a positive interpretation of ambiguous cues (Amin et al., 1998; Huppert et 
al., 2007; Leary et al., 1988), which is consistent with the notion that there may be deficits in 
making positive inferences of ambiguous situations or information (Hirsch & Mathews, 
2000). 
The results from the group of studies which did not include a deliberate induction of 
ambiguity also provide some evidence that ambiguous feedback or a lack of clarity regarding 
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expected standards leads to greater levels of subjective anxiety, rumination, and self- 
awareness in socially anxious individuals. However, these findings are preliminary, as 
interaction effects between group status and ambiguity/no ambiguity would be required to 
support an assumption that socially anxious individuals display more anxiety, rumination or 
self-awareness in ambiguous contexts. 
In addition, although the first category of studies attempted to include manipulation 
checks for the ambiguous conditions, there was only one study which explicitly asked 
participants to rate the perceived level of clarity of the ambiguous condition (Moscovitch & 
Hofmann, 2007). Two studies employed a check for credibility of feedback (Zou & Abbott, 
2012; Cody & Teachman, 2010). Thus, future studies should attempt to employ manipulation 
checks either online or post-experimentally to ensure that intended manipulations of 
ambiguity are indeed effective.  
All reported studies encompassed experimental designs, however, there were a limited 
number of studies which deliberately sought to investigate how socially anxious individuals 
resolve and interpret ambiguous information. Within these studies, clearer conclusions can be 
extrapolated from the results in observing group differences between ambiguous and 
unambiguous conditions. These methodologies should be applied to future studies to look at 
the level of subjective anxiety, self-awareness and rumination when individuals are required to 
resolve ambiguous information by making an interpretation. This would allow for broader 
conclusions to be drawn across symptom and process variables and any changes that occur 
across time and as a function of experimental manipulations. Thus, while there is already a 
relatively clear picture in regards to interpretation biases of ambiguous information in socially 
anxious individuals, understanding of these biases can be furthered by identifying the potential 
mechanisms which underlie these observed effects. Such an understanding would help to 
improve conceptualisations of heighted anxiety and threat when faced with ambiguous 
83 
 
contexts for socially anxious individuals and allow for a concentrated focus to attenuate such 
biases in treatment.  
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                                                             CHAPTER 3 
Abstract 
Socially anxious individuals have been shown to interpret ambiguous self-relevant 
information negatively, in line with more stable negative self-representations. Such biases 
may also extend to positive social outcomes, and interact with increased standards for 
performance following success. The present study examined the effects of ambiguous 
feedback which was inconsistent and contained both positive and negative references to 
performance, and compared its effects to two other conditions in which there was only either 
positive or negative references to performance. All participants engaged in a three-minute 
impromptu speech task and were provided with standardised feedback one week later. 
Shortly afterwards, they were informed that they would have to engage in another speech 
task, which did not take place. Results showed that while controls were relatively less 
affected by feedback across time, socially anxious individuals exhibited greater changes on 
symptom and cognitive variables in response to the ambiguous and positive feedback than to 
the negative feedback. Surprisingly, cognitive re-appraisals matched moderately positive 
evaluations of the ambiguous feedback in the clinical group. Although positive feedback was 
also initially received well in the SAD group, further changes to cognitive appraisals occurred 
post-feedback, such that significant reductions were observed for appraisals of performance 
and ability. These results are discussed in relation to current cognitive models of SAD, self- 
verification theories, and susceptibility to external feedback and subsequent discounting of 
self-discrepant feedback.  
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) is one of the most common anxiety disorders, and is 
characterised by a marked and persistent fear of one or more situations where there is 
potential for scrutiny by others (American Psychiatric Association [DSM-5], 2013). 
Cognitive models of social anxiety disorder (SAD) propose that dysfunctional belief systems, 
hypervigilance to internal and external cues and overestimation of probability and cost of 
negative outcomes (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995, Rapee & Heimberg, 1998) contribute to the 
maintenance of the disorder, including avoidance of feared situations. Discrepancy between 
perceived standards and one’s perceived ability is also proposed to exacerbate anxiety, which 
may in part be due to the setting of unrealistic standards for performance (e.g., Carver & 
Scheier, 1986; Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Hofmann, 2007). 
A large number of anxiety-provoking situations encountered by socially anxious 
individuals are not accompanied by objectively negative cues during or following socio- 
evaluative events, but despite this, there is minimal reduction in apprehension about 
subsequent encounters (Clark & McManus, 2002). This may be in part due to inherent 
ambiguity within social situations and the tendency for socially anxious individuals to 
interpret self-relevant information in a way that confirms unhelpful beliefs (Clark & Wells, 
1995). Empirical studies have established that socially anxious individuals consistently make 
threat-based interpretations of relevant information (e.g., Clark & MacManus, 2002; Hirsch 
& Clark, 2004; Rapee & Heimberg, 2007), particularly in the case of ambiguous social cues 
(Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Stopa & Clark, 2000). The notion of ambiguity has been 
conceptualised to be related to a lack of clarity, inconsistency, multiple meanings and 
incompleteness (Norton, 1975). Information relevant to a social situation may simultaneously 
represent varying degrees of these concepts and can be present at different stages of anxiety- 
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provoking situations, for example, in anticipation of, during and following the anxiety- 
provoking situation. Clark and Wells (1995) posit that any ambiguity during a social situation 
is later resolved during post-event rumination where biased recollections or information 
superimposed by the individual may lead to conclusions consistent with pre-existing beliefs. 
As such, negatively biased cognitions may also arise in anticipation of events, leading to 
heightened anticipatory anxiety or avoidance behaviours. 
Ambiguity prior to an evaluative situation has been shown to be detrimental for 
socially anxious individuals. For example, Moscovitch and Hofmann (2007) presented an 
exemplar speech video to participants who were then either given instructions relevant to 
expected standards (either high or low condition) or no relevant instructions (ambiguous 
condition). When there was insufficient information about external standards, socially 
anxious individuals adopted significantly higher standards compared to controls, which 
resulted in self-appraisals comparable to those made by individuals in the high standard 
condition. These results suggest that for socially anxious individuals, biases occur in 
anticipation of events, where unclear cues about performance lead to the setting of high 
standards and poorer predictions for performance. 
Negative interpretations of ambiguous social scenarios have been reported across 
studies (Stopa & Clark, 2000; Constans, Penn, Ihen, & Hope, 1999). For example, Amir and 
colleagues (2005) presented SAD, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and non-anxious 
control groups with social and non- social scenarios and found that the SAD group 
consistently selected the negative interpretation of socially-relevant scenarios for which 
information was incomplete within hypothetical social situations. These interpretive biases 
have also been shown to occur for unambiguous events; for example, Voncken et al., (2003), 
found that socially anxious individuals were more likely to select a profoundly negative 
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interpretation for positive, ambiguous, mildly negative events compared to controls. 
Furthermore, overestimations of threat were made for all social scenarios regardless of 
valence, although group differences were most pronounced for ambiguous social scenarios. 
In anticipation of a socio-evaluative event, certain types of mental imagery may also lead to 
detrimental effects for socially anxious individuals. Brozovich and Heimberg (2014) found 
that socially anxious individuals who recalled mental images about a previous negative 
speech performance made poorer predictions of performance and more negative 
interpretations of ambiguous social scenarios, compared to a control condition in which 
simple tasks of working memory were administered. These results suggest that negative 
memory for past experiences may exacerbate the mis-interpretation of ambiguous 
information, which is indirectly consistent with findings that socially anxious individuals 
demonstrate impairments in making ‘online’ assessment of ambiguous verbal information, 
such that they are slower to make both threat-based and benign interpretations (Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2000) compared to controls who display a benign inferential bias. It is possible 
then, that the salience and internal focus on negatively valenced memories co-occurs with 
reduced processing and incorporation of current external information, which maintains 
interpretive biases (e.g., Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
The most common stimuli implemented in the examination of interpretive biases for 
ambiguous cues are hypothetical social scenarios where information is not provided in full 
(e.g., Stopa & Clark, 2000), social behaviours that potentially have multiple meanings (e.g., 
Kanai et al., 2010; Budnick et al., 2015) or comments about one’s appearance which lack 
clarity (Amir et al., 2005). Such studies have consistently reported that socially anxious 
individuals perceive such information to be significantly more negative than controls. 
Various factors may affect the degree to which interpretation is required to resolve ambiguity, 
for example, feedback about performance provided during a socio-evaluative event may lead 
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to greater involvement of interpretive biases than feedback about performance following an 
event. Generally, a complete lack of information about standards or performance is likely to 
result in a more ambiguous context than one in which some form of information is provided, 
even if such cues contain multiple meanings or are inconsistent. 
Interpretive biases may also extend to positive events for socially anxious individuals, 
who fail to capitalise on corrective experiences (Kashdan, Weeks, & Savostyanova, 2011). 
Not only do individuals with SAD endorse lower frequency of positive experiences which are 
associated with more unpleasant physical anxiety symptoms (Franklin & Foa, 2000), 
interpretations of positive aspects of a social situation also become more negative over time 
(Brendle & Wenzel, 2004; Cody & Teachman, 2010). The degree to which one fears positive 
evaluation (FPE; Weeks, Heimberg, & Rodebaugh, 2008) has also been associated with 
greater anticipatory anxiety and worse predictions for future performance following success 
(Alden, Taylor, Mellings, & Laposa, 2008). An increase in standards following a positive 
interaction has also been reported, which leads to underestimations of performance and 
maintenance of anxiety (Wallace & Alden, 1995). Taken together, these findings suggest that 
positive information may be processed in a way that maintains threat, which may be related 
to subsequent fears of negative evaluation. 
Socially anxious individuals may be unable to use corrective information as intended 
because external causal attributions are made in response to information that is incongruent 
with self-views (Swann, 1983). Consistent with this theory, Heimberg and Becker (2002) 
demonstrated that socially anxious individuals were inclined to attribute success to external 
variables instead of internal attributes or personal effort. The process of externalisation 
reduces a sense of self-efficacy in causing unexpected outcomes and minimises the 
contribution of one’s personal qualities or ability (Maddux, Norton, & Leary, 1988), which is 
likely to maintain anxiety for future events. CBT-based interventions for SAD require 
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individuals to revise pre-existing beliefs gradually through a process of accumulating external 
information which contradicts initial self-evaluations or perceptions of evaluations made by 
others. Such information, although not objectively negative, may still entail some degree of 
ambiguity, as it is does not match with initial expectations of how one would be evaluated. 
Consequently, such information may still be susceptible to interpretive biases, particularly 
over time (e.g., Cody & Teachman, 2010). 
Given that therapeutic interventions often involve direct comparison between 
predictions and outcomes within socio-evaluative situations and outcomes themselves may 
contain multiple meanings and are often inconsistent with predictions, it is important to 
understand how the tendency to interpret ambiguous social information negatively impacts 
affective and cognitive outcomes. Furthermore, it is important to delineate between contexts 
in which such interpretive biases may occur, and examine whether or not particular 
conditions could potentially attenuate susceptibility to negative interpretation biases. 
The present study aimed to investigate how delayed provision of feedback following 
performance influences mood, state anxiety, future performance appraisal, perceived ability, 
perceptions of threat, and the setting of standards in individuals who meet diagnostic criteria 
for a primary diagnosis of SAD and non-anxious control participants. We aimed to identify 
the degree to which ambiguous feedback following a performance task elicits similar effects 
to stimuli which is typically presented before or during socio-evaluative situations (e.g., 
Moscovitch & Hofmann, 2007; Amir et al., 2005; Bögels & Lamers, 2002). The study also 
directly applies the concept of ambiguity to verbal written feedback in the absence of 
additional congruent behavioural cues seen across other studies (e.g. Budnick et al., 2015). 
Importantly, the ambiguous feedback condition provides the same amount of information as 
the positive and negative conditions but the inclusion of both positive and negative elements 
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pertains more to multiple meanings and inconsistency than to the lack of information 
implemented across previous studies. The study further aims to directly compare the effects 
of possible interpretive biases for ambiguous and positive feedback within a single study, 
with the inclusion of a negative feedback condition to provide a comparison point between 
groups, in relation to the effects of any interpretive biases across the three feedback 
conditions. 
The current research follows from a significant number empirical studies which have 
used an impromptu speech task to induce social anxiety (Rapee & Lim, 1992; Abbott & 
Rapee, 2004; Rapee & Abbott, 2007; Perini, Abbott & Rapee, 2006; Chen, Rapee, & Abbott, 
2013). Participants were randomly allocated to one of three feedback conditions, to receive 
positive, negative or ambiguous feedback, provided approximately one week after the initial 
speech task. All feedback scripts were composed from selected items on the Speech 
Performance Questionnaire (SPQ; Rapee & Lim, 1992). The positive feedback condition 
consisted of only positive statements which referred to different aspects of the speech 
performance. The negative feedback condition was comprised of only negative statements 
referring to the same aspects of speech performance. The ambiguous feedback condition 
consisted of an equal number of positive and negative statements which again referred to the 
same aspects of performance as the other two conditions, but in addition, certain words were 
modified to increase the potential for multiple meanings. 
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3.2 METHOD 
 
3.2.1 Participants 
 
A total of 1265 first year psychology undergraduate students completed the Social 
Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998). One participant was recruited 
from the general university population and was compensated accordingly for their 
participation. Students who scored 40 and above and 15 and below were deemed eligible to 
participate in the study in exchange for course credit. Guidelines for cut-off scores have been 
reported by Peters (2000) with a score of 36 as the upper threshold. To maximise efficiency 
in the screening of eligible participants, a score greater than 40 was applied and the lower 
threshold set at 15 (see Zou and Abbott, 2012). A total of 127 participants who met the SIAS 
cut-off criteria were administered the Anxiety Disorder Interview Schedule (ADIS-IV; 
DiNardo, Brown, & Barlow, 1994) for DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000) to determine their clinical status and the Avoidant Personality Disorder (APD) section 
of the International Personality Disorder Examination (IPDE) for IDC-10 (Loranger et al., 
2007) was also administered. Participants who met criteria for a principal diagnosis of SAD, 
or those with no current Axis I diagnosis were deemed eligible to participate in the study. A 
total of 12 individuals were excluded following completion of the ADIS-IV because they did 
not meet criteria for a principal diagnosis of SAD and/or met criterion for other disorders 
(except Specific Phobia). The ADIS interviews were videotaped or voice-recorded and 
coded by an independent rater who was blind to the clinical status of participants. Inter-rater 
reliability for a principal diagnosis of SAD was calculated using kappa coefficients, and 
showed excellent agreement between raters (kappa = .91). 
The final sample consisted of 51 participants in the SAD group and 64 in the control 
group. Two participants met criteria for a diagnosis of Avoidant Personality Disorder. The 
mean clinician rated severity (range of 0-8) was 5.20 (SD =.96), where higher scores indicate 
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greater interference and distress. Within the clinical group, 10 participants met criteria for at 
least one comorbid Axis I disorder (2 Panic Disorder, 4 Generalised Anxiety Disorder, 7 
Specific Phobia, 2 Major Depressive Episode and 1 Dysthymia). Within the control group, 
two participants met criteria for a Specific Phobia; they were included in the final sample as 
the content of the specific phobia was unrelated to that of SAD concerns. 
The clinical group consisted of 10 males and 41 females with a mean age of 19.08 
years (SD = 2.31). The control group consisted of 27 males and 37 females, with a mean age 
of 20.14 (SD = 5.48). There was no significant difference in the mean ages of the two groups 
t(113) = 1.29, p = 20. The clinical group had a mean SIAS score of 40.80 (SD = 10.27), and 
the control group a mean score of 14.45 (SD = 6.35). Chi-square tests revealed no significant 
differences between the SAD and Non Anxious Controls (NAC) groups in terms of 
relationship status, χ2 (1, N = 115) = 7.39, p> .05, education, χ2 (1, N = 115) = 6.03, p> .05, 
employment status, χ2 (1, N = 115) = 1.74, p> .05 and income, χ2 (1, N = 115) = 11.06, p> 
 
.05. There was, however, a significant difference between groups in terms of gender, χ2 (1, N 
 
= 115) = 6.63, p = .01, with a more even distribution of males and females in the control 
group. The full sample consisted of 67.8% females. The majority (72.2%) was single, and 
was in first year of university (85.2%), and reported annual family income to be greater than 
$70,000 (61.4%). 
 
3.2.2 Design 
 
The current study employed a 2 x 3 between subjects design, where the two levels of 
independent variables were the clinical status of the participant (SAD vs. NAC groups) and 
feedback condition (positive, negative or ambiguous). The dependent variables were 
symptom and cognitive state measures taken before and after the speech task and feedback 
manipulation. 
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3.2.3 Measures 
Trait Measures 
The Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998) assesses generalised 
 
social interaction anxiety and distress for situations involving conversations with others. 
Items are rated on a five-point Likert scale to indicate the degree to which each statement is 
characteristic of the responder, from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). Total scores range from 0- 
80 where higher scores indicate greater interaction anxiety. 
High internal consistency has been reported amongst undergraduate students (Osman, 
Guiterrez, Barrios, Kopper & Chiros). The original authors reported Cronbach’s alpha values 
ranging from .88 to .94 as well as excellent test-retest reliability at 1 month (r= 0.92) and 3 
months (r= 0.92) (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) and excellent reliability and construct validity has 
been reported across a range of experimental studies (see Heimberg & Turk, 2002). 
Significantly higher scores on this measure adequately discriminate individuals with Social 
Anxiety Disorder from those with other anxiety disorders (Peters, 2000) and moderate to high 
convergent validity has been reported (Hughes, Heimberg, Coles, Gibb, Liebowitz, & 
Schneier, 2006). Internal consistency for the present sample was .95. 
The Social Phobia  Scale (SPS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998) complements the SIAS and 
 
assesses specific fears of scrutiny associated with social anxiety. Responses are made on a 
five-point Likert scale to indicate to the degree to which each statement is true or 
characteristic of the responder, from 0 (not at all characteristic/true of me) to 4 (extremely 
characteristic/true of me). Total scores range from 0-80 where higher scores indicate greater 
fear of scrutiny in social situations. High internal consistency, test-retest reliability and 
discriminative validity have been reported (Mattick & Clark, 1998; Osman, Guiterrez, 
Barrios, Kopper, & Chiros, 1998). Internal consistency for the present sample was .94. 
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The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE; Leary, 1983) is a widely used measure 
 
of cognitions associated with the fear of negative evaluation. Responses are made on a 5- 
point Likert scale from 1 (not at all characteristic) to 5 (extremely characteristic). Total scores 
range from 12-60. Good internal consistency and test-retest reliability at 1 month intervals 
(Leary, 1983; Duke et al., 2006). Internal consistency for the present sample was .92. 
State Measures 
 
The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales – Short Form (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 
 
1995) is 21-item self-report questionnaire that reflects three factors: anxiety, depression and 
stress. Higher scores reflect greater severity of symptoms and each total subscale score ranges 
from 0 to 21. Responses on the items reflect the level of symptoms over the period of a week. 
Excellent psychometric properties for the DASS-21 have been reported in both clinical 
(Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997) and non-clinical samples (Henry & 
Crawford, 2005). Internal consistency for the current sample was .92. 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1998) 
 
consists of 10 descriptors of positive affect (PA) (e.g., interested, excited) and 10 descriptors 
of negative affect (NA) (e.g., upset, scared). Responses are made on a 5-point Likert scale 
from 1 (Very slightly or not at all) to 5 (Extremely) and total scores range from 20-100. 
Instructions given for completing the measure were adapted to be appropriate for participants 
to rate their mood state at different time points. For all time points, participants were directed 
to rate their mood state “at the moment”, with the exception of Time 2 for which they were 
asked to rate how they felt “during the speech”. Good internal consistency, test-retest 
reliability at 2 months and discriminant validity were initially established (Watson, Clark and 
Tellegen, 1988), similar psychometric properties have been reported in a more recent adult 
sample (N=1003; Crawford & Henry, 2004). Internal consistency for the current sample 
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ranged from .87 to .91 for the PA scale and .82 to .86 for the NA scale. 
 
 The State Anxiety Rating Scale (SAR; Rapee & Abbott, 2007) is a state anxiety measure 
specifically designed for speech tasks which consists of 10 items rated on a 5-point Likert 
scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). This measure was adapted to an 8-item scale for 
ratings taken prior to or following the speech, removing two items “I felt like turning my 
back to the camera” and “I felt like stopping the speech”. The full 10-item measure was used 
to obtain a measure of state anxiety during the speech. Internal consistency for the 8-item 
version ranged from .83 to .93 and was similarly excellent for the 10-item measure (α = .91). 
Performance Appraisal 
The Performance Questionnaire (PQ; Rapee & Lim, 1992) was included as a subjective 
 
measure of performance. Ratings are made in regards to different aspects of the speech across 
17 items, 12 of which are specific (e.g., had a clear voice, blushed) and 5 are global (e.g., 
made a good impression, generally spoke well). Responses are made on a 5-point Likert 
scale, from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much) and total scores range from 0-68. Higher scores 
reflect more positive evaluations of one’s speech performance. Instructions for the PQ were 
adapted for anticipation of the speech tasks to be appropriate for predictions to be made in 
relation to an upcoming speech task rather than subjective ratings made post-speech (see 
Appendix B). Good internal consistency and inter-rater reliability among additional observers 
has been reported (Rapee & Hayman, 1996; Rodebaugh & Chambless, 2002). Internal 
consistency for the present sample ranged from .85 to .93. 
The Ability Questionnaire (AQ; Gold & Abbott, submitted; Penney & Abbott, 2014) is a 10- 
 
item self-report measure which assesses perceived ability to meet perceived performance 
standards for a speech task (e.g., ‘It is likely that my performance will be worse than what the 
rater expects’). Ratings are scored on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 (Not true at all) to 4 
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(extremely true). Total scores range from 0-40 with higher scores indicating greater 
confidence in ability to meet perceived standards and reduced discrepancy between ability 
and perceived standards. Internal consistency for the present sample ranged from .86 to .92. 
The Probability and Costs Questionnaire (PCQ; Rapee & Abbott, 2007) is a self-report 
 
measure designed to measure levels of perceived social threat as indicated by probability and 
cost estimates of negative evaluation. This 14-item measure is comprised of two 7-item 
subscales for probability (e.g., How likely is it that the raters will think you look anxious) and 
cost (e.g. How bad would it be if the raters thought that you looked anxious). Responses are 
made on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely) and higher scores indicate 
greater levels of perceived threat in relation to greater likelihood and cost associated with 
negative evaluation. Internal consistency for the present sample was between .91 and .92. 
The Expectations Questionnaire (EQ; Gold & Abbott, submitted) is a 5-item self-report 
 
measure that assesses differences in perceived audience expectations for a speech task (e.g., 
The rater will expect my speech to look professional). Responses are made on a 5-point 
Likert scale from 0 (not true at all) to 4 (extremely true). Higher scores indicate that the 
higher perceived audience expectations. Internal consistency for the present sample ranged 
from to .90 to .93. 
Post-event rumination 
  The Thoughts Questionnaire (TQ; Abbott & Rapee, 2004) measures the tendency to engage 
 
in positive and negative post-event rumination following a speech task, consisting of 22 items 
(e.g., ‘I looked nervous/anxious’, ‘I enjoyed myself’). Ratings reflect how frequently 
thoughts about various aspects of the speech occurred during the week following the speech. 
Ratings are made on a 5-point Likert scale, from 0 (never) to 4 (very often). Adequate 
psychometric properties have previously been reported (Abbott & Rapee, 2004). Internal 
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consistency for the current sample was .93. 
 
3.2.4 Procedure 
 
Participants completed the study over two sessions spaced approximately one-week 
apart, the first of which involved completing the ADIS-IV for DSM-IV interview and an 
impromptu speech task in which the participant elected a topic to speak about for three 
minutes. In the second session, they received standardised feedback regarding their 
performance. In the SAD group, 17 participants were randomly allocated (via computer 
generated random number generation) to the negative feedback condition, 18 to the positive 
feedback condition and 16 to the ambiguous feedback condition. In the NAC group, 22 
participants were allocated to the negative and ambiguous feedback conditions and 20 
participants to the positive feedback condition. 
Feedback for the three conditions was constructed from 12 of the 15 items in the 
Performance Questionnaire (PQ; Rapee & Lim, 1992) that included observable behaviours. 
As such, five items that would be difficult for someone to observe from a video-recording of 
the speech were not included (e.g., sweating) or were similar to other items (e.g., ‘stuttering’ 
and ‘um and ah-ing’). Remaining items were included in all three feedback scripts and the 
valence of these items was adapted to align with ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ feedback. For 
example, in the negative feedback condition, the item ‘kept good eye contact’ was instead 
modified to ‘did not keep good eye contact’. For the ambiguous condition, five items were 
‘positive’ and five were ‘negative’ which, based on previous definitions of ambiguity 
pertained to the concept of inconsistency and multiple meanings (Norton, 1975). The final 
sentence provided as part of the feedback related to whether or not the performance was at a 
level expected for an undergraduate student and was unique only to the negative feedback 
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condition. These feedback scripts were piloted on a sample of 12 doctoral level clinical 
psychology students who were asked to provide ratings for the following dimensions: 
valence, clarity, consistency and perceived multiple meanings. See Appendix B for 
individual feedback scripts. 
In the first session, participants were asked to complete the demographic 
questionnaire which comprised of the SIAS, SPS, BFNE and DASS-21, followed by the 
administration of the ADIS-IV interview. Participants were then reminded that they would be 
completing a speech on a topic of their own choosing, before completing a set of 
questionnaires which included the PANAS, SAR, PPQ, AQ, PCQ and EQ (Time 1). 
Participants were then asked to stand opposite the video camera and to begin their three- 
minute speech when ready. The experimenter was present throughout the duration of the 
speech and raised their hand when one minute was remaining. Following the speech, the 
participants completed a similar set of questionnaires (Time 2) that reflected how they felt 
during the speech and how they perceived raters’ standards and expectations having now 
completed the speech. No feedback was provided regarding their speech in Session 1. 
Participants returned a week later for the second session of the study. They were first 
presented with the TQ and DASS-21 (Time 3) to assess frequency of thoughts about the 
speech task over the past week and accompanying anxiety, depression and stress symptoms. 
They were then reminded that they would soon be provided with feedback regarding their 
speech performance from the independent rater and asked to complete the PANAS and SAR 
questionnaires (Time 4). Feedback that had been randomly allocated to the participant 
(negative, ambiguous and positive) was then accessed via an email. Participants were asked 
to read their feedback and then complete Time 5 questionnaires which were identical to those 
presented at Time 2. They were informed that they had to complete an additional speech task 
on a different topic (Time 6), although this did not actually occur. The final set of 
99 
 
questionnaires given to participants in anticipation of the second speech task was identical to 
those administered at Time 1, as they provided a measure of anticipatory anxiety and mood 
prior to the second speech task and evaluation of standards and expectations. Manipulation 
checks were then completed for believability of feedback and instructions for the second 
speech task as well as additional ratings for feedback. The study was approved by the 
University Ethics Committee (Approval Code: 2012/2841). 
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3.3 RESULTS 
3.3.1 Symptom Measures and Mean Ratings prior to Feedback Manipulation 
 
Table 4 displays the means and standard deviations for the trait symptom measures. 
One-way ANOVAs were carried out to compare mean ratings across SAD and NAC groups, 
with the error rate controlled for at α = .05. As predicted, the SAD group reported 
significantly higher scores on all trait and symptom measures compared to the NAC group, 
all p’s< .01. 
Table 4 
Means and standard deviations of symptom measures for SAD and NAC groups. 
 
 SAD Group NAC Group  
Measure M SD M SD F 
SIAS 40.80 10.27 14.45 6.35 258.08** 
SPS 28.35 12.80 8.00 5.57 130.90** 
BFNE 33.31 5.44 25.53 4.47 70.98** 
DASS-D 10.55 8.91 3.22 3.71 35.62** 
DASS-A 11.33 8.38 2.34 3.01 63.50** 
DASS-S 17.10 9.64 6.78 5.73 50.80** 
 
 
 
Note. SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale; SPS = Social Phobia Scale; BFNE = Brief Fear of Negative 
Evaluation; DASS-D = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (Depression Subscale); DASS-A = Depression Anxiety 
Stress Scales (Anxiety Subscale); DASS-S = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (Stress Subscale). *p<.05 
 
 
Multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) were conducted to assess effects 
of group on   cognitive and affective measures (SAR, PANAS, PQ, AQ, PCPQ and 
EQ) for Times 1 and 2 (before and after the speech task) and also for measures (TQ, 
DASS-21, SAR, PANAS) at Times 3 and 4, one week later. The means and standard 
deviations of the trait and symptom measures completed by participants prior to 
feedback are displayed in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
Mean and standard deviations of symptom and cognitive variables at time-points prior 
to feedback for SAD and NAC groups. 
 
Time 1 (Pre-Speech)  SAD Group NAC Group  
Measure M SD M SD F 
SAR 17.09 5.54 9.64 1.68 86.47** 
PANAS-P 23.09 5.57 24.64 6.74 1.48 
PANAS-N 16.95 4.67 13.04 2.56 27.36** 
PQ (Baseline) 29.98 11.25 47.33 7.99 70.37** 
PQ Discrepancy 16.67 12.83 6.25 9.22 21.55** 
AQ 23.23 7.11 12.48 6.66 58.91** 
PCQ 28.46 7.32 15.45 10.30 49.45** 
EQ 6.0 4.55 2.45 3.13 20.79** 
Time 2 (Post-Speech)  SAD Group NAC Group   
Measure M SD M SD F 
SAR 24.88 9.50 14.72 4.34 49.69** 
PANAS-P 24.94 7.16 26.32 8.97 .710 
PANAS-N 19.24 5.76 14.06 3.78 29.06** 
PQ Discrepancy 14.05 10.87 6.74 10.55 11.58** 
AQ 20.91 7.36 12.55 7.28 32.39** 
PCQ 27.65 9.73 13.69 9.97 49.83** 
EQ 5.65 4.82 2.09 2.78 21.20** 
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Time 3 (One week later)  SAD Group NAC Group   
Measure M SD M SD F 
TQ-P 5.76 5.69 9.11 8.13 6.07 
TQ-N 14.49 9.58 7.72 8.70 15.16** 
DASS-D 7.64 7.72 2.26 2.52 26.27** 
DASS-A 7.44 5.90 1.41 2.08 39.93** 
DASS-S 11.80 7.19 4.33 5.26 39.10** 
 
Time 4 (Pre-Feedback)  SAD Group NAC Group  
Measure M SD M SD F 
SAR 11.94 3.75 9.07 1.80 27.98** 
PANAS-P 20.12 5.91 21.77 6.80 1.82 
PANAS-N 13.62 3.88 12.18 2.64 5.39 
 
 
 
Note. SAR = State Anxiety Scale; PANAS-P = The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Positive Subscale); PANAS-N = 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Negative Subscale); PPQ = Predicted Performance Questionnaire; PQ = 
Performance Questionnaire; AQ = Ability Questionnaire; PCQ-P = Probability and Cost Questionnaire (Probability 
Subscale); ; PCQ-C = Probability and Cost Questionnaire (Cost Subscale); EQ = Expectations Questionnaire; TQ-P = 
Thoughts Questionnaire (Positive Rumination); TQ-N = Thoughts Questionnaire (Negative Rumination); DASS-D = 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (Depression Subscale); DASS-A = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (Anxiety 
Subscale); DASS-S = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (Stress Subscale). **p<.01. 
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Group comparisons for state symptom and cognitive measures prior to feedback  
(Hypothesis 1a) 
Overall multivariate effects were carried out with Wilks’ criterion as the omnibus 
statistic. Although pre-existing differences for gender were established in analysis of 
demographic variables, analyses with gender as a covariate variable did not affect the pattern 
of significant and non-significant differences on affective and cognitive symptom measures at 
each time-point. Consequently, the results of analyses are reported without inclusions of 
gender as a covariate. In addition, the discrepancy between subjective and objective 
performance appraisal scores were calculated and included in place of purely subjective 
ratings at Time 1 and Time 2 as they provide a more accurate reflection of any distortion 
(underestimation) in speech performance ratings. 
At Time 1, there was a significant effect of group, F(8,88) = 15.36, p< .001, η2 = .58, 
such that the SAD group reported greater levels of state anxiety, η2 = .48, negative affect, η2 
= .22, discrepancy in appraisals, η2 = .45, less ability, η2 = .38, more threat, η2 = .34 and 
higher standards, η2 = .18, all p’s< .01. 
Similarly, at Time 2, there was a significant effect of group, F(5,105) = 16.89, p< 
 
.001, η2 = .46, such that the SAD group reported experiencing greater state anxiety, η2 = .34 
and negative affect, η2 = .23 during the speech. They also exhibited greater discrepancy in 
appraisals, η2 = .11, perceived less ability, η2 = .25, more threat, η2 = .34 and higher 
standards, η2 = .18, p’s< .01. 
No group differences emerged for positive affect pre- or post-speech, p’s> .05. 
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Group comparisons for post-event rumination and anticipatory anxiety prior to 
feedback (Hypothesis 1b) 
At Time 3, there was again a significant effect of group, F(5,105) = 16.89, p< .001, 
η2 = .45, such that the SAD group reported significantly more negative rumination, η2 = .12, 
and endorsed more depression, η2 = .19, anxiety, η2 = .34, and stress related symptoms, η2 = 
.27, compared to the NAC group during the week following their speech, p’s< .01. The SAD 
group did not, however, differ from controls on levels of positive rumination, p> .05, η2 = 
.05. 
 
At Time 4, immediately prior to the receipt of feedback, there was a significant effect 
of group, F(3,107) = 10.96, p< .001, η2 = .24, such that the SAD group reported more state 
anxiety, p< .01, η2 = .20, but did not differ from the NAC group in levels of positive affect 
or negative affect, p’s> .05. 
 
3.3.2 Manipulation Checks 
 
Multivariate analyses of variance were conducted to assess any effects of group, 
condition and possible interactions for ratings of valence, agreement with the “independent” 
rater, ratings of ambiguity (clarity, consistency, multiple meanings) and believability of 
feedback. Overall multivariate effects using Wilks’ criterion as the omnibus test statistic 
revealed no overall effect of group, F(7, 95) = .75, p> .05, η2 = .05, but a significant effect 
of condition, F(14,190) = 21.13, p< .001, η2 = .61, and a significant interaction, F(14,190) = 
2.20, p< .01, η2 = .14. 
  Valence Ratings and Agreement with “Independent” Rater 
Mean valence ratings between feedback conditions differed significantly, p< .001, η2 
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  = .78, such that the positive condition (M = 3.71, SD = .86) was rated as significantly more 
positive than the ambiguous condition (M = 1.73, SD = 1.68) which was in turn, more 
positively rated than the negative condition (M = 3.26, SD = 1.93), p’s< .001. 
Ratings of agreement with feedback also differed between conditions, p< .01, η2 = 
 
.09, such that mean ratings were significantly higher in the ambiguous feedback condition (M 
 
= 72.97, SD = 18.24) compared to the negative condition (M = 55.71, SD = 27.04), p< .01, 
but not compared to the positive condition (M = 64.57, SD = 19.15), p> .05. The interaction 
effect between group and condition was also significant, p< .01, η2 = .10, such that the SAD 
group gave similar ratings for the negative (M = 65.00, SD = 25.56) and ambiguous 
conditions (M = 67.67, SD = 19.59) compared to the positive condition (M = 57.22, SD = 
22.70), whereas the NAC group gave similar agreement ratings for the positive (M = 72.35, 
SD = 10.33) and ambiguous feedback (M = 75.91, SD = 17.09), compared to negative 
feedback (M = 47.89, SD = 26.37). 
Ambiguity Ratings across Feedback Conditions 
 
Mean clarity ratings for feedback differed significantly between conditions, p<. 05, 
η2 = .08, such that the ambiguous condition (M = 6.65, SD = 2.32) was rated significantly 
less clear than the negative condition (M = 7.91, SD = 2.19), p< .05, but did not differ from 
the positive condition (M = 7.71, SD = 2.09), p = .10. No significant differences between the 
positive and negative feedback conditions were observed, p> .05. 
Mean consistency ratings for feedback differed significantly between conditions, p< 
 
.01, η2 = .09, such that the mean rating in the ambiguous condition (M = 6.86, SD = 2.04) 
was significantly lower than the positive (M = 8.11, SD = 1.78) and marginally lower than the 
negative condition (M = 7.94, SD = 2.01), p = .06, which did not differ from each other, p> 
.05. 
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Mean ratings pertaining to multiple meanings for feedback differed significantly 
between conditions, p< .001, η2 = .09, such that mean rating in the ambiguous condition 
(M= 4.22, SD = 2.90) was significantly higher than both the positive (M = 2.86, SD = 2.19) 
and negative conditions (M = 2.74 SD = 1.98), p’s< .05, which did not differ from each 
other, p> .05. 
Only the interaction effect between group and condition for clarity ratings was 
significant, p< .05, η2 = .06, such that positive (M = 8.33, SD = 2.06) and negative feedback 
(M = 7.75, SD = 2.15) were rated as more clear than the ambiguous feedback (M = 5.87, SD = 
2.10) in the SAD group, whereas mean clarity ratings did not differ between ambiguous (M = 
7.18, SD = 2.36), positive (M = 7.06, SD = 1.98) and negative (M = 8.05, SD = 2.27) 
conditions in the NAC group. 
 
Believability of Feedback 
 
Univariate analyses revealed that mean belief ratings for feedback differed 
significantly between conditions, p< .01, η2 = .11. Post-hoc Tukey analyses revealed that 
mean ratings were significantly higher in the ambiguous condition (M = 2.95, SD = .94), 
compared to both the positive (M = 2.26, SD = .89), p = .02, and negative (M =2.10, SD = 
.1.27) feedback conditions, p< .01, which did not differ from each other, p> .05. 
 
In addition, both groups rated instructions for the second speech task to be between 
“very believable” and “extremely believable”. 
 
3.3.3 Baseline Analyses 
Baseline means and standard deviations for trait and state variables are reported in 
Table 4 and Table 5. Analyses comparing trait (SIAS, SPS, BFNE) measures at baseline and 
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state measures (SAR, PANAS-P, PANAS-N, PQ, AQ, PCQ, EQ, TQ, DASS-21) at Times 1 
to 4 across the three feedback conditions were separately analysed for the SAD and NAC 
groups. As anticipated, the results of the one-way ANOVAs showed no significant effects of 
condition on state or trait symptom measures for the SAD and NAC groups, all p’s> .05. 
 
 3.3.4 Self and Observer Performance Appraisal Comparisons 
Underestimation of speech performance relative to an objective rater (Hypothesis 1c) 
 
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted comparing 
objective and subjective ratings, to examine any effects of rater and interaction with group. 
Mean subjective and objective performance appraisal ratings for the SAD group at Time 2 
(post-speech) was 32.58 (SD = 9.30) and 46.24 (SD = 8.75) respectively. Mean subjective 
and objective performance appraisal ratings for the NAC group at Time 2 was 46.08 (SD = 
10.61) and 53.61 (SD = 8.09). There was a significant effect of rater, such that objective 
ratings were better than subjective ratings overall, F(1,98) = 93.96, p< .001, η2 = .49. The 
interaction with group was also significant, F(1,98) = 11.58, p< .01, η2 = .11, such that 
underestimation of performance was greater in the SAD group, compared to the NAC group. 
 
3.3.5 Symptom Measures at Post-Feedback and Prior to the Anticipated Second Speech Task 
 
Table 6 presents the mean affective and cognitive symptom variables by group and 
condition. Raw performance appraisal scores at Time 6 were included in the analyses, rather 
than calculating a discrepancy score based on differences between objective ratings from the 
first speech and subjective ratings for a subsequent speech task which did not take place.  
108 
 
Table 6 
Means and standard deviations of symptom and cognitive measures by group and condition at time-points post-feedback. 
 
 
Time 5 (Post-Feedback) 
Group Condition SAR PANAS-P PANAS-N Performance 
Appraisal 
Ability Threat Standards 
SAD Negative 11.06 (4.91) 15.62 (4.13) 13.69 (5.30) 26.00 (8.07) 23.25 (7.35) 27.38 (12.25) 8.06 (5.25) 
 Ambiguous 9.86 (2.91) 19.50 (6.37) 12.64 (2.95) 35.16 (6.96) 18.29 (6.92) 21.20 (8.54) 6.21 (4.82) 
 Positive 9.56 (2.31) 23.00 (7.60) 12.81 (2.14) 46.71 (13.90) 15.69 (6.94) 17.38 (7.73) 6.00 (3.56) 
NAC Negative 9.11 (2.56) 18.42 (6.38) 12.16 (2.29) 42.43 (12.10) 15.79 (8.27) 16.05 (11.47) 4.47 (5.34) 
 Ambiguous 9.19 (1.83) 21.30 (8.07) 12.63 (3.06) 42.64 (8.94) 11.75 (6.73) 11.25 (9.34) 2.89 (3.61) 
 Positive 8.16 (.37) 21.42 (7.46) 11.76 (1.00) 55.84 (6.93) 6.53 (4.03) 7.95 (7.64) 0.69 (1.20) 
Time 6 (Pre-Speech 2) 
Group Condition SAR PANAS-P PANAS-N Performance 
Appraisal 
Ability Threat Standards 
SAD Negative 16.93 (6.49) 18.60 (4.07) 15.47 (3.72) 30.60 (8.81) 21.27 (7.09) 25.73 (12.38) 7.73 (5.92) 
 Ambiguous 15.15 (6.03) 20.62 (7.71) 15.85 (4.36) 33.00 (11.13) 20.08 (5.87) 22.15 (7.55) 6.46 (4.67) 
 Positive 18.31(7.49) 18.69 (5.42) 16.56 (3.10) 38.69 (7.83) 18.50 (6.35) 20.75 (9.15) 6.00 (4.20) 
NAC Negative 11.05 (5.29) 20.11 (5.94) 14.11 (4.65) 43.64 (10.08) 15.42 (7.45) 15.11 (11.61) 4.63 (5.77) 
 Ambiguous 11.31 (3.74) 20.63 (7.73) 13.38 (2.87) 41.39 (11.51) 14.63 (7.62) 11.25 (11.07) 2.78 (4.54) 
 Positive 9.61 (3.74) 20.70 (9.14) 12.28 (1.53) 53.22 (7.46) 8.22 (3.96) 7.72 (8.11) 0.88 (1.26) 
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Group, condition and interaction effects for state symptom and cognitive measures 
following feedback (Hypothesis 2) 
The p-values and effect sizes of main effects of group and condition, as well as 
interaction effects can be found in Table 7 for each of the following sets of analyses. 
Time 5 (Post-Feedback)  
MANOVAs were conducted to assess the overall effect of group, condition and their 
interaction immediately following feedback and in anticipation of the second speech task. 
Overall multivariate effects were used with Wilks’ criterion as the omnibus test statistic as 
the most conservative test for overall interactions between group and condition. 
At Time 5, immediately after feedback, there was a significant effect of group, 
 
F(8,87) = 7.52, p< .001, η2 = .41, and condition, F(16,174) = 4.20, p< .001, η2 = .28, but no 
 
significant interaction effect, F(16,174) = 1.11, p> .05, η2 = .09.  
 
Overall, the SAD group reported greater state anxiety, worse performance appraisals, 
perceived less ability, more threat, and higher standards but did not differ from controls in 
terms of positive or negative affect. 
Differences between conditions were significant for positive affect,  performance 
distortion, threat, ability, and standards but not for state anxiety or negative affect. Post-hoc 
analyses revealed that compared to those who received negative feedback, those in the 
positive feedback condition reported more positive affect, and less threat, all p’s< .001. 
Compared to those who received positive feedback, the degree to which one underestimated 
performance was significantly higher in both the negative, p< .001, and the ambiguous 
conditions, p = .001. In terms of perceived ability, those who received negative feedback 
reported significantly lower ability than those in the ambiguous condition, who in turn 
perceived significantly less ability than those in the positive condition, p’s< .05. Finally, 
those in the ambiguous condition held significantly lower standards than those in the negative 
condition, p< .05.  
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No other interaction effects were significant for any individual dependent variables. 
Time 6 (Anticipation of Second Speech) 
 
At Time 6, there were significant effects of group, F(8,84) = 8.96, p< .001, η2 = .46, 
condition, F(16,168) = 2.84, p< .001, η2 = .21, but no significant group by condition 
interaction, F(16,168) = .78, p> .05, η2 = .07. 
Overall, the SAD group reported greater state anxiety, negative affect, worse  predictions 
of performance, less ability, greater threat, and higher standards, but did not differ from controls 
in regards to positive affect. 
Differences between conditions were significant for the predicted performance, threat  
and perceived ability, but not for state anxiety, positive or negative affect nor standards. Post-
hoc comparisons between conditions revealed that compared to the positive feedback 
condition, performance appraisals were worse in the ambiguous, p< .05 and negative 
feedback conditions, p< .01. Similarly, compared to those who had received positive 
feedback, perceived ability was lower in the ambiguous, p< .05, and negative conditions, p< 
.05. Threat ratings were higher in the negative condition compared to the ambiguous and 
positive conditions, p’s< .05. 
No other interaction effects were significant for any individual dependent variables. 
 
3.3.6 Changes from Baseline and from Post-Feedback Across Group and Condition 
 
Difference scores were calculated by subtracting mean scores between Time 1 
(baseline) and Time 6 (anticipation of Speech 2) which provides an indication of shifts in 
affect and cognitive appraisal from baseline. Similarly, scores were calculated for differences 
between Time 5 (post-feedback) and Time 6 as this reflects immediate changes between 
feedback and any impact on appraisals for a second speech task. Positive difference scores 
indicate that the affective or cognitive symptom score at the first specified time-point was 
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greater than that of the second time-point. 
MANOVAs were conducted to assess the overall effect of group, condition and their 
interaction at Time 5 and Time 6. Overall multivariate effects were used with Wilks’ criterion 
as the omnibus test statistic. Additional follow-up ANOVAs and t-tests were conducted to 
examine group differences in change scores between ambiguous and negative feedback 
conditions and between ambiguous and positive feedback conditions. 
Group, condition and interaction effects for changes between baseline (Time 1) and 
anticipation of speech 2 (Time 6) for symptom and cognitive measures (Hypothesis 3a) 
For difference scores between Time 1 and Time 6, there was no overall effect of 
group, F(8,87) = 1.40, p> .05, η2 = .10, but there was a significant effect of condition, 
F(16,174) = 3.10, p< .001, η2 = .19. There was not a significant group by condition 
interaction, F(14,176) = .97, p> .05, η2 = .07.  
Main group effects were significant for changes in predicted performance, such that 
those in the SAD group reported a greater change in mean PQ scores compared to controls. 
They also displayed a greater change in perceived ability compared to controls, averaged 
across feedback conditions. No significant differences in change scores between groups were 
observed for state anxiety, positive and negative affect, threat or standards. 
Effects of condition emerged for changes in predicted performance. Post-hoc analyses 
revealed that averaged across groups, predicted performance was better in the positive feedback 
condition compared to baseline, t(35) = 4.14, p< .001, but marginally worse in the negative 
condition, t(35) = 1.88, p = .07 with no changes in the ambiguous condition, t(32) = .66, p> .05. 
There was also a significant effect of condition for standards, such that standards for the 
anticipated speech task was significantly higher than at baseline in the negative feedback 
condition, t(34) = 3.49, p< .01, with no significant changes in the ambiguous, t(32) = 1.18, p> 
.05, or positive conditions, t(33) = .52, p> .05. Follow-up ANOVAs revealed that socially 
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anxious individuals in the ambiguous feedback condition responded more similarly to those in 
the positive feedback condition, p> .05, than the negative condition, F(1, 29) = 3.39, p = .07, 
for predicted performance. In contrast, controls responded more similarly to those in the 
negative feedback condition, p> .05, than the positive feedback condition, F(1, 35) = 4.64, p< 
.05. The SAD group made significantly better predictions for performance in both the 
ambiguous, t(14) = 2.79, p< .05, and positive feedback conditions, t(16) = 3.68, p< .01, but not 
in the negative feedback condition, p> .05. Controls also predicted better performance in the 
positive feedback condition, t(18) = 2.21, p< .05, but not the ambiguous condition, p> .05, and 
predicted worse performance in the negative feedback condition, t(19) = 2.79, p< .05. Socially 
anxious individuals perceived greater ability in the ambiguous, t(13) = 2.85, p< .05, and 
positive conditions, t(16) = 2.25, p< .05, whereas controls did not, p’s> .05. Neither group 
perceived a change in ability in the negative condition, p’s> .05. In terms of changes in 
standards however, the effects of ambiguous feedback was equivalent to positive feedback for 
both groups, p’s> .05, but differed significantly from the effects of negative feedback for both 
the SAD group, F(1, 28) = 4.27, p< .05, and controls, F(1, 36) = 7.75, p< .01. Both the SAD 
group, t(14) = 2.67, p< .05, and controls, t(19) = 2.31, p< .05, perceived higher standards for 
the second speech in the negative condition. No changes in standards were observed in the 
ambiguous and positive feedback conditions for either group, p’s> .05. 
No other interaction effects were significant for any individual dependent variables. 
 
Group, condition and interaction effects for changes from post-feedback (Time 5) to 
anticipation of speech 2 (Time 6) for symptom and cognitive measures (Hypothesis 3b) 
For difference scores between Time 5 and Time 6, there were significant effects of 
group, F(7,89) = 4.28, p< .001, η2 = .25, condition, F(14,180) = 2.50, p< 0.01, η2 = .17, 
and an interaction effect which approached significance, F(14,178) = 1.58, p = .09, η2 = .11. 
 
Main group effects were significant for anxiety, such that the SAD group exhibited a 
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greater increase in state anxiety from Time 5 to Time 6 compared to the non-anxious 
controls, regardless of the type of feedback received, see Figure 4. The same pattern of 
differences emerged for negative affect, p = .01, η2 = .07, and perceived threat, p< .05, η2 = 
.04. Both groups felt more anxious at Time 6 compared to post-feedback in the ambiguous, 
positive, and negative feedback conditions, p’s< .05, see Figure 4. In terms of perceived 
threat, however, only socially anxious individuals in the positive condition perceived a 
significant increase, t(13) = 2.37, p< .05, whereas controls and socially anxious individuals 
allocated to the other two feedback conditions did not, p’s> .05. Socially anxious individuals 
felt more negative in the ambiguous, t(14) = 4.72, p< .001, and positive feedback conditions, 
t(16) = 4.03, p< .01, but were unaffected in the negative feedback condition, similar to 
controls in all three conditions, p’s> .05. No significant group effects emerged for 
performance appraisal, ability, threat or standards. 
 
Figure 4. Changes in state anxiety (SAR) scores across time between condition and group. 
 
Effects of condition were significant for positive affect, performance appraisal, and 
perceived ability, but not for state anxiety, negative affect, threat or standards. 
 Post-hoc analyses revealed that averaged across groups, there was a significant 
increase in levels of positive affect in the negative feedback condition, t(35) = 3.66, p< .01, a 
significant reduction in the positive condition, t(35) = 2.37, p< .05, but no change in the 
ambiguous condition, t(35) = 1.88, p> .05. Performance appraisals increased significantly in 
the negative condition, t(35) = 2.15, p< .05, decreased significantly in the positive condition, 
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t(35) = 3.83, p< .01, and did not change in the ambiguous condition, t(35) = .74, p> .05. 
Perceived ability was significantly worse at Time 6 in the positive, t(35) =3.05, p< .01, and 
ambiguous conditions, t(31) = 2.23, p< .05, but did not change in the negative condition, t(3) 
= 1.33 p> .05. Follow-up ANOVAs revealed that socially anxious individuals who received 
ambiguous feedback responded more similarly to those in the negative feedback condition, p= 
.66, than the positive condition, F(1, 30) = 8.79, p< .01, for changes in positive affect. In 
contrast, controls in the ambiguous feedback condition responded more similarly to those in 
the positive condition, p> .05, than the negative feedback condition, F(1, 36) = 4.31, p< .05. 
The SAD group felt significantly less positive in the positive condition, t(16) = 2.96, p< .01, 
more positive in the negative condition, t(15) = 2.85, but were unaffected in the ambiguous 
condition, p> .05. Controls also reported feeling more positive in the negative feedback 
condition, t(19) = 2.31, p’s< .05, but were unaffected in the other two conditions, p’s> .05. In 
terms of changes to performance appraisal, the effects of ambiguous feedback in the SAD 
group tended to be more similar to the positive feedback, p> .05, rather than negative 
feedback, F(1, 29) = 4.75, p< .05. The controls, however, did not differentially respond to 
positive, p = .16, or negative feedback, p> .05, relative to the ambiguous feedback. The SAD 
group significantly reduced performance appraisals in the positive feedback condition, see 
Figure 5, t(16) = 2.99, p< .01, increased ratings in the negative condition, t(15) = 2.78, p<.05  
but were unaffected in the ambiguous condition, p> .05. For changes in perceived ability, the 
effects of ambiguous feedback for the SAD group did not appear to differ from positive or 
negative feedback conditions, p’s> .05, although those in the positive feedback condition 
perceived significantly less ability at Time 6, see Figure 5, t(16) = 2.31, p< .05. For controls, 
responses in the ambiguous condition were more similar to the positive condition, p> .05, than 
the negative condition, F(1, 35) = 3.79, p = .06. 
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Figure 5. Changes in performance appraisal (PQ) and perceived ability (AQ) scores across time-points in 
the positive feedback condition between groups. N.B. Higher mean AQ scores indicate lower perceived 
ability.  
 
The interaction between group and condition was significant for positive affect and 
approached significance for negative affect and performance appraisal scores. No significant 
interactions were observed for state anxiety, ability, threat or standards.  
  Follow-up ANOVAs revealed no significant group differences in the negative condition 
for affect and performance appraisal, p’s> .05. In the positive feedback condition, group 
differences were significant for negative affect, F(1, 
34) = 10.87, p< .01, and approached significance for performance appraisal, F(1, 34) = 3.41, 
p = .07, but not for positive affect, F(1, 34) = 2.55, p> .05. In the ambiguous condition, group 
differences were not significant for affect or performance appraisal, p’s> .05. 
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Table 7 
 
P-values and effect sizes (η2) for main effects of group, condition and interaction effects. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Time 5  Time 6 
Main Effect 
(Group) 
Main Effect 
(Condition) 
Interaction Effect Main Effect (Group) Main Effect 
(Condition) 
Interaction Effect 
Symptom measures 
p-value 
Effect 
Sizes 
p-value 
Effect 
Sizes 
p-value 
Effect 
Sizes 
 
p-value 
Effect 
Sizes 
p-value 
Effect 
Sizes 
p-value 
Effect 
Sizes 
State Anxiety <.05 .058 .19 .035 .65 .009  <.01 .256 .82 .004 .20 .035 
PANAS Positive  .47 .006 <.05 .099 .38 .020  .41 .008 .76 .006 .84 .004 
PANAS Negative  .16 .021 .68 .008 .59 .011  <.01 .135 .91 .002 .23 .032 
Performance Appraisal  <.01 .246 <.01 .368 .15 .039  <.01 .321 <.01 .162 .54 .013 
Performance Distortion .12 .026 <.01 .313 .39 .020  <.05 .055 <.05 .104 .39 .020 
Ability  <.01 .253 <.01 .220 .73 .007  <.01 .243 <.05 .107 .26 .030 
Threat  <.01 .215 <.01 .127 .98 .000  <.01 .251 .05 .064 .87 .003 
Expectations  <.01 .197 <.05 .074 .48 .015  <.01 .159 .09 .051 .51 .015 
 Time 1 – Time 6  Time 5 – Time 6 
State Anxiety  .20 .017 .52 .014 .19 .035 <.01 .210 .51 .014 .21 .033 
PANAS Positive  .90 .000 .59 .011 .23 .031  .91 .000 <.01 .152 <.05 .075 
PANAS Negative  .19 .018 .24 .030 .76 .006  <.05 .066 .91 .002 .07 .055 
Performance Appraisal  <.05 .059 <.01 .150 .26 .029  .37 .008 <.01 .169 .07 .053 
Ability  . <.01 .078 .20 .034 .46 .016  .43 .006 <.05 .093 .36 .022 
Threat .45 .006 .13 .043 .77 .005  <.05 .041 .06 .058 .20 .033 
Expectations  .93 .000 <.01 .144 .93 .002  .60 .003 .90 .002 .81 .005 
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3.4 DISCUSSION 
 
The current study aimed to examine how feedback that is objectively positive, 
negative or more ambiguous differentially influences affective and cognitive (re)appraisals 
for future performance for socially anxious and non-anxious individuals. The use of 
standardised feedback following the speech task was effective, although the ambiguous 
feedback was rated as more believable than positive and negative feedback by both groups. 
Although both groups rated the ambiguous feedback as moderately positive in valence, 
socially anxious individuals believed it to be less clear than positive and negative feedback, 
whereas controls perceived all three types of feedback to be equally clear. Overall, the 
ambiguous feedback was rated as less consistent, and containing more multiple meanings 
than the other two types of feedback. 
In support of the first hypothesis, prior to and immediately following the first speech 
task, socially anxious individuals reported greater anxiety, negative affect, underestimated 
performance to a greater degree, perceived more threat, and held higher standards and 
 perceived less ability, compared to controls. Significant group differences were maintained a 
week later, with the SAD group engaging in significantly more negative rumination about the 
speech task than controls. As expected, they also felt more anxious in anticipating feedback 
than controls. No differences in levels of positive affect were reported between groups prior to 
the receipt of feedback. 
Compared to cognitive appraisals made for the first speech task, the SAD group 
actually predicted better performance and ability for the second speech task in the ambiguous 
condition, compared to controls who were unaffected. Surprisingly, a significant 
improvement in predicted performance and perceived ability was also observed for socially 
anxious individuals in the positive feedback condition who were expected to feel more 
anxious, make worse predictions for performance and increase standards for the second  
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speech task. Interestingly, these cognitive re-appraisals by the SAD group in the ambiguous 
and positive feedback conditions were not accompanied by any changes in anticipatory 
anxiety in either condition. Overall, controls exhibited relatively minimal changes in state 
anxiety across time, irrespective of feedback condition, whereas the SAD group exhibited 
significant changes in state anxiety across time in each of the feedback conditions. 
This pattern of results in which ambiguous and positive feedback induced similar 
effects on cognitive re-appraisal are at odds with the second hypothesis that responses would 
be more similar between the ambiguous and negative feedback conditions in the SAD group. 
Furthermore, the notion that positive feedback would not be beneficial to socially anxious 
individuals in relation to cognitive outcomes was not supported by the current findings. In 
contrast to initial expectations, no changes in standards were observed for socially anxious 
individuals who received positive feedback, instead, both groups increased standards for the 
second speech task in the negative feedback condition only. 
In partial support of the third set of hypotheses, increases in state anxiety, negative 
affect and perceived threat was greater in the SAD group overall between appraisals post- 
feedback and the second speech, relative to controls. A significant increase in state anxiety 
occurred irrespective of group and condition between these time-points. In the positive 
feedback condition, however, socially anxious individuals significantly lowered both 
appraisals for performance and ability, increased perceptions of threat, and felt less positive 
and more negative in anticipation of the second speech task. This differed from the pattern of 
responses in the ambiguous feedback condition which induced relatively minimal changes in 
the SAD group. In the negative feedback condition, perceptions of performance increased, as 
did levels of positive affect in the SAD group, while the appraisals of the control group 
remained largely stable between these time-points. 
The results of the current study demonstrate that when external information about  
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performance is limited, socially anxious individuals fare worse than non-anxious controls, 
replicating results of studies which elicit concerns about performance via an interaction task 
(Kashdan and Savostyanova, 2011). In the present study, the SAD group was also found to 
distort their performance to a greater degree which is consistent with the basic assumptions of 
cognitive models (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The finding that the 
SAD group set higher standards when conditions were ambiguous replicates the findings of 
Moscovitch and Hofmann (2007), where the no standards condition led to the setting of 
standards comparable to those assigned to the high standards condition for the socially 
anxious group. However, the finding that the SAD group in the current study perceived 
significantly less ability for the task differs from the results of Wallace and Alden (1997), 
which may be due to participants making their ratings against standardised videos of 
interactions anchored at different levels of social performance. Hence, differences in 
perceived standards and ability in the current study may have in part been due to different 
interpretations of questionnaire items which refer to terms such as “better than average” and 
“high standard” between groups. 
Despite these considerations, the pattern of results appear to be generally compatible 
with self-representational theories (e.g., Schlenker and Leary, 1982) which state that greater 
discrepancy between perceived ability and standards can lead to increased anxiety, which 
may or may not interfere with actual performance. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., 
Stopa & Clark, 1993; Mellings & Alden, 2000; Walden and Alden, 1995), the controls 
objectively outperformed the socially anxious individuals and while both groups 
underestimated their speech performance, the SAD group did so to a significantly greater 
degree, replicating past research (e.g., Rapee and Lim, Wallace & Alden, 1995; Abbott & 
Rapee, 2004; Perini et al., 2006; Zou & Abbott, 2012). In the absence of immediate feedback 
about performance, the SAD group also reported more negative rumination about speech  
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performance, consistent with previous studies (e.g., Abbott and Rapee, 2004; Zou & Abbott, 
2012). 
The finding that ambiguous feedback improved predictions for both performance and 
perceived ability for the second speech task was surprising, given that socially anxious 
individuals have been found to be significantly less likely to endorse a positive interpretation 
of ambiguous social information within hypothetical social situations (Amin et al., 1998; 
Huppert et al., 2007). There are a number of possible explanations for the current findings. 
Firstly, the positive references to specific aspects of performance contained within the 
feedback may have been more salient for the SAD group, as these would have presumably 
been unexpected but likely to be desired (e.g., Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997). Furthermore, the feedback may have in fact, activated both positive and negative self- 
presentations, setting up a context in which acquisitive goals were prioritised over self- 
protective ones (Wallace & Alden, 1997). These concurrent processes may have contributed 
to the pattern of changes in appraisal from baseline, which were largely congruent with 
perceptions that one successfully avoided negative evaluation, which according to cognitive 
theories is a primary short-term goal for socially anxious individuals (Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997). The inclusion of both positive and negative references to performance may have also 
made the feedback more believable, as indicated by post-experimental ratings, leading to a 
greater impact on challenging pre-existing negative self-presentations in the SAD group and 
sustained effects on cognitive appraisals over time. 
The degree to which interpretive biases were elicited in the current study may differ 
markedly from contexts where a greater degree of ambiguity exists, for example, when no 
feedback about performance is available. This context may direct individuals to rely on 
internal self-representations to inform appraisals, which for socially anxious individuals are 
more likely to be negative than positive self-presentations in the absence of additional  
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information from external sources. This suggests that the more ambiguous a context is 
perceived to be, the more likely an individual is to rely on the negative self-presentations to 
inform responses. This may in part explain why negative interpretation biases are reported 
consistently across studies which examine interpretations of ambiguous social information 
prior to or during socio-evaluative tasks (e.g., Budnick et al., 2015; Kanai et al., 2010, Amin 
et al., 1998) as these contexts may not adequately challenge the dominance of negative self- 
presentations which are believed to provide a more reliable source of information about one’s 
performance or behaviours of an interaction partner. Alternatively, it may be that interpretive 
biases occur more readily under contexts of heightened anxiety, which may not be present 
when simply reading feedback about performance. Indeed, worse outcomes for performance 
appraisal and rumination have been reported previously in studies where feedback about 
performance is absent and support the findings of the current study (e.g., Rapee & Lim, 1992; 
Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Kashdan & Savostyanova, 2011). 
Directed feedback about performance also typically entails the provision of 
information which is likely to reduce ambiguity within a situation. This may be particularly 
pertinent for socially anxious individuals who tend to be less certain about positive self-views 
relative to negative ones (Wilson & Rapee, 2006) and may potentially predispose individuals 
to greater fluctuations in response to external feedback. So for socially anxious individuals, 
re-appraisals in line with external feedback may be more likely to occur when it proves salient 
enough to present as a better alternative to internal representations, which socially anxious 
individuals are less likely to be certain about. 
Unexpectedly, socially anxious individuals in the positive feedback condition also 
made better predictions for performance and ability in anticipation of the second speech task. 
Although they did not feel more anxious about the second speech task, their affective 
experience was no different to what was reported for the first speech. Cognitive models (e.g.,  
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Clark & Wells, 1995) posit that information which does not match with negative self-views is 
naturally more susceptible to distortion over time, and this is supported by empirical findings 
that memory for positive feedback tends to become more negative over a period of days 
(Cody and Teachman, 2010). Hence, the limited amount of time for post-ruminative processes 
may have rendered positive feedback less vulnerable to distortion, and as such, may reflect the 
consequences of processing of positive feedback which occurs over restricted time periods. 
According to self-verification theories (Swann, 1983), responses can be congruent to external 
information which contradicts self-views held with greater certainty without actually 
internalising such information to inform appraisals for future tasks. As was the case in the 
current study, it was in the positive feedback condition that appraisals from post-feedback 
continued to fluctuate for both affective and cognitive variables. This suggests that self-
verification motives may have been enacted only after initial re-appraisals were made in 
response to feedback, rather than immediately upon presentation of feedback when 
socially anxious individuals felt relatively less anxious. The significant reductions in 
performance, ability and mood which occurred in anticipation of the second speech task in 
the SAD group who received positive feedback may thus reflect the early stages of 
discounting, possibly due to greater self-discrepancy between internal and external 
evaluations. A return to more negative self-presentations may then have contributed to 
subsequent appraisals for the second speech task as the salience of external information 
reduced. Furthermore, this process may be exacerbated over longer periods of time as initial 
self-appraisals become more negative in line with predominant self-views (e.g., Cody & 
Teachman, 2010). Taking the pattern of responses of the SAD group who received 
ambiguous feedback into consideration, it may be that feedback which partially verifies 
initial expectations is relatively less susceptible to fluctuations over time and may lead to 
more sustained effects of cognitive reappraisals. Lowering one’s perceptions of ability 
following positive feedback may be an adaptive response in the short term, such that  
 
123 
 
maintaining an internal attribution for success would require a more laborious process of 
challenging dominant negative self-views which can serve as a source of threat (Heimberg & 
Becker, 2002). 
Poorer appraisals for future performance following a successful social interaction 
have been shown to be due to an increase in standards from pre- to post-interaction for 
individuals with SAD (Wallace & Alden, 1997). In the current study, significant changes 
from baseline in terms of standards were only observed in the negative feedback condition, 
for both groups. This was not anticipated, and may be due to the increase, rather than a 
decrease in predictions for performance in the positive feedback condition observed in the 
SAD group in the current study. An increase in standards has been proposed to be associated 
with adopting self-protective strategies to avoid loss of positive evaluation for future tasks 
(Wallace & Alden, 1995); however, socially anxious individuals have been shown to hold 
both acquisitive and self-protective goals when positive events occur (Lake & Arkin, 1985). 
The lack of increase in standards following positive feedback accompanied by a significant 
increase in perceived ability together suggest that socially anxious individuals may not have 
prioritised self-protective goals to avoid negative evaluation for the second speech task in the 
current study. 
It is similarly possible that changes in standards did not occur following positive 
evaluation because the conditions in which individuals anticipated the first and second speech 
task differed, which is a potential limitation of the current study. Although post-experimental 
manipulation checks indicated that all participants believed that the second speech would 
occur, motivation to leave a particular impression for the second speech task may have been 
reduced due to uncertainty about further evaluation and provision of feedback. That is, for all 
individuals, the first speech was approached with the understanding that evaluation would 
certainly follow, regardless of the perceived importance of feedback. The second speech task,  
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however, was approached without explicit knowledge of whether or not evaluation would in 
fact follow. In previous studies (e.g., Wallace & Alden, 1997), a similar deception was used 
where instructions for a second interaction task was initially withheld, however, in that study, 
feedback was provided during the social interaction, which meant that conditions were similar 
to those in which the first interaction task was anticipated as perceived evaluations co- 
occurred with performance. As such, this caveat in the current study may have affected the 
underlying motivations of participants, such that individuals may have been less concerned 
about evaluation in anticipating the second speech task. 
Despite these considerations, a significant increase in standards was observed in the 
negative feedback condition which may be related to this feedback inducing a context where 
further negative evaluation would have been undesirable and self-protective goals were 
adopted (Wallace & Alden, 1997). Given that non-anxious individuals would not have 
expected such feedback about their performance (Kashdan & Savostyanova, 2011), the 
increase in standards in the control group may have been made simply in response to 
realising that one had underestimated the standards of the external evaluator, which is 
compatible with a lack of changes in cognitive appraisals from post-feedback in the control 
group. For the SAD group however, who initially perceived higher standards than controls, 
the further increase in standards occurred even though predictions of performance and ability 
was maintained. Interestingly, perceptions of performance and ability did increase from post- 
feedback and was accompanied by a significant increase in positive affect, which suggests 
that believing that standards will be higher for future performance may in fact help with 
initial reactions to negative feedback. 
Overall, the results of the current study suggest that when ambiguity exists in relation 
to standards and performance in the absence of direct external feedback, socially anxious 
individuals fare worse on a range of affective and cognitive outcomes compared to controls,  
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and report significantly more negative rumination in the week following performance. 
Socially anxious individuals may treat external feedback about performance initially as a more 
salient source of information, upon which cognitive re-appraisals are based. It may be that 
external feedback which contains positive references to performance serves as a cue to 
challenge internal negative self-presentations which are presumably more dominant prior to 
the presentation of such feedback. Furthermore, greater discrepancy between self- and 
external evaluations may render initial re-appraisals less stable across time, such that negative 
self-presentations which are held with greater certainty may ultimately induce some degree of 
disqualification of external feedback that is very positive. In the current study, the positive 
evaluations did not lead to changes in standards between the first and second speech task and 
may have occurred in a context where loss of positive evaluation was not of primary concern. 
Further limitations to the current study warrant consideration. Firstly, the inclusion of an 
additional control group in which no feedback was provided would have allowed for further 
comparisons of responses to the three types of feedback. In addition, questionnaires assessing 
changes in motivational goals of individuals at different time-points in the study would have 
facilitated interpretation of the unexpected findings. The generalisability of the current 
findings to treatment-seeking individuals may be reduces, as positive and ambiguous feedback 
may serve as less effective cues to challenging negative self-presentations which are more 
entrenched and reinforced in treatment seeking samples who report greater interference and 
distress associated with anxiety symptoms and avoidance behaviours. As proposed by Brewin 
(2006), more positive self-presentations may be rendered inaccessible by negative self-
presentations which are pervasive and reinforced more consistently; consequently, negative 
interpretation biases to external feedback may occur more reliably across contexts in 
treatment-seeking samples. 
One of the strengths of the current study is that it addresses limitations of previous  
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studies which have neglected direct comparison of appraisals towards ambiguous and 
unambiguous information between socially anxious and non-anxious groups. For example, 
the systematic review of relevant studies in Chapter 2 found that most studies directly 
manipulated ambiguity by use of ambiguous social information or behavioural cues, but did 
not compare the responses of socially anxious individuals to social information which was 
less ambiguous (e.g., Amin et al., 1998). In particular, it is at present argued that ambiguous 
stimuli across previous studies have consistently reported negative interpretation biases 
because dominant negative self-presentations remain unchallenged within these contexts, 
which encourage reliance on negative self-beliefs to inform appraisals. The results of the 
current study call for closer inspection of how temporary changes in re-appraisal may be 
influenced by the nature of the external information about performance and its interaction 
with perceived self-discrepancy. Furthermore, identifying possible interactions with 
motivational goals, i.e., to seek approval or avoid disapproval, may further inform the 
complex and subtle processes undergone by socially anxious individuals in response to 
external feedback about performance. 
There is a number of potential treatment implications for the current findings which 
relate to the nature of corrective feedback used to challenge unhelpful thoughts about 
anxiety-provoking situations in SAD. Feedback which follows an anxiety-provoking situation 
is often incompatible with initial fears, and is more likely to be objectively positive and 
perceived to be highly self-discrepant. As the results of the current study suggest, the benefits 
of corrective information may be more susceptible to post-processing when self-discrepancy 
is high, and as such, the initial benefits of contradictory feedback may be difficult to maintain 
in informing appraisals for future tasks which occur after a period of a few days. Failing to 
intervene at the initial stage where external feedback used to inform initial re-appraisals may 
start to be discounted is likely to impede treatment progress, which is supported by reports  
that failure to incorporate corrective information is viewed as one of the more significant 
obstacles towards change in treatment (Heimberg & Becker, 2002). Consequently, clinicians 
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may need to monitor and continually revise interpretations of self-discrepant feedback over 
the course of treatment in order to maximise gains from these experiences. 
The results of the current study suggest that the way in which external information 
informs self-appraisals is a dynamic process which can result in both momentary and 
sustained change, which is a view that has also been advocated by Hofmann (2007). The 
current findings highlight the importance of differentiating between various contexts in which 
ambiguity about performance or other’s behaviours is present. Failure to do so may only offer 
a limited and over-simplified view of the complex processing undergone by socially anxious 
individuals. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4.1 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This chapter provides an overall summary of the present thesis and relates the results to 
previous empirical studies and theories of SAD. The implications of the results, strengths and 
limitations, as well as directions for future research are discussed. 
 
4.1.1 Research Overview 
 
Findings across a number of studies provide converging evidence that socially 
anxious individuals process self-relevant information in line with negative self- 
representations during socio-evaluative situations compared to non-anxious individuals. 
Negative interpretations of ambiguous stimuli is consistent with the predictions of cognitive 
models of SAD, however, recent evidence also suggests that positively valenced events may 
be susceptible to such interpretive biases. 
Greater levels of threat have been attributed to ambiguous social scenarios in highly 
socially anxious (Voncken, Bögels and de Vries, 2003) and treatment seeking individuals 
diagnosed with SAD, who are more likely to select a negative interpretation and less likely to 
select a positive interpretation of self-relevant ambiguous scenarios that directly invite 
resolution, compared to controls (Amir et al., 2008). These group differences also extend to 
interpretation of non-verbal behaviours during speech performances which are perceived to 
be more threatening and negative (Kanai et al., 2010). Neutral and positive behaviours 
exhibited by an interaction partner have been associated with objective deficits in 
performance, comparable to those who engage with a partner who displays consistently 
negative behaviours (Budnick et al., 2015). Those high in trait anxiety have been found to 
rate ambiguous comments about their appearance more negatively than controls, but overall, 
mean ratings were between those made for objectively negative and positive comments (Amir 
et al., 2005). Ambiguous contexts prior to a speech performance seem to result in the setting  
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of high standards and subsequently poorer predictions of performance (Moscovitch and 
Hofmann, 2007). The lack of information about standards may require the individual to rely 
on pre-existing self-beliefs, predisposing them to adopt motivational goals in line with 
avoiding disapproval rather than seeking approval. In summary, socially anxious individuals 
interpret ambiguous information more negatively than non-anxious controls for both verbal 
and non-verbal information made available during and prior to socio-evaluative events, 
potentially due to the salience of internal negative self-representations in such contexts. 
Individuals diagnosed with SAD have reported lower frequency of positive social 
experiences (Franklin & Foa, 2000), more negative reactions to positive events (Gilboa- 
Schechtman, Franklin, & Foa, 2000), and reduced positive affect compared to controls 
(Kashdan, 2007). Socially anxious individuals demonstrate poor recall of positive aspects of a 
social situation following a delay, even when controlling for depressive symptoms (Brendle 
and Wenzel, 2004), and their memory for positive feedback about performance tends to 
become more negative over time (Cody & Teachman, 2010). Individuals with SAD have also 
demonstrated a lack of positive inferential bias (Hirsch & Mathews, 2000). Given these 
findings, socially anxious individuals may fail to capitalise on the potential benefits of 
positive outcomes (Kashdan, Weeks, & Savostyanova, 2011), whether it be through elevating 
perceived standards required for performance following success (Wallace & Alden, 1997), or 
discounting such information and perceiving it to be less accurate, given the incongruence 
initial expectations (Weeks et al., 2008). 
The current study attempted to apply the concept of ambiguity to written feedback 
about speech performance which was only provided following a delay, and compare its 
effects to less ambiguous feedback about performance which was objectively positive or 
negative in valence. 
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 4.1.2 Summary of Systematic Review 
 
The results of studies reported in the Systematic Review in Chapter 2 suggest that 
socially anxious individuals are more likely to make negative interpretations of ambiguous 
information, and possibly less likely to make positive interpretations compared to non- 
anxious controls. Furthermore, when feedback is absent, or inconsistent, socially anxious 
individuals tend to underestimate both their performance and believe that it is less likely that 
an external evaluator will view their performance positively. The results of studies which 
examine biases with ambiguous facial stimuli are less consistent and may be due to 
methodological differences between studies. There is relatively limited evidence that post- 
event rumination, self-focused attention and subjective anxiety is higher in response to 
ambiguous contexts for socially anxious individuals, as results from studies do not adequately 
account for pre-existing group differences. 
Study designs which include conditions to compare the effects of ambiguous 
contexts to may be useful, for example, the presentations of positive or negatively valenced 
social information alongside conditions where information is more ambiguous. The current 
study attempted to do this for feedback about performance following a delay, which was 
either consistently positive, negative or contained an equal number of positive and negative 
references to aspects of performance, to examine changes across time on symptom and 
cognitive outcome variables. 
4.1.3 Summary of Results 
 
The main results of the current study are summarised below, followed by a more detailed 
discussion of the findings in relation to other empirical studies and current conceptualisations 
of Social Anxiety Disorder. 
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Pre-feedback 
 
The current study hypothesised that socially anxious individuals would fare worse 
than non-anxious controls across affective and cognitive variables prior to the first speech 
task and prior to provision of feedback one week later. In general support of these hypotheses, 
the SAD group reported greater state anxiety, more negative affect, greater distortion in 
performance appraisal, higher levels of threat, higher standards and less ability, compared to 
the control group, both prior to and following the first speech task. A week later, the SAD 
group reported more negative rumination about their previous performance, and reported 
greater anticipatory anxiety about feedback. Furthermore, socially anxious individuals 
underestimated their speech performance to a greater degree than non-anxious controls, 
relative to ratings made by an objective rater. 
Post-feedback 
 
Overall, controls tended to exhibit relatively less changes from baseline, particularly 
in the case of cognitive appraisals for predicted performance and perceived ability for the 
second speech task. The pattern of changes for state anxiety indicated that the effects of 
condition and time were relatively minimal for controls. 
In contrast to initial hypotheses, socially anxious individuals did not exhibit a 
negative interpretive bias in relation to the ambiguous feedback, and like controls, perceived 
such feedback to be a moderately positive evaluation of speech performance. Again, 
unexpectedly, predictions for performance and perceptions of ability were better for the 
second speech compared to the first speech in the ambiguous and positive feedback 
conditions in the SAD group. Despite these re-appraisals being congruent with feedback, no 
changes in anticipatory anxiety was observed for the clinical group in either condition. In the 
negative feedback condition, predictions of performance and perceived ability remained 
unchanged for the second speech task in the SAD group. An increase in standards was 
observed for both groups in anticipation of the second speech task in response to negative 
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feedback, however, no changes occurred for socially anxious individuals in response  to  
positive or ambiguous feedback. 
In partial support of initial hypotheses, the SAD group exhibited greater overall 
changes from post-feedback for state anxiety, negative affect, and threat appraisals, compared 
to controls. A significant reduction in performance appraisal and perceived ability was 
observed for socially anxious individuals in the positive feedback condition only, which was 
accompanied by a significant increase in perceived threat and worsening of affect. In contrast, 
relatively fewer changes occurred in the SAD group following ambiguous feedback, although 
those who received negative feedback actually increased predictions for performance for the 
second speech and reported an increase in positive affect. 
 
  4.1.4 Interpretation of the Results 
 
The primary finding of the current study was that socially anxious individuals made 
better appraisals for performance and perceived more ability for the second speech task in the 
ambiguous and positive feedback conditions. Despite these changes, they continued to feel as 
anxious as they had prior to being provided with feedback, and did not differ from socially 
anxious individuals who received negative feedback. Immediately following these 
reappraisals however, socially anxious individuals in the positive feedback condition exhibited 
significant reductions in performance and ability and perceived an increase in threat in 
anticipation of the second speech task; a pattern which was not reliably observed in the 
clinical group who received ambiguous or negative feedback, or in the non-anxious control 
group. 
As predicted, group differences were observed at all time-points prior to the provision 
of feedback, which is adequately accounted for by cognitive models of SAD (Clark & Wells, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). A greater degree of negative rumination was reported by 
socially anxious individuals in the current study, which may be related to initial 
underestimations of performance (e.g., Zou & Abbott, 2012), which occurred to a greater 
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degree than in the control group in the current study. These findings also directly replicate a 
study which compared high and low SA groups and found that the high SA group reported 
more anxiety, worse performance appraisals and more rumination a week after an interaction 
task (Dannahy and Stopa, 2007). Given that external feedback about performance was not 
provided during the first speech task, socially anxious individuals are likely to have relied on 
internal self-representations, including physiological symptoms during the speech to inform 
self-appraisals (e.g., Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Greater negative rumination has also been 
reported by Abbott and Rapee (2004), who noted that performance appraisals tended to 
become more negative over a one-week period for individuals with SAD whereas self- 
appraisals for controls tended to improve. These findings may in part be explained by the fact 
that socially anxious individuals predominantly hold negative self-representations that impact 
on cognitions which arise during a post-ruminative period, in contrast to controls whose 
memories becomes more positive over time (Cody & Teachman, 2010; 2011). The SAD 
group reported more depression-, anxiety- and stress-related symptoms in the one-week 
period prior to both sessions of the study, with no differences between feedback conditions 
observed for either group. Group differences were not observed for reported levels of positive 
affect which is at odds with the results of a meta-analysis that found social anxiety to be 
inversely associated with positive affect (Kashdan, 2007). The results, however, do provide 
support for previous findings that suggest that anhedonia may be more characteristic of 
depressive disorders (Watson, Clark, & Carey, 1988; Brown, Chorpita & Barlow, 1998), 
which is consistent with the current clinical sample who reported low comorbidity with 
depressive disorders. 
The finding that performance appraisals and perceptions of ability were significantly 
better for the second speech task in ambiguous and positive feedback conditions in the SAD 
group was unexpected, and is inconsistent with the interpretive bias of ambiguous social  
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information reported in the literature. One possibility why re-appraisals were congruent with 
the retrospective evaluations of positive and ambiguous feedback in the SAD group may be 
that these individuals attributed greater importance and relevance of external information 
initially to inform self-views relative to the control group. A number of studies have reported 
that socially anxious individuals have low self-concept clarity compared to those who are 
non-anxious (Wilson & Rapee, 2006; Stopa, Brown, Luke, & Hirsch, 2010), which is 
characterised by less certainty about self-views and susceptibility to influence by external 
contextual and temporal fluctuations (Campbell, Assanand, & Di Paula, 2003). Stopa et al., 
found that negative self-perceptions were more stable and held more consistently by socially 
anxious individuals compared to positive self-perceptions, but overall, greater uncertainty 
about self-views characterised clinical groups. These differences in self-concept clarity may 
explain why re-appraisals occurred in response to positive and ambiguous feedback to a 
greater degree than changes observed in the negative feedback, in which external evaluations 
of performance may have been more consistent with expected evaluations and/or initial self- 
appraisals (Kashdan & Savostyanova, 2011). Overall, socially anxious individuals may also 
have been more susceptible to external information which partially verified expectations of 
how one would be evaluated, as was the case for ambiguous feedback that contained both 
positive and negative references to performance, improving its believability. 
It may be that the positive elements within the ambiguous feedback condition 
activated relational knowledge consistent with less-negative self-representations, which 
although held with less certainty, matched the underlying goals of the SAD group, i.e., social 
approval rather than disapproval. Although socially anxious individuals have been shown to 
be more concerned about avoiding disapproval than controls, they do not necessarily differ in 
their motivational goals compared to controls when they perceive positive evaluation 
(Wallace & Alden, 1997). In a study by Baldwin and Main (2001), the presence of an external  
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stimulus that activated relational knowledge about social acceptance was found to be 
beneficial to socially anxious individuals during an interaction, more so than the effects of 
another stimulus that was associated with social rejection. Therefore, a point of distinction 
between previous studies which have consistently reported negative interpretation bias of 
ambiguous social vignettes (Amin et al., 1998; Amir et al., 2005), non-verbal behaviours 
during a speech performance (Kanai et al., 2010), ambiguity about standards for performance 
(Moscovitch & Hofmann, 2007) and the current study may be that previous studies simply 
did not provide any opportunity to allow for less-negative self-representations to inform 
appraisals. For example, the presence of neutral non-verbal behaviours poses no challenge to 
pre-existing negative self-representations, and consequently, self-appraisals may be made in 
line with predominantly negative self-views. In addition, anxiety prior to or during socio- 
evaluative situations may be particularly high during socio-evaluative situations which 
increases the salience of internal self-representations. Brewin (2006) hypothesised that more 
positive self-representations may be obscured in socially anxious individuals due to the 
chronicity of the negative self-beliefs, which can be temporally alleviated by the activation of 
relational knowledge consistent with more positive self-beliefs. Hence, the fact that ambiguous 
feedback contained positive references to performance may have led to the activation of 
matching self-representations which informed self-appraisals in the SAD group. 
An additional point of difference between the current and previous studies is that non- 
verbal cues presented across other studies may be more susceptible to negative interpretive 
biases as such information cannot be taken at ‘face value’, particularly when presented during 
the target evaluative situation. Typically, specific feedback about performance inherently 
resolves ambiguity about one’s performance and how it was perceived, and as such, the mere 
availability of feedback following performance may lower subjective ambiguity. Compared to 
the aforementioned studies, the deliberate manipulation of ambiguity in the present study  
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ccurred following performance, rather than preceding or during the situation. In contrast, a 
truly ambiguous condition in regards to feedback would entail the absence of external 
information about performance, which has been associated with worse performance appraisals 
and more negative rumination (Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Perini, Abbott, & Rapee; 2006; Rapee 
& Hayman, 1996b, Rapee & Lim, 1992), which was also replicated in the current study. 
Presumably, the absence of external information about performance may mean that internal 
information is relatively more salient for the individual and in the case of those with SAD, re-
appraisals will then be more likely to be informed by more negative self-views. 
Compared to ambiguous and negative feedback, the positive feedback is likely to 
have been perceived with greater discrepancy between expectations and actual outcomes in 
the SAD group. According to self-verification theories (Swann, 1983), socially anxious 
individuals should have interpreted this feedback in a way that maintains pre-existing 
appraisals as external evaluations which contradict self-views conflicts with underlying 
motivations to maintain one’s sense of certainty about the self. While Swann and colleagues 
(1987) found that external feedback which is inconsistent with dominant self-representations 
was perceived to be less accurate and more likely to be refuted, this was only the case for 
participants who were given an opportunity to discuss and respond to the self-discrepant 
feedback provided by the external evaluator (Swann & Hill, 1982). The authors proposed that 
participants in this study who read the feedback without additional discussion may have in 
fact switched to other self-views congruent with positive feedback, presumably due to greater 
motivation to maintain consistency between internal and external representations, and 
attributing greater importance to external evaluations of performance. 
These previous findings reflect the pattern of data in the current study in which the 
SAD group did not immediately discount positive feedback in informing their appraisals. 
However, the effects of the positive feedback appeared more transient, given that perceptions  
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of performance and ability decreased, and perceptions of threat increased in anticipation of 
the second speech task. This suggests that they may have been reluctant to surrender to 
information which was highly self-discrepant from initial expectations to actually inform 
their approach to future tasks. This pattern of discounting following initial re-appraisals was 
not observed in the control group, or in socially anxious individuals who received negative or 
ambiguous feedback. 
Taken together, this suggests that the effects of non-negative feedback may not only 
occur at specific stages of processing, but also occur more readily for feedback which is 
perceived to be highly self-discrepant. It may be then that the positive feedback initially led to 
temporary shifts in self-views which informed cognitive appraisals because external feedback 
was initially prioritised over internal evaluations which were regarded with less certainty. 
However, as the salience of external information decreases and more negative internal 
representations return to be more dominant once again, appraisals for future anxiety- 
provoking situations will ultimately be informed by the latter (Swann, 1983). Given that the 
period of time between appraisals made immediately following feedback and appraisals made 
in anticipation of the second speech task was limited, the finding that appraisals for 
performance and ability were still higher for the second speech task compared to baseline 
may have been a function of these temporal restrictions. For example, Cody and Teachman 
(2010) found that positive aspects of feedback about speech performance tended to become 
increasingly negative, but only after a period of two days. Hence, had there been more time 
between provision of feedback and the second speech task, the reversal of positive effects on 
re-appraisals made by the SAD group in the positive feedback condition may have been more 
pronounced. If this is indeed the case, it suggests that not only are positive and negative self- 
representations competing for dominance within situations (e.g., Brewin, 2006), but also that 
immediate re-appraisals may be counteracted by a return to negative self-representations over  
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longer delays, which ultimately inform responses leading up to future events. 
 According to self-representational theories (e.g., Schlenker & Leary, 1982), the 
discrepancy between perceived ability to form a particular impression within socio-evaluative 
situations should lead to increased anxiety, so it would be expected that perceiving greater 
ability should in turn reduce anxiety. However, the effort required to fully integrate external 
self-discrepant feedback and allow an opposing self-view to inform appraisals for future tasks 
is perhaps more likely to occur if one perceives high self-efficacy in directing outcomes over 
repeated instances where outcomes are positive. This may explain why cognitive re- 
appraisals made by socially anxious individuals in the ambiguous and positive feedback 
conditions in the current study did not lead to changes in anticipatory anxiety even though 
cognitive re-appraisal is proposed to be a necessary component in the down-regulation of 
negative emotions such as anxiety (Paret et al., 2011). It may be that only with mounting 
contradictory evidence, does greater reliance on non-negative self-representations ensue and 
inform appraisals, which over time can be held with greater certainty and stability (Brewin, 
2006). Presumably, taking such risks prematurely (e.g., following a successful outcome which 
occurs in isolation) may be associated with greater personal cost for socially anxious 
individuals, because there is potential for the initial acceptance of positive self- 
representations to be disconfirmed in future social situations. 
Although no increase in perceived standards was observed in the SAD group 
following positive feedback, contradicting previous findings (e.g., Wallace & Alden, 1997), 
these results may in part be due to the fact that socially anxious individuals did not predict 
worse performance for the second speech task in the positive feedback condition. 
Interestingly, an increase in standards from baseline was only observed in the negative 
feedback condition for both groups, however, the SAD group maintained appraisals for 
performance and ability whereas controls only lowered predictions for performance. These  
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findings partially replicate the pattern of responses between groups for individuals who 
engaged with a confederate displaying negative behaviours in the Wallace and Alden study. 
The authors found that non-anxious controls actually perceived less ability and higher 
standards following the negative interaction, whereas socially anxious individuals reported no 
significant changes in their perceptions of ability and standards. Taken together, the increase 
in standards despite the lack of changes in cognitive appraisals in the clinical group may 
reflect stronger motivations in the SAD group to avoid further negative evaluation even 
though the feedback largely matched initial expectations (Kashdan & Savostyanova, 2011). 
The increase in the control group may instead have been due to acknowledging that they had 
initially underestimated the external standards as the negative feedback was presumably 
unexpected. It may be that appraisals for ability and performance were largely unaffected in 
the clinical group due to less self-discrepancy, suggesting that when negative evaluation has 
indeed occurred, the goals of socially anxious individuals are maintained, i.e., to avoid 
disapproval, rather than to seek approval. 
The results of the current study suggest there is a complex process in the integration 
of external information by socially anxious individuals, which is influenced by a range of 
contextual factors that may include the availability of positive self-representations and the 
degree to which external feedback verifies initial expectations and self-beliefs. Not only is the 
competition between negative and positive self-views likely to be dynamic process, it may be 
that particular contexts facilitate access to underlying positive self-representations and impact 
on cognitive reappraisals in the short-term. In particular, the responses of socially anxious 
individuals to external feedback which is very positive, but highly self-discrepant, may be 
particularly susceptible to further fluctuations post-feedback, as they may revert back to 
negative self-representations to incur less risk of future evaluations not matching more 
positive appraisals, even though this ultimately contributes to a self-defeating cycle. 
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4.1.5 Limitations of Current Study 
 
There are a number of limitations to the current study which may influence current 
interpretations and generalisability of the present findings. 
Firstly, although the contexts in which the first and second speech task were 
anticipated were intended to be as equivalent as possible, explicit instructions about external 
evaluation was only provided for the first speech task but not the second. Despite the fact that 
all participants strongly believed that they would indeed engage in a second speech task, there 
was some ambiguity in relation to whether or not future evaluation would in fact occur, and if 
so, how further feedback about performance would be provided. Consequently, the appraisals 
for the second speech task may have been made under conditions where the importance of 
further evaluation was diminished. This may have impacted on the motivational strategies of 
participants such that individuals may have been less inclined to adopt self-protective 
strategies because concerns about evaluation overall were potentially reduced. 
Another limitation of the current study is the amount of time available for the 
processing of feedback was somewhat restricted compared to real-life situations where one 
might also ruminate on or recall past experiences to inform predictions about future 
performance. In line with the interpretation that the presence of positive references to 
performance within the feedback may have facilitated access to positive self-representations, 
and interacted with approval-seeking goals within these contexts, congruent re-appraisals 
may thus be more representative of changes under time-pressure. These effects may not 
automatically translate to sustained changes over longer periods of time, due to post- 
ruminative processes in which the salience of external feedback may be attenuated. 
Although the inclusion of the three feedback conditions within the current study 
allowed for comparisons between conditions across the two groups, a potential caveat is that 
there are pre-existing group differences in re-appraisals which would have occurred over time  
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in the absence of any external feedback. For example, prior to the receipt of feedback, self- 
appraisals in the clinical group may already have become more negative, whereas the 
appraisals of controls became more positive. The inclusion of a control condition in which no 
feedback about speech performance is provided may have served as an additional comparison 
point for those who were provided with standardised feedback, and allowed for more robust 
conclusions to be drawn about the unexpected findings. As a result, it would be important to 
replicate the study with a different ambiguous condition (e.g., no feedback). Similarly, 
additional measures which assessed self-concept clarity and goal orientations at various time- 
points would have been useful, although this would necessitate a significant increase in 
sample size and analysis complexity. 
The generalisability of these results to individuals who manifest more severe 
symptoms, interference and cognitive vulnerabilities associated with SAD needs to be 
considered. The mean severity rating for the SAD group was between moderate and severe, 
which is lower than that typically reported in treatment-seeking samples who report 
significant educational and occupational impairments (Aderka, Hofmann, Nickerson, 
Hermesh, Gilboa-Schechtman & Marom, 2012). Subsequently, greater rates of attrition or 
refusal to complete the speech task may have been observed in such a sample. Although 
speculative, treatment seeking individuals may not have engaged in the reappraisal of 
performance and ability as readily as the sample in the current study, who appeared to have 
acknowledged both positive and negative self-representations. More pervasive negative self-
beliefs typically held by those with more severe SAD may render accessing positive self-
beliefs a more laborious process (e.g., Brewin, 2006). In addition, the discrepancy between 
expected and actual outcomes within the positive and ambiguous feedback conditions may 
be greater, and be accompanied by immediate processing which serves to discount such 
information and perceive it to be less accurate (Weeks et al., 2008).  
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Furthermore, the results of the current study were based on a sample of university 
students who differ from the general population in terms of education level and age. There 
was also a gender imbalance between groups, with significantly more females than males in 
the SAD group and vice versa for the NAC group, although baseline analyses confirmed that 
there were no differences in gender distributions across feedback conditions. 
 
4.1.6 Strengths of Current Study 
 
One of the strengths of the current study is that unlike previous studies, it attempted to 
manipulate feedback about performance to be more ambiguous than feedback that 
unequivocally indicated either objective success or failure. Furthermore, the implementation 
of ambiguous feedback was based on theoretical definitions of ambiguity in social situations 
(e.g., Norton, 1975), which have been used across other studies, albeit without explicit 
intention. It differs from previous studies which have presented ambiguous behavioural and 
verbal cues simultaneously during a socio-evaluative event such as an interaction, which may 
represent a more demanding context in terms of state anxiety and in regards to interpretation 
of ambiguous behaviours. Although the SAD group perceived the ambiguous feedback to be 
less clear than positive and negative feedback, it was rated to be moderately positive overall, 
which suggests that written feedback that contains both positive and negative elements may 
not require the same degree of interpretation observed for ambiguous social behaviours (e.g., 
Budnick et al., 2015), or situations where there is a lack of relevant information (e.g., 
Moscovitch & Hofmann, 2007). As such, negative interpretive biases of ambiguous 
information may partially be due to the experimental contexts which do not adequately 
challenge negative self-representations, which would otherwise facilitate more positive 
responses to information which indicates the absence of social rejection or failure. 
Additional strengths of the current study relate to the use of a well-standardised and a  
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semi-structured interview to determine diagnosis of SAD. This is particularly relevant given 
that the current sample consisted of predominantly undergraduate university students. The 
use of the diagnostic interview ensured that allocation to the clinical group or exclusion due 
to a non-primary SAD diagnosis was carried out with confidence. All of the diagnostic 
assessments were carried out by the current author, which were coded by an independent 
rater to assess diagnostic reliability. The large sample size of the current study was also 
advantageous, which may have potentially limited the influence of non-normative 
observations, and allowed for measurement of a wide range of affective and cognitive 
variables. 
 
4.1.7 Implications for Clinical Intervention 
 
At present, a significant component of cognitive behavioural approaches to treatment 
for SAD attempts to increase awareness of biases to attention, memory and cognition through 
the introduction of information which has either not previously been encountered or ignored. 
This inherently relies on differences between predictions and outcomes which may then lead 
to acknowledgment of a discrepancy between self-appraisals or expectations and actual 
outcomes. The findings of the present study have important implications for this particular 
aspect of treatment, as it suggests that non-negative feedback may be more readily 
incorporated to inform re-appraisals under certain conditions but external feedback for which 
there is a greater discrepancy (i.e., very positive feedback) may later undergo some degree of 
disqualification and be susceptible to further fluctuations. The current results also suggest 
that immediate re-appraisals in the short-term do not necessarily lead to reductions in anxiety 
for future tasks, which is consistent with findings from treatment studies that some level of 
cognitive preparation facilitates interpretation of objective feedback leading to reduced 
anxiety for future tasks (Harvey, Clark, Ehlers, & Rapee, 2000). 
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Consequently, socially anxious individuals may readily make state-based cognitive re- 
appraisals as a context dependent reaction to external information that is self-discrepant. 
However, when a novel situation presents new challenges, they may engage in a process of 
being drawn back to pre-existing self-representations once external information reduces in 
salience. This interpretation is consistent with clinical reports that early in treatment, patients 
believe conflicting evidence that their beliefs are not true on a rational (or cognitive) level, but 
do not hold such beliefs due to accompanying strong affective experiences. Indeed, clinicians 
have identified that failure to incorporate corrective information in treatment seeking 
individuals poses one of the more significant obstacles towards improvement (Heimberg and 
Becker, 2002). 
Given that the present study found that information about performance which contains 
equally positive and negative evaluations about specific aspects of performance is not 
interpreted negatively by socially anxious individuals, it could be that non-verbal information 
 and information presented during socio-evaluative events are more reliably interpreted in line 
with negative self-views because the focus on internal representations is particularly 
problematic in such contexts (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). As such, negative appraisals of 
ambiguous non-verbal behaviours for which there is greater opportunity to be influenced by 
internal self-relevant information remains an important goal for therapy. Considering the 
possibility that temporal factors and modality of ambiguous information being presented may 
differentially influence responses of socially anxious individuals, behavioural experiments 
may be helpful in increasing exposure to ambiguous information across different performance 
and/or interaction contexts. This approach reflects the aims of cognitive modification studies 
(e.g., Amir, Bomyea and Beard, 2010; Mobini et al., 2014) which explicitly train socially 
anxious individuals to make more benign interpretations of ambiguous social information. 
Thus far, reported findings show some promise of training to reduce cognitive vulnerability to  
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interpretive biases which lead to reduced anxiety for approaching socio-evaluative events in 
the near future. 
Finally, increased standards following success may not occur across all socio- 
evaluative situations, but rather contexts where individuals are highly motivated to ensure that 
positive evaluations are maintained, as negative evaluation following success may present as a 
setback in obtaining important social goals such as developing a friendship with an 
acquaintance. In such instances, the cost of negative evaluation following outcomes which 
were initially successful may be greater, particularly when goals are predominantly oriented 
towards avoiding disapproval rather than actively seeking approval (Wallace & Alden, 1997). 
 
4.1.8 Directions for Future Research 
 
At present, converging evidence from a wide range of studies rely on the key 
assumption that socially anxious individuals hold pre-dominantly negative self-views which 
result in affective, cognitive and behavioural consequences that are consistently worse than 
their non-anxious counterparts. Generally, access to and use of positive self-representations 
also held by socially anxious individuals has received less attention. Brewin (2006) proposed 
that successful treatment leads to greater accessibility of positive self-beliefs which are relied 
upon to inform approaches to challenging socio-evaluative situations, rather than direct 
alterations to negative self-beliefs per se. As such, it is important for future study designs to 
examine the effects of accessing such positive self-representations within ambiguous 
contexts. 
While the focus of previous studies has largely been on determining the nature of 
interpretive biases towards socially relevant information, future studies could shift to 
furthering understanding of how such biases could be attenuated, for example, by examining 
whether accessing positive self-representations may in fact attenuate negative interpretation  
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biases. Brozovich and Heimberg (2013) found that increasing the salience of negative self- 
representations with negative mental imagery exacerbated interpretive bias of ambiguous 
social scenarios which suggests that reducing the salience of these beliefs may potentially 
have effects in the opposite direction. 
Although socially anxious individuals may ultimately have long-term goals which are 
congruent with social success and/or approval, they may in fact revert to more self-protective 
strategies when situations are anticipated to be particularly challenging or they are provided 
with unexpected feedback which indicates that others may have potentially overestimated 
their social ability. Greater understanding of the nature of these state-based changes in goal- 
setting may further inform any concurrent fears of negative and/or positive evaluation. 
4.1.9 Conclusion 
The current study manipulated perceptions of performance via feedback, to examine 
its effects on changes to affective and cognitive outcomes in anticipation of a second speech 
task. Of particular interest were differences in responses to positive and ambiguous feedback 
between groups. Despite a number of limitations as previously outlined, the current study 
found that re-appraisals for predicted performance and ability occurred in line with 
moderately positive and very positive feedback in the SAD group, but did not have any effect 
on reducing anticipatory anxiety for the subsequent speech performance. In addition, the 
results indicated that socially anxious individuals tend to be influenced to a greater degree by 
external evaluations of performance, and are prone to further fluctuations in their re- 
appraisals in anticipating future tasks, particularly for feedback that is highly self-discrepant 
relative to initial self-appraisals of expectations. The results of the current study call for more 
careful investigation of interpretative biases towards different types of social information 
across distinct contexts deemed to be ambiguous, as previous studies may have not have 
sufficiently challenged the dominance of pre-existing negative self-representations. The  
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results of the current study also provide some evidence that objectively positive information 
undergoes some degree of disqualification in anticipating a future speech performance for 
socially anxious individuals, which has implications for cognitive models of SAD. 
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 Dr Maree Abbott (Research Supervisor) 
 
Ms. Shirley Chen (Research Student) 
 
Mackie Building K01 
The University of Sydney  
NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA 
Telephone:   +61 2 9351 2644 
Facsimile:  +61 2 9351 7328 
Email: 
maree.abbott@sydney.edu.au 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT 
Title: The nature of cognitions during speech 
 
(1) What is the study about? 
 The purpose of this study is to explore the nature of cognitions during a speech task. 
 
(2) Who is carrying out the study? 
The study is being conducted by Shirley Chen and will form the basis for the degree of 
Master of Science at The University of Sydney under the supervision of Dr Maree Abbott and 
A/Professor Caroline Hunt. 
 
(3) What does the study involve? 
Participants will be asked to participate in a clinical interview. They will them be asked to 
perform a 3-minute speech, and complete a series of questionnaires regarding anxiety and 
mood. The interview will be video recorded and you will be provided with feedback for your 
speech the following week. When you return for the second session, you will be asked to 
complete some questionnaires. 
 
(4) How much time will the study take? 
The interview will take approximately an hour to complete. The speech task and completion 
of questionnaires will take approximately half an hour. Participants will receive two hours of 
credit for participation when you return a week later to be debriefed and complete the 
additional questionnaires. Should you feel distressed following the first session and no 
longer wish to return for the follow-up session, you will be awarded full credit for the study. 
You can discuss any concerns or feelings of distress with the research student. If you report 
feeling distressed we will refer you to the Student Counselling Service and any other 
relevant services.  
  
(5) Can I withdraw from the study? 
Being in this study is completely voluntary as you are not under any obligation to consent. If 
you do consent to participating in the study, you can withdraw at any time without affecting 
your relationship with The University of Sydney. Should you arrive at the scheduled 
appointment but decide not to consent to participating, you will not be awarded any course 
credit. You may stop the interview at any time if you do not wish to continue, the video 
recording will be erased and the information provided will not be included in the study. If you 
start to feel uncomfortable or feel distressed at any point during the study, please inform the 
researcher. Non-completion of the interview or speech task will not result in any penalty or 
deduction of course credit and you will be awarded 1.5 course credits for your participation. 
However, you will not be able to return for the second session a week later. 
 
(6) Will anyone else know the results? 
All aspects of the study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only the 
researchers will have access to the data collected. A report of the study may be submitted 
for publication, but individual participants will not be identifiable in such a report. 
 
(7) Will the study benefit me? 
 Participants will be awarded course credit for participation in this study. 
 
(8) Can I tell other people about the study? 
It is important that you do not discuss the specific details of the research project with others 
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who may potentially participate in the study. The study will be completed in early 2015, after 
which you may discuss the study with other individuals. 
 
(9) What if I require further information? 
When you have read this information Shirley Chen will discuss it with you further and answer 
any questions you may have.  If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free 
to contact Shirley Chen (shirleyc@uni.sydney.edu.au) or Dr Maree Abbott on 9315 2644.    
 
 (10) Who can I talk to about the study if I feel like I have been emotionally affected by the      
study? 
Should you feel that you have been emotionally or psychologically affected by the study, 
please inform the research student before you leave. She will be able to discuss your 
concerns with you and refer you directly to appropriate services in the Student Counselling 
Service. You can contact the Sydney University Student Counselling Service on (02) 8627 
8433 or 8627 8437. They are located on Level 5 of the Jane Foss Russell Building G02, City 
Road (beside the Wentworth Building) and are open Monday to Friday from 9-5pm. You can 
find more information on their website: http://sydney.edu.au/current_students/counselling/.  
 
 (11) What if I have a complaint or concerns? 
 
Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can contact 
The Manager, Human Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on +61 2 8627 8176 
(Telephone); +61 2 8627 8177 (Facsimile) or ro.humanethics@sydney.edu.au (Email). 
 
This information sheet is for you to keep 
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School of Psychology 
Faculty of Science 
  
 ABN 15 211 513 464  
  Dr Maree Abbott (Research Supervisor) 
 
 Ms. Shirley Chen (Research Student) 
 
Mackie Building K01 
The University of Sydney  
NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA 
Telephone:   +61 2 9351 2644 
Facsimile:  +61 2 9351 7328 
Email: 
maree.abbott@sydney.edu.au 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
I, ......................................................, give consent to my participation in the research project 
 Name (please print) 
 
 
 
Title: The nature of cognitions during speech 
 
 
In giving my consent I acknowledge that: 
 
1. The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been explained to me, 
and any questions I have about the project have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 
 
2. I have read the Participant Information Statement and have been given the opportunity to 
discuss the information and my involvement in the project with the researcher/s. 
 
 
3. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without affecting my relationship 
with the researcher(s) or the University of Sydney now or in the future.  
 
 
4. I understand that my involvement is strictly confidential and no information about me will be 
used in any way that reveals my identity. 
 
 
5. I understand that being in this study is completely voluntary – I am not under any obligation 
to consent. 
 
 
6. I understand that I can stop the interview at any time if I do not wish to continue, the video 
recording will be erased and the information provided will not be included in the study. 
 
7. I consent to: 
 
Video-taping YES  NO  
 
 
 
Signed:  ............................................................................................................................................... 
 
Name:   ............................................................................................................................................... 
 
Date:   ............................................................................................................................................... 
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Appendix B 
 
1. Feedback Scripts 
Negative Feedback 
Positive Feedback 
Ambiguous Feedback 
 
2. Trait Measures 
Demographics Questionnaire 
Social Anxiety Interaction Scale (SIAS) 
Social Phobia Scale (SPS) 
Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE) 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales – Short Form (DASS-21) 
 
3. State Measures 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
State Anxiety Rating (SAR) 
Performance Questionnaire (PQ) 
Ability Questionnaire (AQ) 
Probability and Costs Questionnaire (PCQ) 
Expectations Questionnaire (EQ) 
Thoughts Questionnaire (TQ) 
Manipulation Check Questionnaire 
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Negative Feedback Condition  
 
Hi Shirley, 
 
Here is my feedback for your participant following their speech last week. 
You appeared to be fairly uncomfortable during your speech, and I noticed that you were 
flushed and trembled slightly at times. It may have been that you were unfamiliar with the 
topic you were speaking about, which led to some stuttering and um’ing and ahh’ing. 
Compared to the other speakers I saw, you appeared quite nervous, as you did not keep much 
eye contact. This made it somewhat difficult to remain interested in what you were saying. In 
my experience, your performance was not as polished or as clear as I would have expected for 
an undergraduate student. 
 
Kind regards, 
Jess 
 
 
 
Ambiguous Feedback Condition  
 
Hi Shirley, 
 
Here is my feedback for your participant following their speech last week. 
Overall your speech was generally sound. You appeared reasonably confident during your 
speech, but I could still see that you were somewhat uncomfortable. I noticed that you were a 
little flushed and trembled slightly at times. Nonetheless, I liked that you had a clear voice and 
maintained good eye contact. I did notice that there were times when you had a hard time 
finding the words that you were looking for, which lead to some slight stuttering. However, I 
was interested in what you had to say, and your performance was close to what I would have 
expected for an undergraduate student. 
 
Kind regards 
Jess 
 
 
 
Positive Feedback 
Hi Shirley, 
 
Here is my feedback for your participant following their speech last week. 
You appeared to be fairly comfortable during your speech and I noticed that you had a good 
posture and looked composed. You had a clear voice and spoke without any stuttering, um’ing 
or ahh’ing. Compared to the other speakers I saw, you did not appear nervous, and kept good 
eye contact throughout your speech. This made your speech interesting to listen to. In my 
experience, your performance was close to what I would have expected for an undergraduate 
student.  
 
Kind regards, 
Jess 
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Demographic Questionnaire 
 
 
 
1.   What is your gender? (please circle one) Male Female 
 
 
 
2.   What is your current age?    
 
 
 
3.   What is your current relationship status? (please circle one)  
Single Dating Committed Relationship 
Married Divorced/Separated Widowed 
 
 
4.   How many children do you have? (please circle one) 
 
None One Two Three Four or more 
 
 
5.   Do you identify as belonging to a particular ethnic group? (please circle one) Anglo Australian
 Indigenous Australian  Asian European
 Middle Eastern Other     
 
 
6.   Is English your first language? (please circle one) Yes, 
English is my first language 
No, I have spoken English for 10 years or more 
 
No, I have spoken English for less than 10 years 
 
 
 
7.   What year of tertiary education are you currently enrolled in? (please circle one)  
First year Second year Third year 
Fourth year Fifth year Sixth year or above 
 
 
8.   What is your current employment status? (please circle one)  
Employed full-time Employed part-time Retired 
Full-time student Full-time home duties Unemployed 
 
 
9.   What is your overall annual family income? (please circle one)  
Less than $20,000 $20,000 - $30,000 $30,000 - $40,000 
$40,000 - $50,000 $50,000 - $60,000 $60,000 - $70,000 
$70,000 - $80,000 more than $80,000                                 Prefer not to answer 
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SIAS 
 
 
For each question, please circle a number to indicate the degree to which you feel the 
statement is characteristic or true of you. The rating scale is as follows: 
 
 
0 = Not at all characteristic or true of me  3 = Very characteristic or true of me 
1 = Slightly characteristic or true of me  4 = Extremely characteristic or true of me 
2 = Moderately characteristic or true of me  
 
 
 Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
1. I get nervous if I have to      
 speak with someone in 
authority (teacher, boss, 
0 1 2 3 4 
 etc.).      
2. I have difficulty making 
eye- contact with others. 
0 1 2 3 4 
3.   I become tense if I have to 
talk about myself or my 0 1 2 3 4 
feelings. 
4.   I find difficulty mixing 
comfortably with the people 
I work with. 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
5.   I find it easy to make friends 
of my own age. 
0 1 2 3 4 
6.   I tense-up if I meet an 
acquaintance on the  
       street. 
0 1 2 3 4 
7.   When mixing socially, I am 
uncomfortable. 
0 1 2 3 4 
8.   I feel tense if I am alone 
with just one person. 
0 1 2 3 4 
9.   I am at ease meeting people 
at parties, etc. 
0 1 2 3 4 
10. I have difficulty talking 
with other people. 
0 1 2 3 4 
11. I find it easy to think of things 
to talk about. 
0 1 2 3 4 
12. I worry about expressing 
myself in case I appear 
awkward. 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. I find it difficult to disagree 0 1 2 3 4 
with another’s point of view. 
14. I have difficulty talking to an 
attractive person of the  0 1 2 3 4 
            opposite sex 
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Not at all Slightly Moderately  Very     Extremely 
 
15. I find myself worrying that I 
won’t know what to say in 
social situations. 
16. I am nervous mixing 
with people I don’t 
know well. 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
0 1 2 3 4 
17. I feel I’ll say something 
embarrassing when talking. 
0 1 2 3 4 
18. When mixing in a group, I 
find myself worrying I will be 
ignored. 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
19. I am tense mixing in a group. 0 1 2 3 4 
20. I am unsure whether to 
greet someone I know only 
slightly. 
        
0 1 2 3 4 
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SPS 
 
 
For each question, please circle a number to indicate the degree to which you feel the statement 
is characteristic or true of you. The rating scale is as follows: 
 
 
0 = Not at all characteristic or true of me  3 = Very characteristic or true of me 
1 = Slightly characteristic or true of me  4 = Extremely characteristic or true of me 
2 = Moderately characteristic or true of me 
 
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately  Very Extremely 
 
1.  I become anxious if I have 
to write in front of other 
people. 
2.  I become self-conscious 
when using public toilets. 
3.  I can suddenly become 
aware of my own voice and 
of others listening to me. 
4.  I get nervous that people 
are staring at me as I walk 
down the street. 
5.  I fear I may blush when I am 
with others. 
6.  I feel self-conscious if I have 
to enter a room where 
others are already seated. 
7.  I worry about shaking or 
trembling when I’m 
watched by other people. 
8.  I would get tense if I had to 
sit facing other people on a 
bus or a train. 
9.  I get panicky that others 
might see me faint or be 
sick or ill. 
10. I would find it difficult to 
drink something if in a 
group of people. 
11. It would make me feel self- 
conscious to eat in front of 
a stranger in a restaurant. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4
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 12. I am worried people will 
Not at all 
 
0 
Slightly 
 
1 
Moderately 
 
2 
Very 
 
3 
Extremely 
 
4 
think my behaviour odd.      
13. I would get tense if I had to 
carry a tray across a 
crowded cafeteria. 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
14. I worry I’ll lose control of 
myself in front of other 
people. 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
15. I worry I might do 
something to attract the 
attention of other people. 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
16. When in an elevator, I am 
tense if people look at me. 
0 1 2 3 4 
17. I can feel conspicuous 
standing in a line. 
0 1 2 3 4 
18. I can get tense when I speak 
in front of other people. 
0 1 2 3 4 
19. I worry my head will shake 
or nod in front of others. 
0 1 2 3 4 
   20. I feel awkward and tense if                  0                    1                      2                   3                   4 
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BNFE 
 
 
Read each of the following statements carefully and indicate how characteristic it is 
of you according to the following scale: 
 
1 = Not at all characteristic of me    2 = Slightly characteristic of  me 
3 = Moderately characteristic of me   4 = Very characteristic of me 
5 = Extremely characteristic of me 
 
 
 Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
1. I worry about what other      
 people will think of me even 
when I know it doesn't make 
1 2 3 4 5 
 any difference.      
2. I am unconcerned even if I      
 know people are forming an 
unfavourable impression of 
1 2 3 4 5 
 me.      
3. I am frequently afraid of 
other people noticing my 
shortcomings. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
4. I rarely worry about what 
kind of impression I am 
making on someone. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
5. I am afraid others will not 
approve of me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I am afraid that people will 
find fault with me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Other people's opinions of 
me do not bother me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. When I am talking to 
someone, I worry about 
what they may be thinking 
about me. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
9. I am usually worried about 
what kind of impression I 
make. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
10. If I know someone is judging 
me, it has little effect on me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Sometimes I think I am too 
concerned with what other 
people think of me. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
12. I often worry that I will say 1 2 3 4 5 
                             or do the wrong things. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
174 
 
 
DASS21  
 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much 
the statement applied to you over the past week.  There are no right or wrong answers.  
Do not spend too much time on any statement. 
 
The rating scale is as follows: 
 
0 Did not apply to me at all 
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2 Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
3 Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
 
 
1 
 
I found it hard to wind down 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
2 I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0 1 2 3 
3 I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all 0 1 2 3 
4 I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g., excessively rapid 
breathing, breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion) 
0 1 2 3 
5 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things 0 1 2 3 
6 I tended to over-react to situations 0 1 2 3 
7 I experienced trembling (e.g., in the hands) 0 1 2 3 
8 I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0 1 2 3 
9 I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make 
a fool of myself 
0 1 2 3 
10 I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0 1 2 3 
11 I found myself getting agitated 0 1 2 3 
12 I found it difficult to relax 0 1 2 3 
13 I felt down-hearted and blue 0 1 2 3 
14 I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with 
what I was doing 
0 1 2 3 
15 I felt I was close to panic 0 1 2 3 
16 I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0 1 2 3 
17 I felt I wasn't worth much as a person 0 1 2 3 
18 I felt that I was rather touchy 0 1 2 3 
19 I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical 
exertion (e.g., sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a 
beat) 
0 1 2 3 
20 I felt scared without any good reason 0 1 2 3 
21 I felt that life was meaningless 0 1 2 3 
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PANAS 
 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Please read each item and circle a number 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 which indicates how much the 
item applied to you during the speech. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too 
much time on any item 
 
The rating scale is as follows: 
 
1 Very slightly or not at all 
2 A little 
3 Moderately 
4 Quite a bit 
5 Extremely 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Interested 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
2 Distressed 1 2 3 4 5 
3 Excited 1 2 3 4 5 
4 Upset 1 2 3 4 5 
5 Strong 1 2 3 4 5 
6 Guilty 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Scared 1 2 3 4 5 
8 Hostile 1 2 3 4 5 
9 Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 
10 Proud 1 2 3 4 5 
11 Irritable 1 2 3 4 5 
12 Alert 1 2 3 4 5 
13 Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 
14 Inspired 1 2 3 4 5 
15 Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
16 Determined 1 2 3 4 5 
17 Attentive 1 2 3 4 5 
18 Jittery 1 2 3 4 5 
19 Active 1 2 3 4 5 
20 Afraid 1 2 3 4 5 
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SAR 
 
 
Please rate how you were feeling/felt during the speech, using the following rating scale: 
 
1 = Not at all 2 = Somewhat 3 = Moderately 
4 = A lot 5 = Extremely  
 
   
Not at all 
 
Somewhat 
 
Moderately 
 
A lot 
 
Extremely 
1. I felt nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I felt worried 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I felt like escaping/leaving 
the room 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I felt like looking away 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I felt embarrassed 1 2 3 4 5 
6. I felt shy 1 2 3 4 5 
7. I felt anxious 1 2 3 4 5 
8. I felt like stopping the speech 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I felt like hiding 
 
1 2 3   4    5 
10. I felt like turning my back to the 
camera 
 
1 2 3   4    5 
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PQ 
 
Instructions: 
 
We would like you to rate yourself on the features listed below, in regards to how you think you 
performed in the speech task. For each feature, please circle the appropriate number to indicate 
how you feel you performed. Your evaluation will remain confidential. 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
Not at all 
 
Slightly 
 
Moderately 
 
Much 
 
Very Much 
 
 
 
1. Content  was  unders tandable  0 1 2 3 4 
2.     Kept  eye  contac t  wi th  audience  
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
3. 
 
Stuttered 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
4. 
 
Had long pauses  (more  than  5  
seconds)  
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
        
5. 
 
Fidgeted 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
6. 
 
“Um”ed and “ah”ed 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
7. 
 
Had a clear voice 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
8. 
 
Trembled or shook 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
9. 
 
Sweated 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
10. 
 
Blushed 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
11. 
 
Face twitched 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
12. 
 
Voice quivered 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
13. 
 
Appeared confident 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
14. 
 
Appeared nervous 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
15. 
 
Kept the audience interested 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
16. 
 
Generally spoke well 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
17. 
 
Made a good impression 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
178 
 
 
 
 
AQ 
 
 
This questionnaire asks what you believe about your ability to meet the standards of the task. Please rate 
the following items according to how you truly perceive your ability to meet expectations. Your responses 
are completely confidential.  
Please use the following rating scale: 
 
            0        1   2        3   4 
    Not true at all                 Somewhat true            Moderately true                   Very true                    Extremely true 
 
 
 
1.  I am doubtful about my ability to meet the rater’s expectations. 0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 
2. I am confident in my ability to meet the rater’s expectations. 0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 
3. It is likely that my performance will be worse than what the rater 
expects.   0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 
4. I expect my performance will satisfy the rater’s expectations. 0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 
5. I will feel bad if my performance does not meet the rater’s 
expectations.  0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 
6. I am confident that my performance will hold the interest and 
attention of the rater.  0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 
7. It is likely that I will be more anxious than the rater expects.  0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 
8. It is likely my performance will be more boring than the rater 
expects. 0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 
9. I am concerned that my performance will fall short of the rater’s 
expectations. 0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 
10. I cannot meet the expectations set for this task.  0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 
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PCQ 
 
 
Over the next week, an experienced rater will watch the video of your speech. They will evaluate your 
performance and provide you with feedback about your ability. The following questionnaire asks about 
your reactions to possible judgements that the rater may make about your speech performance.  
Listed below are a number of possible judgements the rater may make about your speech. Please indicate 
how likely you think it is that the raters will make these judgments when they evaluate your speech. Please 
use the following rating scale:  
 
 
            0        1   2        3   4 
       Not at all                          Somewhat                     Moderately                         Very                             Extremely  
 
How likely is it that 
1.  The raters will think that you look anxious. 0 1  
2 3 4 
2. The raters will think your topic is boring.  0 1  
2 3 4 
3. The raters will think you are incompetent.    0 1  
2 3 4 
4. The raters will think you look silly. 0 1  
2 3 4 
5. The raters will think you are not very smart.   0 1  
2 3 4 
6. The raters will think you are unattractive. 0 1  
2 3 4 
7. The raters will think you generally speak badly.    0 1  
2 3 4 
 
You will receive feedback on the quality of your speech from the rater in a week from today. Now imagine 
that the raters actually provided you with the following feedback. Please rate how bad you would feel 
about this if it happened. Please use the following rating scale: 
 
 
            0        1   2        3   4 
       Not at all                          Somewhat                     Moderately                         Very                             Extremely  
 
 
How bad would it be for you if: 
1.  The raters thought that you looked anxious. 0 1  
2 3 4 
2. The raters thought your topic was boring.  0 1  
2 3 4 
3. The raters thought you were incompetent. 0 1  
2 3 4 
4. The raters thought you looked silly. 0 1  
2 3 4 
5. The raters thought you were not very smart.    0 1  
2 3 4 
6. The raters thought you were unattractive. 0 1  
2 3 4 
7. The raters thought you generally spoke badly.     0 1  
2 3 4 
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EQ 
 
 
This questionnaire is designed to assess your beliefs in relation to the rater’s expectations of your speech 
performance. Please rate the following items in terms of what you truly believe the rater expects of your 
performance. Your responses are completely confidential.  
The raters will not know anything about you or the purpose of the experiment.  
 
 
Please use the following rating scale 
            0        1   2        3   4 
    Not true at all                 Somewhat true            Moderately true                   Very true                    Extremely true 
 
 
 
 
 
1. The rater expects me to perform to the level of an experienced 
debater. 0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 
2. The rater expects my performance to be better than average. 0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 
3. The rater will expect my performance to meet a high standard.  0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 
4. The rater will expect much of my performance.  0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 
5. The rater will expect my speech to look professional.  0 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 
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TQ 
 
 
This questionnaire examines how often you have thought about various aspects of the speech task you 
completed last week. Some people will have had very few thoughts about the speech, whereas others 
may have thought about it more frequently.  Please read each of the statements below.  In relation to 
the speech, how often did the following thoughts go through your mind over the past week? 
 
Please use the following rating scale: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
Never 
 
Rarely 
 
Sometimes 
 
Often 
 
Very often 
     
 
1. I felt very anxious 0 1 2 3 4 
2. I made a lot of mistakes 0 1 2 3 4 
3. My performance was good 0 1 2 3 4 
4. I felt confident 0 1 2 3 4 
5. The investigators didn’t like me 0 1 2 3 4 
6. I looked nervous/anxious 0 1 2 3 4 
7. I handled the speech well 0 1 2 3 4 
8. My speech was really bad 0 1 2 3 4 
9. I made a fool of myself 0 1 2 3 4 
10. I enjoyed myself 0 1 2 3 4 
11. I always  do badly at this sort of thing 0 1 2 3 4 
12. I looked stupid 0 1 2 3 4 
13. It went very smoothly 0 1 2 3 4 
14. I felt very self-conscious 0 1 2 3 4 
15. I felt like a failure 0 1 2 3 4 
16. I looked self-assured 0 1 2 3 4 
17. I looked confident 0 1 2 3 4 
18. I felt awkward 0 1 2 3 4 
19. I was impressive 0 1 2 3 4 
20. My heart was pounding very fast 0 1 2 3 4 
21. I made a bad impression 0 1 2 3 4 
22. I wonder what the raters thought of my      
speech 
0 1 2 3 4 
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Experiment Evaluation Sheet 
 
You were just told that you would have to complete another 3-minute speech task. How much  
did you believe that this would actually happen at the time the instructions were given? 
 
 
      0          1       2       3                                4 
Not at all           Slightly believable    Moderately believable                  Very believable                  Extremely 
believable 
 
Prior to being told that you would complete another speech task, you were provided feedback  
regarding your performance in the previous speech task from last week. How believable did you  
find the feedback to be at the time it was given? 
 
      0          1       2       3                                4 
Not at all           Slightly believable    Moderately believable                  Very believable                  Extremely 
believable 
 
Did you have any suspicions regarding the research hypothesis? If yes, please provide details below. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Please rate how POSITIVE or NEGATIVE you found your feedback for your speech, where ratings to the 
right of ‘0’ indicate that the feedback was POSITIVE and ratings left of ‘0’ indicate that the feedback was 
negative.  
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
NEGATIVE                                                                                                                                  NEUTRAL                                                                                                                                    POSITIVE 
 
 
Please rate the CLARITY of the feedback you received for your speech, where higher ratings indicate that 
the feedback was CLEAR to you and lower ratings indicate that the feedback was UNCLEAR or 
AMBIGUOUS for you. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
UNCLEAR/AMBIGUOUS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      CLEAR/UNAMBIGUOUS                                                                               
 
 
Please rate the CONSISTENCY of the feedback you received for your speech, where higher ratings indicate 
that the feedback was CONSISTENT and lower ratings indicate that the feedback was INCONSISTENT or 
CONTRADICTORY. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
INCONSISTENT/       CONSISTENT/ 
CONTRADICTORY                                                                                                                                                                                            NON-CONTRADICTORY 
 
 
Please rate the extent to which feedback contained multiple meanings where higher ratings indicate that 
the feedback contained multiple meanings very much and lower ratings indicate that the feedback was 
did not contain multiple meanings. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
NONE                                                                                                                                       MODERATE                                                                                                                       VERY MUCH SO 
 
 
Please use a percentage to indicate your level of agreement with the independent rater who provided 
you with your feedback following your speech. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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Appendix C 
 
1. University of Sydney Ethical Approval for Research Letter 
2. Debrief Form  
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Debrief 
Title: The nature of cognitions during speech 
Description of Experiment: The aim of this experiment is to investigate how individuals who differ 
in levels of social anxiety experience feedback. In particular, how positive, negative and ambiguous 
feedback impact on one’s state anxiety, setting of standards for performance and expectations to 
attain such standards. Participants were assessed using the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for 
DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Di Nardo, Brown, & Barlow, 1994) to determine their clinical status. Those who 
met Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th edition) criteria for a principal 
diagnosis of Social Anxiety Disorder were included in the form of high social anxiety group, while 
those who do not meet criteria form a low social anxiety group. During the experiment, participants 
were asked to complete various questionnaires at different time points during the two sessions. 
Participants were provided with feedback which had previously been constructed and in fact were not 
provided based on the evaluations of an independent rater. Thus, your feedback did not actually 
correspond to your performance but was rather randomly allocated to you. The deception used to 
inform you that you needed to complete another speech task was included to directly observe the 
effects of the feedback you were provided on your subsequent anxiety, expectations and predictions.  
Please let me know if you have any questions after reading this debrief form.  
 
Please contact any of the following services if you would like to speak with someone about your 
worries or life stressors. 
University Counselling Service  (02) 8627 843 
USYD Psychology Clinic   (02) 9351 7328 
CRUFAD     (02) 8382 1408 
Lifeline     13 11 14 
University Doctor/Medical services  (02) 93513484 (Wentworth Building) 
(02) 935 14095 (Holme Building) 
Australian Psychological Society  www.psychology.org.au 
 
 
Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can contact The 
Manager, Human Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on +61 2 8627 8176 (Telephone); 
+61 2 8627 8177 (Facsimile) or ro.humanethics@sydney.edu.au (Email). 
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